ISSN 0971-9318

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

(JOURNAL OF HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION)
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, United Nations
Vol. 14 Nos. 1-2 January - June 2010

SIBERIA SPECIAL

Transportation Infrastructure in Siberia
Jatinder Khanna
National Self-Identification and Language Security in Siberia
Gritsko Maria
Image of Chinese Migrants in pre-Revolutionary Russia
Elina Dyatlova
Chinatowns in Siberia: Case Study of Irkutsk
Viktor I. Dyatlov
Soviet Policy towards the Buddhist Faith
Victor M. Mitypov
Intercultural Relations in the Baikal
Olga V. Buraeva
Administrative-Territorial Division of Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1937
E. Palkhaeva
Role of National Intelligentsia in the Formation of Self-Consciousness of the Buryats
Svetlana V. Baldano
Peculiarities of Socialist Industrialization in Buryatia
Marina N. Baldano
Social Changes in Buryatia in the post-Soviet Period
Konstantin.B. Mitupov
Relationship between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia
B. V. Bazarov

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Editor : ***K. WARIKOO***
Associate Guest Editor : ***MARINA BALDANO***
Assistant Editor : ***SHARAD K. SONI***
Sub Editor : ***MAHESH R. DEBATA***

© Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi.

* All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without first seeking the written permission of the publisher or due acknowledgement.
* The views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation.

SUBSCRIPTION

IN INDIA			
Single Copy (Individual)	:	Rs.	500.00
Annual (Individual)	:	Rs.	1000.00
Institutions & Libraries (Annual)	:	Rs.	1400.00
OVERSEAS (AIRMAIL)			
Single Copy	:	US $	30.00
		UK £	20.00
Annual (Individual)	:	US $	60.00
		UK £	40.00
Institutions & Libraries (Annual)	:	US $	100.00
		UK £	70.00

***Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* is indexed and abstracted in *Worldwide Political Science Abstracts* and *PAIS International*, CSA, USA**

Subscriptions should be sent by crossed cheque or bank draft in favour of ***HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION****, B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029 (India)*

Printed and published by Prof. K. Warikoo on behalf of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029. Distributed by Anamika Publishers & Distributors (P) Ltd, 4697/3, 21-A, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002. Printed at Nagri Printers, Delhi-110032.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Hridaya Kaul
New Delhi (India)

Prof. Harish Kapur
Professor Emeritus
Graduate Institute of
International Studies
Geneva (Switzerland)

Prof. Vitaly Naumkin
Director
Institute of Oriental Studies
Moscow (Russia)

Prof. Devendra Kaushik
Gurgaon, Haryana (India)

Dr. Lokesh Chandra
Director
International Academy of
Indian Culture
New Delhi (India)

Prof. Priyankar Upadhyaya
Director
Malaviya Centre for Peace
Research
Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi (India)

Prof. Muzaffar Olimov
Tajik Institute of Innovation
and Communication
Director
SHARQ Research Centre
Dushanbe, Tajikistan

Dr. Sanjyot Mehendale
Executive Director
Caucasus and Central Asia Program
University of California
Berkeley, USA

Prof. R. S. Yadav
Chairman
Department of Political Science
Kurukshetra University
Kurukshetra
Haryana (India)

Prof. Ganga Nath Jha
Chairperson
Centre for South, Central &
Southeast Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi (India)

CONTRIBUTORS

Prof. K. Warikoo is Director, Central Asian Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Prof. Marina Baldano is Head, Department of History, Ethnology and Sociology, Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Dr. Jatinder Khanna is a Delhi based researcher.

Dr. Gritsko Maria works at the Institute of Philology, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia

Dr. Victor I. Dyatlov is Professor at the Department of World History and International Relations, Irkutsk State University, and also Director of the Research Center "Inner Asia", Irkutsk, Russia.

Dr. Elina Dyatlova teachers at the Department of Service and Technologies of the Faculty of Service and Advertising, Irkutsk State University, Irkutsk, Russia.

Dr. Igor A. Arzumanov is Chief Manager, Research Center for Religion Studies, Chita State University, Russia.

Dr. Victor M. Mitypov is associated with the Ministry of Economics, Government of the Republic of Buryatia, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Prof. Olga V. Buraeva teachers at the Department of History, Ethnology and Sociology, Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Dr. Svetlana V. Vasiljeava teachers at the Department of Russian History, Buryat State University, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Dr. Elizaveta Palkhaeva is Associate Professor and Head of the Russian History Department, Buryat State University, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Dr. Svetlana V. Baldano is associated with the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Dr. K.B. Mitupov is Professor at the Buryat State University, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Prof. B.V. Bazarov is Director, Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan Ude, Russia.

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Vol. 14 Nos. 1-2 **January - June 2010**

CONTENTS

Editor's Page		**1-2**
Transportation Infrastructure in Siberia	*Jatinder Khanna*	3-15
Globalisation, National Self-Identification and Language Security in Siberia	*Gritsko Maria*	16-26
Trans-border Migrants and the Russian Society: Strategy and Practice of Mutual Adaptation	*Viktor I. Dyatlov*	27-33
Image of Chinese Migrants in pre-Revolutionary Russia	*Elina Dyatlova*	34-39
Chinatowns in Siberia : Case Study of Irkutsk	*Victor I. Dyatlov*	40-70
Philosophical and Legal Aspects of Confessional Tolerance in the Trans-Asian Context	*Igor A. Arzumanov*	71-80
Soviet Policy towards the Buddhist Faith	*Victor M. Mitypov*	81-85
Intercultural Relations in the Baikal	*Olga V. Buraeva*	86-90
The Role of Old Believers in the Baikal Region	*Svetlana V. Vasiljeava*	91-97
Administrative-Territorial Division of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1937	*E. Palkhaeva*	98-104

Peculiarities of Socialist Industrialization in Buryatia — *Marina N. Baldano* 105-111

Social Changes in Buryatia in the post-Soviet Period — *Konstantin.B. Mitupov* 112-116

Relationship between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia in the era of Globalization — *B. V. Bazarov* 117-124

HRCF File

Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India Report of Exhibition and Seminar (3-4 October 2007) 125-133

Editor's Page

Comprising the central and eastern parts of the Russian Federation, Siberia was incorporated in the Tsarist Russian empire during the 16th and 17th centuries. Geographically speaking, Siberia extends from the Urals in the west to mountainous ridges of the Okhotsk sea coast in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the borders of Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China, thus encompassing much of the Eurasian steppe. Broadly speaking, Siberia includes the federal subjects of the Siberian Federal District (Altai Krai, Altai Republic, Buryat Republic, Chita Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Republic of Khakassia, Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tuva Republic), some parts of Urals Federal District (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Kurgan Oblast, Tyumen Oblast) and Sakha (Yakutia) Republic of Far Eastern Federal District.

After the incorporation of Siberia in the Russian empire during the 16th and 17th centuries, Trans-Siberian Railway was constructed during the period 1861-1916 bringing the resource rich Siberia closer to the industrial towns of Russia. And after World War II, Baikal Amur Mainline railway was constructed. Whereas over one million prisoners were exiled to Siberia during the nineteenth century, several million settlers moved to Siberia from European parts of Russia, mainly during the quarter century before World War I. During the 17th to 19th centuries, Russian migrants to Siberia included hunters, fugitive peasants in search for life free of serfdom, fugitive convicts, Old Believers and Decembrists. On May 10, 1906, by the decree of the Tsar, agriculturists were granted the right to transfer to the Arabic Russia, thereby facilitating the settlement of few million Russians in Siberia. So much so between 1897 – 1914, the population of Siberia increased by 73 per cent and the area under cultivation doubled.

Though Siberia covers about 60 per cent of Russia's territory, it is sparsely populated with about three persons per square km. Apart from the indigenous population of Buryats, Yakuts, Tuvans, Siberian Tatars, Khakass, most Siberians are Russians, Cossacks, Russified Ukrainians and Germans. Besides few hundred thousand Chinese are reported to be living in the region, being engaged in trade and business. The Siberians have

several beliefs mainly being Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Shamanism besides the indigenous traditions and practices.

With its historical-cultural specificities, geocultural homogeneity stretching from the Urals to Vladivostok and abundant natural resources, Siberian region is poised to become an engine of Russia's future economic growth. Growing Russian economic and industrial investments in Siberia would further integrate this region with the mainstream both economically and politically. The rich oil, gas, timber and mineral resources of Siberia are waiting to be harnessed for the overall benefit of Russia. The recognition of Siberia as Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has triggered off major economic activity in the region. Siberia is going to be an important player due to the existence of trans-national routes, inter and intra-regional communication networks both within Russia and between Russian Far East and European markets. That the peoples of Siberia Buryatia, Chita, Irkutsk, Tuva, Altai, Urals etc. have distinctive historico-cultrual similarities with India due to common Buddhist religion and traditions, makes this region an important area of study.

It is in this context that the *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* started the publication of special issues devoted to Siberia or parts thereof. Buryatia and Khakassia special issues of this journal were brought out in 2007 and 2009, as part of academic collaboration with the East Siberia State Academy of Culture and Arts, Ulan Ude and Khakassia State University, Abakan respectively. This Siberia special issue which is a result of active collaboration with the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberia Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Ulan Ude, Russia, brings into focus various issues related to Siberian history, culture, society, migrations, politics and economy.

K. Warikoo

Transportation Infrastructure in Siberia

Jatinder Khanna

Transport lines are the arteries of economic life, greatly contributing to the economic growth and regional development of an area. Human, agricultural and industrial activities are dependent on the availability of transportation. Production, consumption and distribution activities aid the productive forces in a region. Thus for economic development and integration of an area, need for adequate transportation system is quite obvious. The greater the degree of specialization in different parts of the country, the more complicated the transport system should be. Transport is of utmost importance for the geographical division of labour and their participation in certain industries presupposes the possibility of mutual exchanges of produce. Economists, therefore, regard transportation and better communication as an important factor in development.

The speed and success of the economic development of Russia will depend on substantial expansion of transportation capacity in Siberian region. Siberia is the world's most critical region in terms of resource concentration. The whole region is extraordinarily rich in minerals, energy resources, hydropower and forests. Often referred to as the "Asian region of Russia", Siberia remains developmentally backward even while it serves as a resource appendage to the more prosperous "European Russia". Soviet planners realized the importance of the speedy exploitation of Siberia's natural endowments for regional economic development. Transportation is of particular importance for Siberia because of the following factors:

- Siberian territory is very vast with all the extremely dispersed and varied physical landscape;
- Exploitation of unevenly distributed mineral resources;
- For the provision of labour and capital to mineral rich areas;
- To sustain and develop human habitation in the region;

- For the proliferation and exchange of technical and managerial knowhow;
- To take the finished goods to the market areas;

Siberia covers a territory of 13,488,500 sq km. which comprises 7.5 per cent of the total territory on Earth. Siberia is a geographically large and administratively complex region of Russia. At the same time, the region has harsh climate. During winter, average temperature in Siberia ranges from -23°C to below -45°C. Paradoxically, it is a resource rich region with under-exploited resources and under-developed economy. Siberia is in many respects what geographer David Hooson would call Russia's "effective national territory," or its economic heartland- the region that produces a surplus relative to the size of its population and that essentially supports the rest of the country.[1] However, Siberia has long been a neglected resource-rich region due to its harsh climate. Today's Russia is banking on Siberia to become its shining star in energy arena. It wants to develop the vast yet economically impoverished region as a world supplier of natural gas, coal, petroleum and next generation renewable energy resources like hydropower. The Siberian region produces 30 percent of Russia's GDP. Siberia holds important energy resources, including 80 percent of Russia's proven natural gas reserves (or 30 percent of the global share), 75 percent of its oil (4 percent of global reserves), and 90 percent of its coal. Siberia generates more than 30 percent of all electric power in Russia. As the source of most of Russia's oil and natural gas, Siberia plays a major role in the country's modern but struggling market economy.[2]

Another related plan is to develop connections to the 'mainstream' world by way of transcontinental railway lines. This way it attempts to bring the market closer to the isolated Siberia. The Far East and Siberia of the Russian federation share border with five countries- Mongolia, China, North Korea, Japan, and the US. These countries are going to play a crucial role in shaping the future agenda of development in that region. Norwegian navigator F. Nansen, predicted Siberia to be the land of the future. A century after the prediction, Siberia still remains a swathe of landmass with abundant resources and emaciated demography both east and west of Lake Baikal.

The Siberian Challenge

The present system of transportation is not satisfactory to meet the needs of the Siberian economy. Territorial bickering with neighbors - Japan and

China jeopardized the prospects of regional cooperation for development of the region throughout the Soviet years. Prospects of Siberia's development show that its economy had been struggling with the gigantic railways and pipeline projects. The two parallel rail links - the Trans Siberian Railway built by the Tsar in the early 20th century and the Baikal Amur Railway built by the Soviets through the 1970s are the only surface connects for common masses to the region, with the mainland Russia.

The key challenge besides a harsh climate it faces is that the region is economically underdeveloped and scantily populated. Siberia and Far East today comprise of three-fourths of Russia's territory but have only one-sixth of its population. The Siberian territory is diverse when considering both physical-climatic features and its economic development. The present gap between the manpower resources of Siberia and its economic potential are really very large. The region possesses close geographical proximity to the extraordinary rich population and economically growing but relatively resource poor nations. As the report on guidelines for the economic and social development of Russia for 1986-1990 and for the period ending 2000 AD underlines, one of the most pressing territorial problems is to provide closer linkage between industrial location and available man power and material resources. This, however, is not quite easy to achieve as the resources and production assets are concentrated in European region of Russia, while the large fuel and raw material resources are waiting to be exploited in the wilderness of Siberia.

Transportation Infrastructure in Siberia

The absence of transportation infrastructure in the Siberian region has formed a vicious circle: resources are not utilized optimally because of lack of infrastructure and socio-economic development suffers because the resources are under-utilized. The lop-sided development of the region also manifests itself in the problem of inadequate transportation systems. 68.5% of public part of the railway network is located mostly in the European part of Russia (59,013 km) which accounts for only 25.2% of the total area of Russia. Yet only 31.5% of the network (27,138 km) is located in the vast expanse of the Asian part (Siberia and the Russian Far East) which accounts for 74.8% of the country's area. Consequently, the railway network's density in the European part of Russia is 13.7 km/1,000 sq. km as opposed to 2.1 km/1,000 sq. km of the Asian part.[3]

Since the late 19th century, the development of the Siberian section

was hampered by poor transportation links within the region as well as between Siberia and the rest of the country. The Czars of Russia especially were concerned that railways should connect their empire to the main strategic port of Vladivostok. The massive project of building the Trans-Siberian Railway network (TSR, *Òðàíññèáèðñêàÿ ìàãèñòðàëü*, Transsibirskaya Magistral in Russian) was taken up. Today the TSR consists of 22,000 miles of track across 7 time zones. The Imperial State Budget spent 1.455 billion rubles from 1891 to 1913 on the railway construction, a record expenditure which was surpassed only by the military budget in World War I. It is for this reason that many analysts contend that TSR was built due to political motivations at an enormous financial and human cost. The Trans-Siberian Railway remains the most important transportation link within Russia; around 30 per cent of Russian exports pass through this line.

There are 4 main routes on the Trans-Siberian Railway: the Trans-Siberian Line, Trans-Manchurian Line, the Trans-Mongolian Line and the Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM). There is also a southern Ural route from Moscow to Yekaterinberg via Kazan. Kazan is the capital of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan and hosts several heritage sights in Kazan.

The first spike of the railroad was laid by then Tsar Nicholas on 19 May 1891 at Vladivostok. Similar to the Transcontinental Railroad in the USA, Russian engineers started construction at both ends and worked towards the center. The Trans-Siberian Railway, completed in 1901, enabled millions of peasants to migrate over the Urals. The Trans-Siberian rail travels some 9,289 kms (about 6,000 miles) from Moscow to Vladivostok. Starting from Moscow or St. Petersburg, the railway pass through Suzdal famous for its onion domed churches, the industrial city of Perm, Yekaterinburg, Omsk with its 19th century buildings along Lyubinsky prospekt/Lenin Street, Novosibirsk with its railway museum, Tomsk, the oldest Russian city in Siberia with interesting wooden buildings, Krasnoyarsk close to the huge national nature reserve of Stolby. After this, the BAM line splits off to the north going to Vanino opposite Sakhalin Island Tayshet at Tayshet. The main Trans-Mongolian line going through Mongolia and onto Beijing splits off at Ulan-Ude. The Trans-Manchurian going through Harbin and Beijing splits off at Chita. From Tayshet to remote Sovetskaya Gavan, a port on the Strait of Tartary, most of which was built in 1944-1946, mainly by gulag prisoners, including German and Japanese prisoners of war, this line passes the northern Lake Baikal town

of Severobaikalsk and a ferry from the port city of Vanino takes to Sakhalin Island.

Map showing Major cities connected by Rail in Russia



Source: http://www.wildrussia.spb.ru/WRTrsib/Images/map_train_small2.JPG

Railways in the Siberia and Soviet Far-East



TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAYS AND MAJOR TRANSIT RAILWAYS IN RUSSIA



Source: http://www.transsib.ru/Map/transsib-passenger-eng.gif

The Trans-Siberian Railway is the main trans-continental Russian train that connects the European and Asian parts of Russia. A second primary route is the Trans-Manchurian, which coincides with the Trans-Siberian as far as Tarskaya. The third primary route is the Trans-Mongolian, which coincides with the Trans-Siberian as far as Ulan Ude on Lake Baikal's eastern shore. The 2,305 mile-long Baikal Amur Railway Baikalo-Amurskaya Magistral') is the fourth stream of the TSR. BAM runs about 380 to 480 miles north of and parallel with the Trans-Siberian Line.

The most famous project was Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM). It was planned simultaneously with the Trans-Siberian, but its construction which began just before the World War II, was put on hold during the war and was restarted. The route of the present-day BAM was first considered in the 1880s as an option for the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian railway. The engineers building the Trans-Siberian Railway thought of shortening its total length by 400 kms by routing it further north. In 1930s and 1940, a 180-kilometer section of the track was laid, but it was dismantled due to World War II and a vital railway near Stalingrad was laid. The 180-500 kilometer track laid in the north of the Trans-Siberian trunk line relieved the pressure of traffic on the Trans-

Siberian Railway, which carried nine percent of all freight moved by rail all over the world.

The BAM was intended to encourage the growth of number of industrial enterprises engaged mostly in processing high quality timber and mining copper and tin in this section. The project would open up the boundless riches that lay along its winding track, as it linked agricultural and mineral-rich areas. People would increasingly come to the almost unpopulated area. The first settlers would be the construction workers themselves, some of whom remained to work on the railways, while others would find employment in the enterprises of territorial industrial complexes.

The distinctive feature of the BAM was to join the zones or clusters of a variety of mineral deposits mainly of oil, gas, iron-ore and coal to promote comprehensive resource development through creation of Territorial Production Centres (TPCs). The pressing inescapable dependence of Soviet economy on Siberia's resources made BAM an important investment. However, the immensity of natural obstacles, huge construction costs and low level of indigenous technology put its construction beyond the realm of practicability. As TSR became closer to the USSR's border, the vast natural resources in Siberia became vulnerable to an attack by the hostile southern neighbour (China) and placed the construction of BAM as a priority Soviet project. The downside of this development was the ecological damage due to the low standards of production and excessive sizes of dams (the bigger projects were favoured by the industrial authorities and received more funding), and increased humidity sharpened the already hard climate.

The BAM route crosses seven mountain ranges, reaching up to 2,800 meters and 3,200 water courses, among them nine major rivers, including the Lena and the Amur, necessitating the construction of no less than 3,200 engineering structures-one for every kilometer of track, including 200 railway stations, 64 of which provide the starting point for full scale towns, 142 large bridges and 25 kilometers of tunnels. After policy shifts and sporadic constructions, BAM was finally declared complete in 1991. Till the mid-1990s BAM was one of Russia's least profitable railways. By then, the total cost of constructing the line had reached 14 billion US dollars. The BAM project has been criticized for myopic planning. Infrastructure and basic services like running water were often not in place when workers arrived. The abuse of alcohol was extremely high among workers and retention of labour became a challenge as workers

left after a year, when their contracts expired. At least 60 boomtowns developed around the route, but presently most of them are ghost towns. The building of the BAM has also been criticised for its complete lack of environmental protection.[4]

There were several unintended consequences of the BAM project. Centered on the issue of the polluting the Lake Baikal, Siberian environmental groups became some of the first organizations to challenge the Communist party's decisions openly. Indigenous peoples also protested against the damage to their environment in the autonomous regions.

At present, of the three main railroads the one running from Siberia westward, the TransSib - remains within the Russian territory. The other two (SredSib and YujSib) after the disintegration of former USSR are now located in the territory of the sovereign Kazakhstan. Moreover, the main TransSib trespasses Kazakhstan territory for short length along the Omsk-Ekaterinburg run (in the neighborhood of Petropavlovsk). The other TransSib travelling along this run (through Tyumen) is technically weaker. Among the most significant longitudinal lines there is Tyumen-Tobolsk-Surgut-Urengoi run, leading to the oil and gas bearing regions. Tomsk-Asino-Belyi Jar, Achinsk-Lesosibirsk, Jeleznogorsk-Ust Ilimsk runs give access to the main timber reserves areas. There are no western standard highways in Siberia as yet. Regular motor roads are with latitudinal way Tyumen-Omsk-Novosibirsk-Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk-UlanUde-Chita and down to Vladivostok. It runs for the most part along TransSib. The Chyujskii way - the backbone motor road in Altai mountains - runs from Bijsk down to Mongolia. The northern bound ways are of lower class. The development of national economy of Russia depends on the effectiveness and development of the transportation infrastructure in Siberian and Far East regions. There are several air passages laid over Siberia - Southern (along TransSib), Polar (along the Arctic coastline) and Meridianal (along Yenisei). Negotiations with foreign firms for joint ventures are conducted and work on reconstruction and building of airports and air terminals has been started in Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Chita, Barnaul, Kemerovo, Omsk and in other Siberian cities. A plan has been made by Vladimir Putin to upgrade and expand the Trans- Siberian rail-road to become the main transport route for the Eurasian continent. Various modes of transportation are being envisaged to link the Trans-Siberian rail-road to major existing or other transport arteries through Europe and Asia.

Baikal Amur Railway Mainline and Trans Siberian Railway

Historically, Trans Siberian Railway has been the backbone line in Eastern and, in particular, in Western Siberia.[5] As far as Siberia itself is concerned, its foreign economic connections were complicated by new circumstances after the disintegration of former USSR. Firstly, cargoes pass over the territories of the new sovereign states, with whom political and economic relations have not been finalised. And secondly, re-orientation to the seaports, of Russia, as Siberia might make use of, are beyond control of the neighboring countries (the former USSR republics). From a geopolitical perspective with the centre of global economic activity gradually shifting to Asia, the new routes would be effective for trade with Europe. Russia has declared its policy to endeavor to become a bridge between the East and West by planning massive development of transport infrastructure. Russia has been making a concerted effort to see that a large volume of Euro-Asian trade passes through its territory. It has been making major investments to upgrade its domestic transport infrastructure and is rapidly developing its ports along the Caspian Sea coast. The new port of Olya in Astrakhan is now operational and a railway track has been built to link it with Russia's well developed rail network that connects its Black Sea and Caspian Sea ports. The backbone of such continent-linking project is perceived to be the East-West axis of 10,000 km long Trans-Siberian Rail road. Russia plans to transform it into a communication corridor between Europe and Far East, linking it with a road with gas

lines, pipe lines and communication lines etc. Five corridors have been projected to fulfill the dream of new Eurasian land bridge.

The first will be the Northern corridor from Europe, via Trans-Siberian rail road to China, North and South Korea and Japan. The second one is the Transport Corridor (TRACECA) Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor from Eastern Europe via the Black and the Caspian Seas to Central Asia. The Central Corridor will run from Southern-Europe via Turkey, Iran and Central Asia to China. The Southern Corridor will run from southern Europe to Iran, as above, but reaches China via Pakistan, India and South East Asia. A North-South rail-ship corridor which goes from Northern Europe to Russia, crossing the Caspian Sea to Iran and via Iran's southern ports across the Arabian Sea to India is also envisaged. All these five corridors with their numerous branches form a 'Unified Network', providing the foundation for the development of a gigantic economic area of about 4 billion people.

THE FIVE MAIN CORRIDORS OF THE EURASIAN LAND BRIDGE

Source: IR's 1997 Special Report, *The Eurasian Land Bridge: The 'New Silk Road'-Locomotive for Worldwide Economic Development*

Over the last few years in the areas of these five main corridors numerous large scale transport, energy and water projects have been launched and several additional ones are planned. A positive turning point in the realization of the Eurasian development corridors occurred when Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in his speech at a Conference on Socio-Economic Development in Siberia in 2000:

> We can specify more than one reason that people in the Asia-Pacific area should choose transportation routes over Russia. These routes are shorter,

Land Bridge Corridor of Development



Source: Euro-Asian Transport Conference in St. Petersburg-Russia 12-13 September 2000. Also available in EIR's 1997 Special Report, *The Eurasian Land Bridge: The 'New Silk Road'-Locomotive for Worldwide Economic Development*

and not a little safer than the roundabout way by sea, as, for example, from Yokohama to Rotterdam. You can transport containers with the Trans-Siberian road to Europe, and they arrive in less than half the time . . . Perhaps a journey across Siberia would remind many people of the mind boggling natural wealth of Russia. Siberia has unimaginable natural resources and Russia has only just begun to really make use of them. We invite our friends from the Asia-Pacific region, to actively participate with us in this undertaking. Just now Russian firms are thinking about new markets for their products, while mining companies are seeking new methods for exploiting the mineral resources more effectively. One proof of this is the elaboration of extensive projects, such as, for example the creation of an energy bridge between Russia and Japan via Sakhalin and the construction of natural gas pipelines from the Tomsk region to the West China, and from Irkutsk to East China and beyond to North and South Korea.[6]

CHINA'S WEST EAST PIPELINE PROJECT AND PLANNED LINKS INTO RUSSIA



Source: EIR's 1997 Special Report, *The Eurasian Land Bridge: The 'New Silk Road' Locomotive for Worldwide Economic Development.*

During Vladimir Putin's visit to the Siberian Federal district in 2001 on his way from Tomsk to Omsk, he met with the heads of a number of federal agencies and the governors of regions crossed by the Trans-Siberian Railway to discuss government policies in regulating prices for services provided by natural monopolies as well as the future development of Siberia's transport infrastructure. Putin stressed the need to create favourable economic conditions for companies and individuals, stating that efficient price regulation policies are a key prerequisite for economic revival of the Russian Far East and Siberia. Putin underlined that the primary task is to provide for efficient development of natural monopolies while making sure the prices of their services remain affordable. He proposed that a single agency should be set up to administer all related issues. Back in Kremlin, Putin in his opening Remarks at a Meeting with the Cabinet Members on March 1, 2004 at the Kremlin acknowledged the mile-stones:

> I would like to thank all those who were involved in carrying out major projects in Siberia and Far East, such as building the road between Chita and Khabarovsk. In 1903, Russia built the Trans-Siberian Railway, and now, a century later, we have completed the first motorway linking the west and east of the country. This is a big event in our country's life, but

we must not forget that our work does not stop here and that we still have a lot to do to bring this road up to world standards. I think that the Government's plans in this respect and other plans for developing the infrastructure in the Far East should be our priority.

Conclusion

Siberia being a resource rich and a region of great potential evolved as an economic hub. Banking on its resource strengths, the region if developed optimally could help in solving energy problems of the region. The Siberian region possesses close geographical proximity to the economically and strategically important countries. Developmental barriers in the region are being solved by augmenting the region's energy resource utilization. Furthermore, Siberia's locational strengths are being slowly harnessed to be developed as a transport and trade corridor.

References

1. In an article in the *Geographical Journal* in 1962 and then subsequently in a monograph titled *The New Soviet Heartland*, Hooson argued that the heartland extends from Middle Volga to lake Baikal: "The fundamental fact is that it is the repository for most of the accessible resources of energy and raw materials upon which growth of Soviet industrial, military and political power in the world ultimately depends. This situation itself might justify the use of the word 'heartland' taking heart to be the vital generating part of a system, in this case the Soviet State."
2. Peter Cornelius and Jonathan Story (2007), "China and Global Energy Markets", *Orbis*, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 5-20
3. The CD-ROM Land Resources of Russia, developed by IIASA & RAS accessed at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/russia_cd/acknow.htm
4. V. L Mote (1985), "A Visit to the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the New Amur-Yakutsk Rail Project", *Soviet. Geography*, Vol. 26, pp. 691-716.
5. M. Bandman, V. Malov and T. Esikova, "Some Economic Geography", [Online: web] Accessed 2 Dec.2004 URL: http://www.fplib.org/partners/siberia/eco_bus/f1_1.html#other
6. Jonathan Tannenbaum (2001), Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) accessed at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/economy/phys_econ/landbridge_update1101.html

Globalisation, National Self-Identification and Language Security in Siberia

Gritsko Maria

Studying the problems of language security and preservation of national and cultural identity under the conditions of modern globalisation is both ambiguous and promising. Globalisation as a natural-historical process of world structuring, universalisation of diverse communications and relations in the human activity is in the meantime the destructive factor for national identity. Uneven development and insufficient possibilities of the people to find a place in transnational economic and political space and global culture lead to the crisis of self-identity, difficulties in the dialogue of cultures and nationalist upsurge. One understands national identity as the essence to what the person, social group, the people correlate themselves, what they connect themselves to and feel sovereign and independent. The basis of such national self-identification shown at the level of interaction of the nations among themselves (national self-consciousness), as well as at a personal level (ethnic self-identification of the person), are the national culture and national language expressing this culture.

Financial and economic crisis which has engulfed the world, has exposed the vulnerability and instability of the world order and global inter-dependence. However, even in such extreme conditions ethnic foundations remain firm. This fact testifies to their highest principles of reality in human life, than any "creations" of human activity.

Language (or languages) and its problems have become not only means of communication, but also the components of global civilisation. Nowadays language is the means and the tool of globalisation and, simultaneously, a symbol of sovereign historical civilisations. Language of each ethnos has its original features expressing uniqueness of the people.

The general language environment in which the common national-cultural symbols, attitudes, mythologies reflecting the collective mentality are fixed and stored over centuries, is one of the basic components of the phenomenon of ethnicity. According to F. Hekkmann, "ethnicity is an indicator of real mutual relations at both the individual and collective levels, characterising the groups of people connected among themselves by the same ideas about genetic relationship and cultural-linguistic community, possessing collective historical experience." During the period of acceleration, aggravation and "polarity" of globalisation such a characteristic of ethnoses – is a guarantee of their stable existence, and at the same time a source of both large and small conflicts. Therefore the "washing out" of the language basis of the state sovereignties – is a direct threat to the security of the states.

The characteristic feature of a modern geopolitical reality is a great number of national conflicts caused by extreme aspirations of nationalistic character. They are peculiar to many countries in which national minorities historically, and also under recent post-war geopolitical repartitions, consider themselves oppressed, suppressed by the dominating majority of the titular nationality of the state. As such, the struggle for national and language independence, extreme forms of activity of nationalist groups, "flashpoints" of geopolitical relations develop. There arises the possibility of intervention of other states or the interference of military-political blocks in the internal affairs of the states having the national minorities who are dissatisfied with their position. Thus the correctness of struggle of national minorities for sovereignty, and some negative sides of this struggle are ambiguously interpreted by the world community and its "block structures." The latter is one of the major reasons of international instability, where interests of different states based on various factors and intentions, their military-political unions, religious-geographical civilisations clash.

From 3,000 various ethnic groups existing in the modern world, 280 groups seeing the possibilities to get the sovereignty according to the Charter of the United Nations would like to leave the state to which they now belong. The requirements of 70 of these groups have already become the reason of armed confrontations in the member states of the United Nations. The most representative examples during the present historical period are the examples of Yugoslavia (the Serbs - the Albanians – the Macedonians), Spain (the Basques), Sri Lanka (the Tamils), Belgium (the Flemish), Great Britain (the Irish, Scottish), Turkey (the Kurds), Iraq, Republic of South Africa, Indonesia, Commonwealth of Independent States

– number of countries, where problems of nationalist ambitions, including the linguistic one, lead to stressful life and can be sometimes the detonators for big international shocks.

It may be mentioned that the nationalistic struggle does not cease sometimes for years, it can take cruel terrorist forms at times. Therein it is similar to religious opposition in which a religious group is attached to some linguistic distinction. This struggle is to the greatest degree independent and belongs to the area of the weakest influence of the international organizations and international law. Basically the nationalistic displays are not the internal matters of the state as during the period of the unipolar globalisation all forms of internal struggle in various countries are subordinated, supported and sometimes inspired by the most developed players.

In the Russian Federation, as well as in many other countries, the issues of preserving national cultures during multi-dimensional process of world globalization and about their interaction with the world dominating (often polarized), hybrid and average mass culture (pretending to replace national cultures) are of current interest. Languages in these processes are the form of conservation of national originality and sovereignty. In the national cultures bound by centuries-old coexistence in one state, much in common is available; all that forms an all-Russia originality, multilateral and integrated, possessing the unified and many-sided mentality, reflected in the unified state Russian language and in the languages of the people inhabiting Russia.

New problems, linguistic in form but not only linguistic in content have come to the fore in the territory of the former USSR after its disintegration in 1991. The population of Russia, according to census of 2000, is 142.2 million people. Besides Russians making 79.8 per cent of the population, over 180 other nationalities live in the country, speaking more than 100 languages and dialects. In such multinational state as Russia, the question of a unified state language is of great importance. Undoubtedly languages of the people of the Russian Federation are legislatively under the protection of the state and have status of national property. Moreover the state takes measures for their maintenance and development. Nevertheless, status of the Russian language as unified state language is the fundamental factor for communication, unity and integrity of the state.

Sustainable development of the unified state Russian language throughout the last century (especially during the Soviet period) and the

interaction with languages of the people of Russia can be emphasized as one of the achievements of the language policy. Cultural exchange and variety in the country were in every possible way supported by the state and represented the priorities of the national policy. However, after disintegration of the USSR, there has been sharp decline in interest in Russia and its language from former Soviet Republics, as well as from our distant neighbours mainly due to the loss of international status of the country. By 1990, there were 350 million Russian speaking people in the world. In 2005 this number was reduced to 278 million people. According to the forecasts, by 2015 the number of Russian speaking people will have been reduced to 212 million, and by 2025 to 152 million. Russian language is the only one leading world language that has been losing its position throughout the last 15 years. The next 20 years will retain this tendency, if proper attention is not given to the state language policy particularly to linguistic security which can strengthen positions of the Russian language inside the country and all over the world.[3] It should be noted that strengthening of language position is not the matter of only state linguistic strategy and policy, it is an integrated process of all aspects of the state activity, its regional structures and public organizations.

Global communication and cultural contacts between the peoples outside and inside the country, growing tendency to preserve the originality of the peoples, use of this tendency in geopolitical struggle lead to an actual problem of linguistic security. Linguistic security implies the maintenance of preservation and development of sovereign viability of the state, economic, social, ethnic or cultural-historical profile of the countries.

In its socio-linguistic aspect, linguistic security means a series of measures for realisation of the positive linguistic processes, neutralisation of the threatening linguistic processes and their transformation into the positive ones, and also the prevention and liquidation of the dangerous linguistic processes. Such popular terms in the modern linguistic literature as – language planning, language human rights, language tolerance, language variation, language revival, linguistic culturology, linguistic protectionism, socio-linguistics, language competency, speech competency, language variety, linguistic policy, linguistic development, linguistic self-identification, linguistic quality of languages, linguistic methodology, language ecology, language hierarchy - are the positive socio-linguistic processes reflecting positive tendencies in the development and interaction of languages. They promote intensive cultural and political communication

between the peoples. However, many linguistic processes can have both positive and negative development. The latter depends on the course and degree of usage of languages in the general situation of mutual relations between the language speakers.

The processes in a menacing linguistic situation, capable to lead to intrastate complications or cause tension in relations between different states, are characterised by such terms as language globalisation, language homogenisation, linguistic ethno-centralism, language unipolarity, linguistic nationalism, linguistic ethno-chauvinism (title and subject), linguistic separatism, ethno-linguistic separatism, language manipulation, pseudo-linguistics.

As an example of "linguistic nationalism", which means struggle for recognition of one of the national languages predominating over existing languages in the country, one may cite the linguistic situation in India. Numerous attempts to create a standard national language in the polyethnic state, in the territory of which there are 24 languages, do not have clear result till now. Inspite of the considerable usage of Hindi as an official and intermediate language in the country, English is still used as an official language of management, policy, education and in all other traditional communication spheres in spite of the fact that the English language in India is spoken only by 2 per cent of the population.

The dangerous socio-linguistic processes can threaten the state national sovereignty and lead to international political conflicts. Extreme stages of the dangerous socio-linguistic processes can be - linguistic racism, linguistic mutiny, linguistic terrorism, linguistic aggression and language war. In Ukraine, for example, where about 60 per cent of the population speak Russian, this language, nevertheless, has the status of language of national minorities and is actively superseded from the sphere of daily and business dialogue, education and history. In such a situation, linguistic ethno-chauvinism is focused not only on the linguistic infringement of the Russian-speaking people, but it is real linguistic racism when the political elite in every possible way carries out a policy of eradication of the Russian language for the purpose of further aggravation of political relations with Russia. As a rule, such actions are supported or inspired by the third forces pursuing their own interests under the flag of globalisation.

In the conditions of accelerating globalising processes a socio-linguistic aspect (which is at the same time a state-political aspect) of researching the cultural self-identification of the people of Russia, and, in particular, Siberia, is especially important, as languages are the major form of

preservation of national cultures and national originality, and the unified state language acts as one of the pillars of sovereignty.

The Siberian region of Russia (Siberian Federal district) can serve as an object of studying this problem from the aspect of national self-identification. The Siberian region evokes enormous interest due to its geographical position, huge territory, its historical importance for Russia, natural-resource base, developed economy and science, intercontinental transport possibilities, basis of economic, political and socio-cultural contacts for the neighbouring states on the post-Soviet space and to the countries of South East Asia. "The development of self-identity in the regions, territorially located at the historical crossroad of cultures, always has particular specificity.[1]

Russia's "fast growth" with Siberia took place through several centuries – starting from the earliest explorers who discovered Siberia and contributed to it becoming a part of Russia. Later on, for centuries Siberia served as a supplier of natural resources and provisions, as a place of exile for "dissident" population. It was through Siberia that the Far East was opened up, the historical consolidation of Russia took place in the Pacific coast, which in many respects made Russia a world power. The Trans-Siberian Railway, later on Turkistan-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea routes linked together Siberia with the Far-East and Central Asia, and brought the Russian influence into these regions.

The opening up of natural resources in the Urals, Kuzbass, the western Siberia and Yakutiya and drawing them into the economic turnover put Siberia into one of the leading places in the country particularly in the development of energy, metallurgical and industrial potential as a whole. At present, the new potentialities of Siberia as a supplier of energy resources to China, the countries of South East Asia and Europe are being revealed, which are the important geopolitical factors.

Natural resources of Siberia are considered as objects of external or internal expansion incompatible with the sovereignty of Russia. For example, there is the potential of geopolitical struggle for hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic region which may become more accessible in the coming years due to the global warming. Besides, Russia has a vast border along Siberia with Central Asia, as well as with Mongolia and China.

Thus it is important to investigate identity problems in this region which is territorially located on the crossroads of cultures and civilisations. The Russian Siberian multinational self-identity generated on the crossroads of western and eastern civilisations, is significant field of research from

the point of view of linguistic, ethno-religious, political, social and economic, historical criteria. Along with the research of traditional aspects of preservation of self-identification of nationalities of Siberia it is important to look at the problem through the prism of interaction of a unified state language and the languages of nationalities of Siberia, and thereby analyse the problems of their linguistic security.

As a part of the Siberian Federal District only (the population of which makes 20.06 million people, but the territory is 30 per cent of the territory of whole Russia) there are 12 subjects of Russian Federation. Four of them have national language identification except for the nation-wide Russian language (in the Altai republic the Russian and Altai languages have equal rights in usage; in Tuva, Khakassia and Buryatia republics the Tuvan, Khakass and Buryat languages have the status of official languages along with the Russian language).

Federal subjects of the Siberian Federal District

1. Altai Republic 2. Altai Krai, 3. Buryatia Republic, 4. Zabaykalsky Krai, 5. Irkutsk Oblast, 6. Khakassia Republic, 7. Kemerovo Oblast, 8. Krasnoyarsk Krai, 9. Novosibirsk Oblast, 10. Omsk Oblast, 11. Tomsk Oblast, 12. Tuva Republic

Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberian_Federal_District

According to the data of the All-Russian population census of 2002, the national structure of the population of the Siberian Federal district is as following: the Russians (87.38 %), Buryats (2.13 %), the rest being Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, Tuvinians, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, Khakases, Altais, Chuvashis, Azerbaijanians, Armenians and others.

Siberian Federal District: National Structure (%) of the population and the residing territory

Nationalities (%)	Their Residing Territory
Russians (87.38)	All subjects of the Siberian Federal District
Buryats (2.13)	Zabaykalsky Krai, Buryatia Republic, Irkutsk Oblast
Ukrainians (1.86)	All subjects of the Siberian Federal District
Germans (1.54)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai, Buryatia Republic, Khakassia Republic, Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast
Tatars (1.26)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai, Buryatia Republic, Irkutsk Oblast, Khakassia Republic, Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast
Tuvinians (1.20)	Tuva Republic
Kazakhs (0.62)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast
Belorussians (0.41)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai, Buryatia Republic, Khakassia Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast
Khakases (0.36)	Khakassia Republic
Altai (0.33)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai
Chuvashes (0.31)	Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Omsk Oblast
Azerbaijani (0.30)	Altai Republic, Buryatia Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast
Armenians (0.30)	Altai Republic, Altai Krai, Buryatia Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast

Despite the small number of indigenous peoples of Siberia in comparison with Russian population in the republics of the Siberian Federal district issues of teaching, preservation and development of ethnic languages are more often raised. Doubts over the domination of unified state Russian language in all public spheres are publicly aired and that can lead to conflict situations and splash of the ethno-linguistic separatism.

The absence of attention to the problem of linguistic security weakens

efficiency of the language policy forming language and cultural hierarchy, thus leaving space for the disintegration processes and even the attempts to replace and displace Russian language. In other words - nature abhors a vacuum (in Russian interpretation – Holy place is never empty). The languages of native minorities under the pretext of protection of their ethnic languages can "rise" against the state language and stir up interethnic hostility. As a rule, requirements of the language sovereignty involve the symbiosis of ethnoses, finally concentrating on political aspirations. Thus political aspirations for sometime can be hidden (what is called language manipulation), and the language sovereignty, because of its great appeal to masses, can play the role of trigger mechanism.

Today the socio-linguistic processes proceeding in areas inhabited by Siberian ethnic groups need to be analyzed poorly, as these have the potential of posing a threat to linguistic security. The available facts of political life today show weakening of economic and cultural contacts between the nationalities of Siberia. Moreover for some Siberian ethnos like Buryatiya, Tuva that live territorially far from the central European part of the country and so they are close to China and Mongolia in the ethno-cultural sense, there is the presence of nationalist-separatist tendencies of ethnic elite. For example, the massive migration of Russians from Tuva in the early 1990s was the result of it.

By no means it is impossible to ignore the native minorities of the North living in Siberia. Now scientific and cultural elite of northern peoples have united to form the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and have close active cultural and spiritual cooperation with foreign countries, which play up disintegrative ideologies. Consequently the historically developed realities are broken, the unreal dreams and projects are supported, a growing intensity between the Siberian Russian ethnos and the North ethnoses arises.

Numerous researches often state uncertain position of Russian population in the republics and the autonomous regions of the Russian Federation. The sovereignization of national republics resists the strengthening of Russian sovereignty; this contradiction is clearly evident in the North Caucasus, especially in the Chechen Republic, and also in Bashkiria, Tatarstan and Yakutia (Sakha). In the territory of Siberian Federal District, similar situation is observed in the republic of Tuva. As stated by Sokolovsky, "it is rather probable that in the near future in these former autonomous republics there will be a sharp problem of protection of the rights of Russians as national minority."

Nowadays there is a gradual movement from the euphoria of "freedom" to the real problems of coexistence, economic and cultural development in the national-state formations which have received sovereignty on the post-Soviet territory. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Yakutia (Sakha), Tatarstan, Bashkiristan the appeals "to put an end to Russian once and for all" and "readiness for any actions for the blessing of the people" were originally issued. Now there is a more responsible estimation of their language situation - an understanding that national languages are not ready and for a long time will not be ready to replace Russian in all spheres of its usage. In the national languages there are no semantic concepts, terms (as well as dictionaries, textbooks) which are accumulated in Russian, and which can reflect history, the present, connection to the world culture universally, and represent a product of the same globalisation. Today the generations of teachers, managers, leaders who have been studying in Russian still work. Simultaneously, the possibilities not only of bilingualism, but also multilingualism are widely open. For all that, time and reasonable approach are required.

For almost 20 years, in the territory of post-Soviet Russia there were some ethno-political conflicts, including use of weapons, military operations, millions of refugees. Ethno-linguistic clash leads to collision of interests of separate groups or clans clearly in such conditions, a number of ethnic groups and their languages remain unsatisfied. In these cases the unifying function was carried out by Russian language, and the preservation of ethnolinguistic identity was guaranteed by the uniform state. According to the present ground situation an unreasonable attitude of the ethno-linguistic elite of creates potential threat of new conflicts.

Gradual turn of public opinion of the post-Soviet states shows an understanding to maintain the generality of history. At a new modern level, the understanding of the Eurasian union of the Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet periods has come. Thus the Eurasian space includes territories, the states and the people from the Ukraine and Byelorussia to Kurils, and from the Polar region to the branches of Tien Shan and Pamir. The common basis and core of this union is Russian, Russian-speaking culture, that have mentioned the variety of language and cultural world of Eurasia.

In the given aspect, socio-linguistic and "pure linguistic" researches comprise something more for the state and its peoples, than the simple description of language situations in various territories. Essentially linguistic methods investigate world problems, problems of relations between civilisations, "polarity" of the world. Problem of linguistic security is a

reflection of the problems of external and internal policy, economy, culture, historical state and social development. It concerns the interaction of languages and cultures inside Russia as well as relations of Russia with its near and far neighbours, partners and competitors.

Reference

1. E.G. Vodichev and M.I. Gritsko, Linguistic Security and Self-identification in the Global World, In *Siberia in Focus*, Kolkata, 2007.

Trans-border Migrants and the Russian Society

Strategy and Practice of Mutual Adaptation

Viktor I. Dyatlov

Principal novelty of modern migratory situation in Russia consists not simply in the formation of mass trans-border streams of labor migrants and in rapid and dynamic increase of this process. The essence of the problem lays in the unprecedented high role of this factor in the economic, ethno-cultural, social, political and also geopolitical spheres. If Russia turns into a country of migrants, it will completely change its characteristics.

Simultaneously between migrants and an accepting society a huge conflict and tension is being built up along the following lines: ethno-cultural distinctions; contrast between urban and rural cultures; between modern (individualistic, industrial-urban) and traditional (community) models of social behavior, regulation, and control. In real life (and in the peoples' perception), all this is inter-related and follows one another. Two latter factors are often perceived and estimated through a prism of ethno-cultural distinctions. And as up to now the society is dominated by primordial ideas about ethnicity, such distinctions are also understood to be insuperable.

In the conditions when mass inflow of other cultural migrants is inevitable – and the conflict characteristics of this process are inevitable– drawing up a process of management strategy assumes importance. The purpose of such a strategy is to form a situation when a variety would not threaten basic values of all parties that participate in the process and, what is not less important, would not be perceived by them as a threat. In the first place, this assumes mutual adaptation. Without this the migrants will not realize their migratory expectations, and the accepting society will not feel secure. In the most common sense, adaptation includes

naturalization, i.e., bringing of maximum number of migrants into a legal space; acculturation, or familiarizing of migrants with norms and values of the accepting society; accustoming of an accepting society to migrants and to cultural variety as a norm.

In many respects, success depends on a level and character of satisfaction of migrants' adaptable needs. A migrant urgently needs in getting status in the host society (citizenship, residence permit, accommodation, registration, sanction to work, etc.); safety; links (entering a complex web of connections, networks and relations in the accepting society is an indispensable pledge for business success and gaining of a social status); information. This is necessary for:

1. maintenance of the migratory traffic (from decision-making to go up to arrangement in the new place);
2. making of conditions for effective economic activities;
3. maintenance of relations with the historical native land (from remittance and support to the families up to an opportunity to be buried in the native ground);
4. decision of sociocultural and household problems (from necessity to master language, customs, traditions, norms, behavior, clothes, etc. of the accepting society, and up to keeping and reproducing of own identity, maintaining a native language, customs, norms, manners).

Experience has shown that it is impossible to solve these most complicated problems by means of a migrant's individual efforts. There should be a system or a mechanism of safety and intermediary and information-consulting services. The strategy of diasporalixation appeared to be the principal way to finding of such a mechanism.

In the most common form it can be defined as follows: forming of migrants' communities with well developed and effective economic and social networks, mechanisms of mutual support, cooperation, and control. One believes that a diaspora is not just dispersion or staying of the representatives of a certain ethnic group outside their "national center" as a national minority. Then inevitably the question arises: what is an ethnic group, who are its representatives and why, and what is ethnicity in general. Diaspora as a special type of human mutual relations, is a specific system of formal and informal connections, vital strategies, and practices that are based on commonness of exodus from "the historical native land" (or ideas, historical memory and myths about such an

exodus), on efforts to maintain a way of life "in dispersion" – as a national minority in the other-ethnic accepting society. A diaspora is not an apriority, its being (or not-being), coming, and disappearance can be a situational answer to a call of time, place and circumstances. Proceeding from such an approach, one has to agree that presence of a set of persons of one nationality who live outside their national center means not a diaspora, but only a necessary condition to its realization. In other words, same people, or a set of these people, can be or can not be a diaspora.

At present, one watches not just the growing number of migrants: the very type of a migrant, his motivations, mode and style of his life, adaptable opportunities and resources are changing. A migrant of this wave and this type requires a system of group support, a network of family, clan, and ethnic relations, than it was during the Soviet period. All these factors considerably increase the importance of ethnicity and national self-identification. They are constructing diasporal mind and give a powerful spur to building of diasporas. Previously existing structures and networks on ethnic basis are getting wider, and their importance as a resource for survival, for business and social success is changing radically.

These groups (as groups namely) are coming into being in consciousness, both own and others'. Both new migrants and old residents, whom the Soviet power attributed to this or that ethnic group and who felt their connection with this group in a large or lesser degree, begin to feel themselves as a group. In certain situations they behave as members of a group and build a network of relations and connections on the ethnic basis. Using modern terminology, they are *positioning* themselves in such a quality. Proceeding from such an understanding one can speak about diasporas as a new element of social life. A radical shift takes place: from presence of the ethnic minorities' representatives to their structurization, formation of communities with their institutions, active workers, looking for niches, formulating collective (or on behalf of a collective) aims.

Migrants are building formal and informal communities and organizations, which, besides other functions, promote their getting accustomed to the social space of Russian cities. Such networks satisfy migrants' demand for their basic needs in another society: safety, information, relations, infrastructure of accommodation and activities.

From centuries-old experience about world-wide phenomenon of "trading minorities" it is known that communality is the major resource of their economic success. The role of this factor in the adaptation process is a more difficult and ambivalent question. On the one hand, the very

fact of economic success for a labor migrant is simultaneously an indicator of successful adaptation and a pledge for further advance on this way. Diasporal infrastructure, networks and mechanisms of mutual support can become and are becoming the instruments for integration of migrants in the host society.

On the other hand, various intermediary and consulting services, help in primary adaptation of migrants are realized by means of *informal structures* – family, fellow-countrymen and clan. They help a migrant-beginner to find work, house, to solve very difficult problems with registration and legalization, to come into contact with "necessary people". In business sphere such services are of special value. An opportunity "to solve questions" at the level of officials, representatives of law enforcement bodies and local underworld is a pledge not for success simply, but for the very existence of business.

This infrastructure is of complex and multilayered character, its bigger part is informal and not seen from outside. Relatives, neighbors, fellow countrymen are making the networks, which spread information, give support and distribute resources. The networks are the basis for functioning of "patron-client" relations, for business partnerships; criminal structures are tightly connected to them. The markets, which combine management subjects' functions and trading places with functions of social organisms, are the important 'unit' of these networks.

National-cultural societies (NCS) are an open, legally registered, and recognized by the authorities. Though by their charters and definition the primary goal of these societies is to maintain and develop national cultures, customs and languages, in practice all these aims often are a minor task. Real (and highly estimated) activity is concentrated in the sphere of interaction with authorities, intermediary of different kind, rendering a complex of vital services in this sphere to compatriots.

As the active workers and leaders of NCS say, the migrants resort to their help in solving of status problems, primary arrangement, for regulation of different problems of relations with authorities. NCSs also act as an instrument of mutual support in the difficult or extreme situations. In a case of sudden death of their members or simply fellow countrymen in some NCSs, it is accepted to bear all expenses and organizational efforts on sending of a body home. Formal or informal leaders of NCSs are those influential and often rich people, who possess important ties in the city. Protection from them is a big resource for a beginner, and through NCS it is possible to contact them directly.

What is the interest of these powerful people, what makes them to spend big money and even more expensive time for the work in NCS? Moreover, to fight for leadership in these non-governmental organizations? The reasons are different and numerous. Naturally, this is satisfaction of normal aspiration to leadership, prestige, and social recognition. Besides, leading positions in NCS and help to its rank-and-file members allows building relations with them on a "patron-client" principle. This is a significant social and economic resource. Ever bigger resource is high status in the city community, a recognized place in its hierarchy, direct contacts with the authorities and an opportunity, speaking modern bureaucratic language, "to solve questions".

It's a typical situation when leaders and activists of national-cultural societies lobby in the corridors of power the interests of the groups and separate persons they represent. They undertake public relations campaigns in the local mass-media and make general political statements. Some of them gradually enter the local establishment as regular national leaders.

Leadership in NCS allows being in direct contact with the authorities of the exodus states. The new independent states, especially in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and their ruling elites aspire to supervise corresponding diasporas in order to use their financial and human resources for nation-building and in the struggle for power. According to some estimation, up to a quarter of Azerbaijan electorate live in Russia; it's not difficult to understand, how much important is this fact for the elites in Azerbaijan.

Besides, those leaders who have already integrated into the local community are terribly interested in the greatest possible control over migrants-beginners to supervise their behavior. Conscious or more often irresponsible infringement of norms and rules of the host society creates negative reputation for the whole ethnic group and causes serious problems for those compatriots who permanently stay in this city.

All the system is functioning within the framework of market relations and is its integral part. Therefore the services that are rendered in its frameworks are not free. But the price is sought not only in money. The main payment is submission, entering the system of immutable obligations and clientele dependence.

This results in forming of the communal core, in a less degree concerning people of one language and culture, and in a higher degree dealing with the mechanism of social domination, control, and submission.

It has its own laws, mechanisms of their exercising, and a system of sanctions. Community and communal solidarity can function both as a mechanism of mutual support and the control, and as a weapon in the struggle for resources in the host society. They possess huge mobilization potentials.

To conclude, one would confidently estimate the diasporal strategy of migrants' adaptation as quite successful and effective. But simultaneously this strategy is a source of the current problems and conflict situations. Diasporalization can bring to formation of certain firm "cores" that will be impenetrable for the outsiders. This is a precondition for "chrysalization" of migrants within the framework of their communities. In its turn, this can result in reducing their aspiration to integrate into the host society socially and culturally. The best illustration for such a situation is a most bright and widely spread example of China-towns. A hypothesis arises that such a community formation is closed from the host society not only due to its sociocultural and ethnic traits, but also due to its essentially other type of social relations, regulations and power. Formation of a community core in the atomized and individualistic society inevitably brings far-reaching and constant contacts and interaction between two different and probably incompatible types of social organization. This implies existence of multiple mechanisms in the regulation of human behavior, different ways of life, different systems of values and world outlook. The character of such coexistence can be described metaphorically as a city with right-hand traffic on some streets and with left-hand traffic on the others.

The most natural result of such interaction is the city of Kondopoga. In pre-revolutionary Russia the host society in many respects was or still is community based, and that is why any community formation could organically build in the typologically similar communitarian society (a ghetto model). On the contrary, in modern Russia tearing away and conflict are inevitable. Modern market, industrial, and individualistic society is ready to accept ethnic and cultural variety, moreover, such a society is often capable of supporting and developing this variety within the framework of multiculturalism strategy. But it will hardly accept and integrate a communal type of social organization, power, and behavior regulations.

In such a situation for the purposes of integration of the migrants the society is to propose a special strategy, which allows avoiding the communalist danger. This strategy is to be aimed at "interception" or

assignment of the function, which consists in maintenance of adaptable needs of the migrants. It means that such an infrastructure is to be created, which would promote personal and individual adapting of migrants to the accepting society. And this will allow a migrant not to pay a high price of his/her freedom for the diasporal and community resource.

For the present such a strategy doesn't exist and perhaps, there is not even rational demand for it. But its some probable elements are already slightly seen. First of all, this is a special role of school and the whole education system in general. This potentially mighty tool being rationally used, the system of educational institutes can become both the infrastructure of selection, recruiting and migrants' traffic, and the mechanism of their integration. And this integration will be both ethno-cultural and social.

The level of present-day economic demand makes the society to understand, how important is to convert a spontaneous migratory process into a regulated one. In this sense the regulation doesn't imply administrative restrictions that were, are, and will be, numerous and have proved their complete futility, at least in the Russian situation. The situation makes it urgent that the infrastructure of recruiting, traffic and adaptation of the labor migrants is to be organized and sponsored by the host society and its authorities, and consequently on the conditions and public norms of the latter. In the nearest future, the balance of stability and conflict in the country will probably depend on how quickly and effectively this demand will be embodied in a complex of political decisions, legislative activity, institutional development, and inter-relation practices.

Image of Chinese Migrants in pre-Revolutionary Russia

Elina Dyatlova

Inspite of growing internationalization of world economic process, and a tendency to standardize rules of international business co-operation and norms of business ethics, the national features of running business still continue to play a major role in business communications. Therefore, awareness of business culture and national features of partners plays an important role in the field of international business cooperation.

This paper explores the situation of business-partnership of the Russian and Chinese businessmen. This case becomes complicated because of extremely limited contacts between the Russians and Chinese during the period 1960-80s, when mutual apprehension and perceptions were formed under the influence of the state ideology. However, since 1990 the flow of Chinese migrants to Russia, who already were an important factor in the economic life of Siberia and the Far East, has increased. Most of them were busy in the fields of trade and enterprise. According to experts, economic development of the eastern regions will be related to China as a partner in the following next years. There is a counter migratory flow. Many Russians live in China constantly or for long duration for business due to personal reasons. Most of them learn with great pleasure cultural pecularity of China, features of relationship, business and everyday life. Many would like to continue to stay in China, to connect life with it.

Therefore, it is necessary to form mutual understanding and tolerance at the level of intergroup and personal contacts, including informative exchange of cultural features of partners. Thus, both the logic of development of international business and socio-economic features of development of regions of Siberia and Far East, call for a study of national business cultures, including the Chinese one.

Business culture can be defined as a system of relations, shown in norms, values and knowledge. These three base elements usually interlace in the whole – the attitude towards the object of value. The attitude usually exists in the form of appearance, it's often stereotyped. Stereotype is a simplified, steady image of socially meaningful object. It arises because of a comparatively limited past experience, as a result of aspiration to make conclusions based on limited information. Stereotypes are a necessary element, including business co-operation, especially in its first stage. The mutual stereotypes of business-partners are based on more wide stereotypes of a representative of another country.

The attitude towards following objects forms business culture as a system and includes: business itself and the personality; other people (workers, partners, consumers, suppliers); the state as society, its representatives, laws, public opinion, that is a general theoretical scheme of business culture, the so-called "skeleton" overgrowing with the "flesh" of social forms in real life such as traditions, rules, rituals, etiquette and habits of a concrete socio-cultural situation.

The national features of business cultures are shown up strongly in the situations of cross-cultural contacts which are often reasons for misunderstanding, hostility, negative attitute. These are situations where the most obvious distinctions in the business cultures of contacting countries are unsealed. These distinctions reflect particularly in social stereotypes.

The subject of our research is the reflection of features of business culture of Chinese migrants in pre-revolutionary Russia in the consciousness of Russians. Our hypothesis is that business culture possesses a strong inheritance, its process of development is based on the maintainance of succession. It is, therefore, possible to suppose that the stereotype of the Chinese merchant in pre-revolutionary and modern Russia has some similar features, regardless of large temporal distance and break in contacts.

Not going into the details and complete description of business culture of the Chinese merchants, we will look into those cases which found reflections in memoirs, documents, memorandums of our compatriots of that time. These papers caught their eyes, surprised, and somewhere even struck them with the originality and unlikeness in usual Russian realities. However, these obvious differences, reflected in stereotypes usually were cultural barriers, hampering communication, reasons of watchfulness and negativism from the side of Russian population.

In the middle of 19th century, the Russian society was faced with a

completely new phenomenon. The expansion of the empire and the process of economic mastery of eastern regions brought in the mass influx of Chinese migrants and formation of the Chinese diaspora. The image of the Chinese changed for the inhabitants of Russia from mythical character with the halo of inscrutability and mystery, existing out of reach, far from a commonness (on the well-aimed remark of one of pre-revolutionary authors, character "from tea labels") to a real person one can deal with every day. That is how the problem of cultural "recognition" and arranging of relations appeared.

Admission of unbelievable vitality and competitiveness of the Chinese business enterprises is marked in all pre-revolutionary literature. Some authors considered the industrial and commercial competition of Chinese as "more threatening, than their army and fleet." Therefore, it's not surprising to find these authors underlining factors, describing the Chinese merchants as the "aliens". Qualities of Chinese as merchants were highly estimated. The Chinese merchants are "resourceful, industrious, prudent, exact and bold", contrasting strongly with the "immobile" Russian merchants, who lacked initiative. They have the "ability of gaining all favourable conditions for the increase of benefits in the trade turnovers." "Majority of the Chinese were remarkable for energy, enterprise, nimble", "special skill... in trade", for "nimbleness and resourcefulness in a commercial sphere." They are described as bright, sly and it "provides success for them in the trade sphere."

Often the innate being was a priori implied in character of these "enterprise" qualities. "Chinese possess high innate qualities of merchants, they are merchants by nature." "Adding industriousness, endurance, sobriety and more than modest requirements for vital necessities to special propensity and ability of Chinese to trade, easy to clarify that for Europeans competition with them is pointless."

Striking loyalty was especially marked by the word. "An agreement for the Chinese is very important. It's really inviolable and obligations are carried out to the end by both parties." Sometimes dishonest Russian businessmen used this circumstance and lack of ability of most Chinese to read in Russian, giving any texts written with the calligraphic handwriting: from a poem line to a postal receipt instead of delivery contracts and debentures.

There is a lot of mention about violation of laws. Especially often they are about the use of the system of dummies. The Chinese shops sold forbidden hashish and opium. The import of contraband commodities,

avoiding payment of duties and taxes was a widespread practice, reducing expenses on trade. Many Chinese merchants, especially petty ones, traded without getting official permission and paying taxes, (illegally, in fact), profiting out of lack of control by the administration. There were situations, when the police came to the shop for collecting tax or penalty, the owner was declared to have left. A penalty was not effected and he continued business under another name or assuming the role of a simple worker. Cases of deception, economic enslavement of so-called *inorodcev* (aliens) - natives of region, whose occupation was hunting, were common practice.

On the whole, the opinion that Chinese were honest and decent in running business prevailed. Contemporaries were struck by the "utter original character" of organization of trade, foremost, excessive state of workers in shops. It was explained by the principle of collectivism and united efforts. Collectivism had the economic hidden motive, they saved together a small capital, rented a suitable apartment, and bought commodities. Often relatives were partners. Collectivism wasn't built on equality of rights but on principle of strict hierarchy. This was one of the basic principles in providing high competitiveness of Chinese trade.

Principle of participation was followed in the distribution of income. Vitality of the Chinese trade firms was determined by offering the workers to be shareholders, pretending to be comradely trade associations. As a rule, a worker in a trading Chinese firm did not get a salary. The owner kept him and he could get a share on business in 2-4 years being zealous, bright and honest.

It eliminated any possibility of running business dishonestly and intentionally in a loss for the owner. Once found indulging in dishonesty, the worker was retired from a firm and could not get another place to work. No firm, even on another end of empire or abroad, accepted a worker without recommendation which was carefully checked up. As every participant in such trade equated the prosperity with success of the trade business, he aspired to have more income with the least expenses. An exceptional competitiveness was explained by well-organized merchant association, solidarity, corporate spirit, which united all Chinese abroad, who ensured solidarity of actions at the market. It allowed an average Chinese merchant to win in comparison to Russian in acquisition of wholesale consignments, receipt of credit etc. Large concerns supported smaller ones by a credit, forming ramified networks. The Chinese beneficiary associations and trade companies were created for consolidation of forces at the market.

The Chinese merchants found different ways of fighting against a commercial risk. For example, they invested in a few enterprises. As a result, the wide system of the mutual credit, which linked all trading Chinese, was formed. The Chinese shops, especially small and middle ones, were literally saturated with a national colour. A coloured linen signboard, painted with the brilliant Chinese hieroglyphs, was hung out on a shop, a name catching the eye was invented. The "fattest of partners, having moustaches and long nails" sat on the honoured place before the counter for advertising – and the shop prospered." Most of the Chinese shops have been described in this way by the contemporary accounts. Chinese aimed to make the names of the companies "talking", giving positive, advertising business. The Chinese merchants aimed to minimize overhead costs for the shop, renting small apartments, without spending money on building shops, storages, on expensive property insurance and advertising.

Possibility of low prices was explained by an unpretentiousness and utterly low level of requirements. The Chinese merchants lived on the territory of the Far-Eastern areas of Russia as large groups without families and had the cheapest food and clothes. Overhead costs on the maintenance of the state were minimal because workers in the Chinese firms were often the relatives of owners, participating in business, getting an insignificant salary, slept often straight in trade apartments, ate cheap products.

The Chinese were distinguished by working for the rapid commodity and money turn. They were satisfied with the most "insignificant" percentage of profit in order to turn the invested capital quicker and more frequently. The Chinese sold the commodities on 10 to 12 per cent cheaper than other trade enterprises as they were satisfied with much less income than the Europeans. Sometimes the commodity was sold at a price lower than it had been purchased, if there was a possibility to buy another commodity which would sell hundredfold thus covering the losses.

Chinese lived densely, sufficiently isolated from a local population, by communities with their internal self-government. They lived on their own laws, practically not submitting to Russian administration. All this promoted the creation of public organizations, self-government, institution of mutual responsibility.

Cartel solidarity was considerable support for the Chinese in stranger, unfriendly surroundings. The members of cartel helped each other.This mutual solidarity was typical for the associations of the Chinese workers, Chinese merchants, translators, etc. There was the developed

infrastructure, oriented exceptionally for internal consumption. The Chinese settlements were a "little corner of the Podnebesnaya empire with their own customs and habits, with the shops, bath-houses, theatres and public meetings, kharchevkami, gaming-houses and beer houses."

Inspite of the fact that Chinese migrants grew roots in Russia, they did not loose connections with their motherland, family communities, staying a "casual, alien element" in economic and cultural relations. They lived isolated and practically didn't integrate in the Russian society, saving their cultural distinctness and remaining for the local Russian population as "aliens" - people of "quite another planet." The Chinese merchants did not aim to settle in Russia forever but to stay here temporarily.

Both human and professional vices of the Chinese were also watched out. However, there wasn't very much. It was specially marked that "they don't drink much even on holidays", they weren't lazy as Russians, but they smoked opium and were incredibly reckless in playing for money. Excitement isn't only a human vice but also a professional one because all the fortune went down in a moment in the game what destroyed business relationships and connections.

The attitude of the Russian society and authorities towards the Chinese was determined by the complexity of factors. First, that they were feared. It wasn't surprising as a mass influx of immigrants in regions recently joined and scarcely populated with Russians, posed a real danger to the territorial integrity of Russia. Far East, thus, became economically dependent on Chinese labour force, commodities and services.The Russian businessmen saw that there wasn't any possibility to win such a powerful competitor as Chinese merchant. Second, another reason for fear was the fact that one Chinese represented the image of a threatening neighbour – multi-million China. But at the same time, everybody understood perfectly, that there wouldn't be any economic development and even the existence of region without the Chinese.

These difficult relations, mixing the feeling of dependence and hostility, formed the abstract appearance of a Chinese. It consisted of a supercilious attitude towards him as to the representative of a lower race, an industrious man, simple, sly, insidious. The Chinese were reserved, nobody was admitted in their internal world and in the company, they were a clan, helping each other.All these qualities, including industriousness and mutual help, are coloured in negative emotional tones as belonging to a strong and dangerous competitor.

Chinatowns in Siberia

Case Study of Irkutsk

Victor I. Dyatlov

The current status of migration in Russia is unique due to massive cross-border labor migration flows and its swift and persistent dynamics. The problem lies essentially in the unprecedented increase in the role of migration as a factor in economic, ethno-cultural, social and political spheres of life and, potentially, in geopolitics[1] . Russia is steadily being converted into the country of immigrants, and this process is likely to bring a radical turning point in its development.

Migration from China is particularly important, taking into account its potential abundance, low population and development of near-border regions in Siberia and the Far East, the remoteness of such regions from the country's centre, and the fact that such migrants are backed up by billion plus population of China, i.e. the country which is growing into a superpower. The concerns and fears triggered by such circumstances are too important to be ignored.

Contacts and communication among the people of different cultures are ordinary issues of everyday life. Migrants and immigrants not only provide the vitally required manpower, they are subjects of foreign or strange culture, language, mode and lifestyle, manners of behavior, other concepts of granted and admissible, other systems of bans and taboos, and other mechanisms of social controls. As a consequence, both the Russian society which receives the migrants and the migrants themselves while adjusting to the host society constantly face social and cultural challenges. Firstly, it is challenging to mutually respect 'extreme' cultural values, whose rejection may be regarded by each of the parties as a threat to its identity. Secondly, mutually tolerant forms of interaction have to be developed so that mutually unacceptable behavioral standards can be eliminated.

Thirdly, the receiving society is openly challenged by the need to recognize social practices employed by the migrants and diasporas in their economic activities which do not contradict with the current legislation, while the migrants and the diasporas are expected and have to adopt and follow the standards established in the receiving society.

Such challenges are inevitably associated with tremendous cultural shock. Problematic, contradictory and conflicting issues are already arising. The Russian society is generally worried and is fearful of the phenomena which are often described as 'invasion' or 'expansion' of immigrants. And a complex of *'whoever arrived in numbers here!'* is a verbalization of one of the most common responses of the receiving Russian society to such migration which is absolutely new to it. This response is quite tough due to its mass character, 'justification ability' and non-reflected primitiveness. It has already been stereotyped,[2] so that it does not simply reflect, but also significantly influence the current situation. These fears and intolerance have a direct impact on the state, its structures, officials and representatives, thus affecting the development and implementation of the state policies.

One of such 'stress centers' is defined as *Chinatown*. In the mass psyche of Russian citizens, migrants from China are typically viewed as those concentrating in separate city districts to become segregated both socially and territorially. Such a concept is permanently discussed by mass media, mentioned in official and unofficial resolutions of statesmen and politicians of various ranks, and exists in the visions of common people. In its turn, this concept gives grounds for developing various political and geopolitical constructions and assessing the consequences of Chinese migration for the receiving society. In some cases, such constructions can make a direct impact on decision making in relation to important political and managerial issues.

This paper seeks to analyze expectations and fears associated with *Chinatowns*. It also attempts at considering whether *Chinatowns* are emerging in the cities of Russia, and to which extent and by what means their foundation is manifested.

Our research is based on the concept that, due to a number of reasons, currently in Russia there is nothing which could be similar to *Chinatowns* in many cities worldwide. To found a *Chinatown* is considerably complicated in Russia, though individual nuclei / possible embryos / potential foci are in place. They are represented not only by compact residential places, but are also manifested through economic activities, social relations and networks which are concentrated in terms of territory.

Typically, these are places wherein the Chinese migrants are clustered for life, work, leisure and inter-communal activities. These are areas wherein the networks, relations and structures begin to emerge and to enhance their development. In this respect, 'Chinese' lodges and hotels and 'Chinese' markets provide most direct evidences.

Our case study of a Chinese market in Irkutsk is one of the ways to consider mechanisms of such a nucleus. This place is locally known as *Shanghai* or *Shanghaika*. Similar to other markets, it has evolved from a trading area to a complex social organism, an assembly of social relations and networks, including those based on ethnic factors.

Researching Chinese markets in modern Russian cities has its independent value. However, despite a highly important role played by small wholesale markets, in general, and ethnically distinguished markets, in particular, in the everyday city life in 1990s and in the early 2000s, they have not actually become objects of research yet. With changes in the social and economic life of the nation, their role is also changing. Thus there are grounds to consider them as 'a slipping-away model' or a phenomenon which will soon become possible to represent only by reconstruction rather than by description (which is already the case in terms of some markets' parameters).

The reason for choosing the market in Irkutsk as a subject of research is simple – I have been monitoring its development since its first months of existence, i.e. for over 13 years. Some research results have been published.[3] Unfortunately, any similar studies of markets in other cities are not known to me. Rare exceptions in this respect are two small yet highly informative essays about the Chinese market in Ussurijsk (Far East of Russia)[4] . It can be assumed that its environment and status may reflect processes which typically take place throughout the country. However, such a conclusion can be justified only after similar results of studies conducted in other cities and regions become available.

The second influx by the Chinese migrants in Russia commenced in late 1980s and early 1990s producing a shocking effect on the local population. The memory and experience of contacts with migrants of the first, pre-revolutionary wave were completely lost during the Soviet era. Thus the issue was interpreted and assessed as a purely new one. Quite indicative is the fact that almost immediately forecasts were drawn that in the nearest future the Chinese migrants will start establishing permanent compact settlements, i.e., *Chinatowns*. Numerous mass media reports, letters from readers, declarations of politicians and state officials claimed

that Irkutsk (or any other city in the eastern Russia) would "very soon become a *Chinatown*"[5]. Judging from their stylistics, such a vision was mainly supported by anticipations or directly verbalized points of view that since Chinese are abundant, they will soon be numerous here, in this city and/or in Russia as a whole. In most cases, these forecasts did not imply any compact Chinese settlements. A possibility of *Chinese-style conversion* of the state, region or city was implied. This is why anecdotes of the Soviet period were often quoted, such as *'we (Chinese) will penetrate into Russia in small groups, each consisting of a hundred thousand men'*, and *'a loaf of bread will cost a few yuans'*. By and large, an issue of compact Chinese settlements was also discussed. It should be noted that the genre of such discussions always evolved from forecasting to ascertaining facts.

It is often claimed, as if it is a self-evident axiomatic phenomenon, that the compact Chinese settlements have been already established in Siberia and the Far East. In the past, such statements were made not only by journalists, but also by high ranking officials, politicians, experts and scientists. And they still keep saying so. It should be noted that such concepts and visions are enhanced with distance from the Far East and Siberia, whereas names and/or descriptions of such settlements are actually lacking.

The above stated point of view seems to have stemmed from the book published in 1994 by experts - L. L. Rubakovsky, O. D. Zakharova and V. V. Mindogulov[6] as it was the first book about Chinese migration in modern Russia. Their key idea was the following: *"Having huge territorial claims to Russia, China stimulates in all ways its citizens' penetration into its territory and establishing a base for legal residence. Concurrently, economic activity of Chinese people brings tremendous profits… Regardless of forms and channels, the major goal of the Chinese penetration into Russia is to integrate into economic activities, to procure real estate and land, i.e. establishing economic and lawful prerequisites for the legal takeover of the territory…Though most of the immigrants from China to the Far East of Russia are not legally admitted today, the existing system of penetration provides for their settlement and legalization"*[7].

The key word here is 'settlement'. The book gives statistics of the Chinese migrants who are claimed to have settled in the Far East, such as 52, 000 to 55,000 in the Primorsky Krai, 28,500 to 30,000 in the Khabarovsk Krai, 14,000 to 15,000 in the Amurskaya Oblast, and 5,700 to 6,000 persons in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in 1993. The authors concluded that the migrants do not settle regularly, they cluster in separate areas, mainly rural ones, and *"which should be specially noted, in the territories directly*

adjacent to China and defined as areas of priority in terms of territorial claims to Russia"[8]. For our publication, the following statement is important: *"in a number of near-border regions…Chinese communities are intensively being formed, their population is considerable, and they begin to outnumber leading ethnic groups of the given territories*[9].

It should be noted that references to any sources of such information are missing. In the best case, these figures are cited as 'expert assessments'. It looks quite naïve when such figures are referred to for the sake of emphasizing that calculations are precise. Now that a decade went past, it does not make sense to argue about these evidently 'sucked out of nothing' conclusions. Moreover, it is problematic to make any claims since migration had just commenced then, and information about it was scarce. More important are attempts to analyze technologies used to construct such schemes and to evaluate their role in the formation of social conscience.

The content of the book was evidently meant to prove that "*the invasion of Chinese into the Russian territory is in contradiction to the national interests of Russia in the given region and requires strict legal regulations both at the federal and local levels*"[10]. Supporting arguments were ominously huge (and very concrete) numbers whose origin could not be traced in principle. It may only be assumed that the two notions – presence of migrants and their settlement - were exchanged (deliberately or involuntarily). The conclusion on the establishment of permanent Chinese settlements in the near-border regions was supported by a 'description' of how the process took place, i.e. land lots and real estate were procured, the 'Chinese settlements' were found; fake visas, passports and other documents were bought in large numbers – ostensibly to establish joint ventures, to exchange human resources in science and education, and to temporarily mobilize export manpower, *"migrant flows from China to Russia take place along with the legal takeover of its territory…".*

The strategy of '*marital naturalization'* sounds especially threatening as it presumes that numerous migrants (as well as their children and relatives) will be granted the legal status upon marriages, including fictitious marriage registrations. Consequences are described somewhat inarticulately, yet with certainty: *"As evidenced by historical experiences, at various stages of the Far East development, the specific nature of the Far East population and no less specific policies of its neighboring states, including Japan, give a real chance for positive outcome of these long-term, well-planned actions of natural assimilation of the population"*. Instruments are found in '*religious*

expansion', activities of numerous missionaries and educational centers. Therefore, *"a diversity of channels used to penetrate, assimilate or get naturalized and settled in the Far East suggests that this process can be viewed as massive and generally well-organized, though some of the methods look like individually employed (shuttle trade, marriage) .. they represent specific national interests of the neighboring state and its foreign policy goals in the Far East region"*[11].

All this was consecrated by high scientific and expert status of the authors and their indubitable authority in professional circles. I have just demonstrated the commonly used methodology which works similar to notorious financial 'pyramids': 'expert assessments' derived from other 'expert evaluations' become strengthened by the authority of just one more expert. Such a pattern works most effectively when the chain is formed: experts of relevant state authorities ? researchers from academies of sciences ? journalists ? state officials. And so on round the circle[12].

It should be noted that the book itself is not readily available for wide readership and even for specialists since its issue was printed in small numbers. Anyway, its postulates have been quoted and repeated so many times (as a rule, without any reference to the source of data and its authors), that they transformed into common statements or axioms which do not need to be proved. This point of view was promoted by an article anonymously published in illustrated magazine *Asia and Africa Today*[13] which reproduced the statements and conclusions from the book. And now these conclusions are repeated (sometimes word by word) in numerous official analytical notes and numerous publications on geopolitics.

Here are two arbitrarily chosen illustrations on the issue. In 1996, K. E. Sorokin stated as a fact that *"migration of Chinese into Russia is growing, uncontrolled, 'crawling' (they number about 2 millions in our country); 'Chinatowns' which do not obey the Russian legislation are being established, especially in the Far East; Chinese entrepreneurs illegally procure real estate in mass quantities to the east from the Ural, owing to the lack of action from local and central powers"*[14].

In 2005, A. Khramchikhin, with no less certainty, claimed that *"the east of Russia (in the best case, its territory eastwards from Baikal, possibly eastwards from the Yenisey, or, in the worst case, eastwards from the Ural) will convert into a gigantic 'Kosovo' within two decades… Being populated by Chinese, it will become a part of China in terms of economy, finance and administrative policies. Formally, it will be still within Russia (until the time when Kremlin*

will get a new president who will give away de jure what have been already lost de facto); being few in number, citizens of Russia will live in separate ghettos… In China, they realize perfectly well that Russia itself is giving away its east, though it lives at its expense. In China, they know perfectly well that their own state will not sustain without taking neighboring territories. The nation wants to live and resolves the issue of survival by the only feasible way"[15].

The above mentioned article projects increased scale of the catastrophe and its approximation to the future. Forecasting does not require any proof and specific analyses. The essence remains the same – fear of the phenomenon which is categorized as 'demographic expansion'. The motif of 'demographic expansion' founds the basis for the complex and multifaceted phenomenon which is conventionally termed as a syndrome of 'yellow threat', though nowadays it would be more precise to define it as 'Chinese threat"[16].

As for Chinatowns, really existing or potentially inevitable, they are viewed as the instrument, mechanism and result of such 'expansion'. This leads to ideologically and politically motivated categorical non-acceptance of a possibility of their occurrence. For instance, M. Delyagin, Director of Institute of Globalization and a practicing politician, who came to Buryatia "to defend Siberian people"[17], claims uncompromisingly: "There should be no 'Chinatowns' in Irkutsk, Ulan Ude and Chita!" His motivation is still the same: demographic expansion takes place; 2 million of Chinamen have already settled in Siberia; "*colonization of some Russian territories, Siberia for instance, by Chinese*" should be limited. And that the researchers who disagree with such assessments and recommendation are *"being supported"* by Chinese.

Categorical intolerance towards the *Chinatowns* may be motivated by some other considerations. V. G. Gelbras, who authored a number of research studies on Chinese migration and Chinese communities in Russia, is skeptical about the concept of 'demographic expansion'; with open sarcasm, he comments on the estimation of Chinese migrant population in multi-million quantities; in his opinion, migrants are required by the Russian economy, and thus migration is inevitable. He realizes the threats associated with this process, such as a tendency of Chinese communities to 'cocoon', their self-isolation from the receiving society by means of *Chinatowns "which, in many countries of the world, are a form of setting apart from the local community so that assimilation is hindered". "According to the world experience, assimilation of Chinese migrants with the local population takes place extremely slowly. 'Chinatowns' have been in existence for centuries*

and they still retain their national identity" [18].

This view is independently, yet almost word by word, repeated by Yu. Gartner, Chief of GUVD Migration Department of the Irkutsk region: *"A migrant should live in our environment and assimilate the language and culture. His children should study in our schools. But in a compact settlement, it turns out that one culture gets against the other. No isolation is admissible"*[19].

"It seems that 'know-all' in Piter (i.e. in St. Petersburg, Russia), *who do not care about the international experiences and social and political consequences of their decisions, are committed to found a Chinatown. God save us!"*[20]. In this passage which is quite remote from academic stylistics, V. G. Gelbras reveals one more subject which is highly typical of the current Russian environment.

Investment activities of Chinese migrants are often evaluated in categories of future *Chinatowns*, especially when real estate deals and construction projects are concerned. Hardly as soon as municipalities (of St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, or Chita) allocate (or try to allocate) a land lot for construction of a trade centre or services facility with the participation of capital from China or any other Chinese resources involved, such a decision gets automatically classified in categories of launching (or preparations to establish) a *Chinatown*. Typically, the city is sprung into the atmosphere of conflict, and its authorities stand accused of a betrayal of national interests and corruption.

In St. Petersburg, the *Baltijskay Zhemchuzhina* (Baltic Pearl) investment project fuelled extremely hot debates. This huge project aimed at the construction of living premises for 35,400 residents, a hotel and a recreation facility on 150 hectares. Planned investments were said to amount 1.5 billion US dollars. A Chinese company was granted the contract without tender, and the project's political importance was signified in the opening ceremony by the presence of high ranking officials from Russia and China. The project faced strong and well-organized resistance manifested by mass media campaign, public hearings and meetings of citizens, pickets, statements of non-governmental and political officials. Some of the claims referred to the fact that the contract had not been tendered. However, most of the criticism was focused on the assumption that the project would result in constructing a *Chinatown* (this term was widely used), i.e. an alien and potentially threatening ethnic settlement, a potential instrument of China, wherein various social evils such as drug addiction, prostitution and organized crime may flourish.

A similar response was received when investment construction

projects were under discussion in Novosibirsk[21] and Chita[22]. The situation was completely similar to that in St. Petersburg: huge investment projects (1.6 billion US dollars for Novosibirsk), construction of trade and exhibition centers by attracting investments from China, hostile public response, transition of the problem to the political issue, suspicions that the implementation of the project may result in establishing a *Chinatown*. A journalist from France published a comment made by the Mayor of Krasnokamensk, a city located not that far from Chita: *"I was also approached by Chinamen who wanted to construct a three-star hotel. In good time, I realized that the hotel construction would bring Chinese construction workers into my city, then the hotel would provide accommodation for Chinese… And in a decade – for sure! – a Chinese Mayor would take over my position"*, he narrated proudly how he rejected the proposal.

Projects of the kind are viewed by magazine *Business and Finance*[23] as a result of targeted policies of the Chinese authorities. The magazine reports (without any reference to sources of information) that within the framework of '*nonviolent expansion*' of migrants, China has allocated huge financial resources to construct Chinatowns in largest cities in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan).

> Prospectively, Chinatowns may become centers wherein socially dangerous, nationalistically orientated outcast can cluster; they may convert into seed-plots of terrorism inside large cities. It is natural that Russian authorities in the cities of the Russian Federation are reluctant to host compact settlements of foreign migrants of one nationality. This was stated by Konstantin Romodanovsky, Director of Federal Migration Services in his speech in the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament… However, how can the first stone, which was ceremonially installed in the Chinatown in St. Petersburg, be explained? Taking into account experiences of similar enclaves' construction in other countries, we may easily get a territory wherein, in principle, the Russian laws are not in force… No secret that any Chinatown of the kind, upon the order received from the border, may provoke a conflict of any capacity within the country, that may logically be followed by the intrusion of Chinese armies which can cover themselves with protecting the former compatriots against 'the Russian aggression'.

By and large, *Chinatowns* are expected, feared and forecast. Dominant are feelings of tense anticipation of the unpleasant yet unavoidable inevitability. During such expectation, *Chinatowns* are constructed as a virtual reality. The construction materials are supplied by both personal

observations and existing stereotypes. Quite often they are in contradiction. In typical assessments by state officials in charge, the status of migration seems quite normal ("we keep everything under control"), yet the overall situation of migration in the country is catastrophic. There are two visions, i.e. one based on personal observations, and the other one affected by mass media reports, statements of politicians, state officials and other respected persons and formed as per the above described pyramid pattern. The Russian public gives more credence to the second one.

Irkutsk is often visited by journalists from Moscow in search of a *Chinatown* and any visible results of the 'Chinese demographic expansion'. They get quite amazed when they find no prevalence (domination) of Chinese faces in the streets and realize that the Irkutsk citizens are not in panic and are not alarmed by any domination of the kind. The follow-up reaction is quite interesting. In a bluntly naïve and simple-minded way, it was described in *Komsomolskay Pravda* (KP) newspaper[24]: "*As revealed by the KP journalist, the Chinese issue is present in the south-eastern remote area of Siberia; however, it is somewhere at the periphery of conscience of an ordinary Irkutsk citizen. During my visit, local people were concerned with other issues… It was not only once or twice that the KP journalist was asked by the Irkutsk citizens: why have you arrived here to write about Chinese?... With patience, I explained the aboriginal people that it is too late to write about Chinese in the Primorie. As for Transbaikalie and Siberia, this is just the right time*". The journalist came with the already formed vision and thus found, observed and described only what was in compliance with the adopted vision. The facts in disagreement were simply neglected on the basis that the journalist from Moscow is much more knowledgeable about everything than the 'miserable aboriginal people', though they still deserve to 'be patiently explained' what kind of the world they live in. And now, as a testimony published in the newspaper of the largest editions, his article supports the existing stereotype.

On the other side, 'Chinese likeness' is in fashion. According to O. Vendina, "*the fashion for ethnicity and numerous art associations, galleries, cafes, clubs and restaurants as well as show businesses, which exploit ethnic colorings, give evidence that ethnic representations are naturally appearing among sub-cultures of the capital city*"[25]. Internet resources in the Russian language offer thousands of references to *Chinatown* in both English and Russian spellings. However, these are mainly names of restaurants, entertainment and recreation facilities, songs and musical bands. Today this is an essential attribute of virtually every megapolis in Russia.

Chinatown is a marker and symbol of being 'China-like'. Today nobody is surprised at all and much less shocked by 'Chinese Pilot Djao Da' which is the name of the bohemia coffee club in Moscow.

It is of interest that the phenomenon is described as *Chinatown*, but not as 'Chinese block of flats', 'Chinese residential area', or 'Kitai-gorod' (in Russian). This may suggest that the phenomenon is being comprehended through foreign experience. Anyway, the compact Chinese settlements were present in the pre-revolutionary Russia[26]. Much time accounting to a historical epoch has passed since then. *Chinatowns*, or more precisely small Chinese settlements of those times, vanished under the Soviet power. They disappeared not only physically. They have obliterated from the historical memory. They are recollected as vaguely as Atlantida. Nonetheless, such a residual memory - which should be viewed as a post-traumatic syndrome, myth or obscure recollection rather than an experience – indirectly affects the way how the vision, discourse, attitude gets shaped. Anyway, its impact may be less than that of Hollywood, American detective stories, and recently that of personal tourist observations of cities in Europe and America.

Despite the fact that they are a topic of nervously conducted debates and their importance for the nation is being actively discussed, *Chinatowns* are not in existence in Russia yet. In the Russian context, the word itself has lost its essence and was converted into a metaphor or a cliché. The reason is simple – a disperse pattern of settlement and economic activity is dominant among the Chinese migrants. This is caused by many factors. No matter how highly condensed the migration has been, there has not been enough time for *Chinatowns* to be founded. Most of the migrants from China are not committed to settle in Russia for long. They are short-term migrants; most of them come back and forth to China. Any critical mass has not been accumulated yet, i.e., there is no minimal essential number of those who reside permanently and for a long time in Russia. Moreover, city construction policies will keep developing by inertia as per the Soviet time strategy of city arrangements which hampered the progress of social and, currently, ethno-cultural segregation.

Researches conducted by V. G. Gelbras show that Chinese migrants in Moscow have arranged effectively structured networks (associations) which perform various functions of mutual support, operate as mechanisms of adjustment to the receiving society, social control and regulation, support links with the motherland, and provide for minimal ethno-cultural needs. In fact, economic activities of the migrants are

regulated through such networks. However, these networks are not clustered in terms of territory. These are separate nuclei represented by hotels, lodges, market places.

According to O. Vendina, in Moscow there is a tendency of representatives of some national groups to cluster; however, this is more likely to result from processes of social and material differentiation rather than to occur due to the inclination to have common settlement in order to satisfy ethno-cultural needs and to consolidate[27].

To summarize, it is possible to conclude that there are no *Chinatowns* in Russia, yet there is a *problem of Chinatowns.* On the one hand, there is a perspective of their establishment, which means there is a need to analyze the associated problems in advance. Of higher importance is a complex of the associated fears and threats that is already in existence as a factor of social and political development of the nation.

Therefore, it is important to consider already manifested tendencies and potential prototypes of the phenomenon. This is highly challenging for researchers to attempt at describing and interpreting the diaspora networks, relations, behavioral strategies which may be realized by means of territorial clustering. In Russia, there is a unique opportunity to monitor the process from its initial stages, and this is more valuable than mere observation of available results.

The studies should focus on *Chinatown* embryos which have already emerged in Russia:

- locations wherein the migrants cluster for life, recreation, intra-community activities;
- places wherein business events, social relations, permanent residence or temporary stay take place;
- areas wherein networks, relationships, structures, institutions are localized and manifested in territorial parameters;
- Chinese market posts, lodges and hotels;
- small residential areas in suburbs.

Currently, in Irkutsk these clusters are scattered through the city; they are specialized rather than complex. Still they offer enough data to formulate a number of research problems. The present case study is focused on the Chinese market place in Irkutsk. This market emerged inconspicuously as a result of the city authorities' action aimed at regulation of commerce conducted in the streets. It became known as Shanghai or *Shanghaika* and very soon acquired a more important role than that of a

mere trade zone or just one of petty market places which are numerous in the city. Through *Shanghaika* China has come to Irkutsk. China has come to its everyday life and become an integral part of its economic life and social conscience. On second thought, Shanghaika is currently the main place wherein civilizations and cultures meet each other. It is the place and the mechanism of their mutual understanding and adjustment. At the same time, it is a headache and a challenge for the city management. *Shanghaika* attracts permanent and close attention of the Irkutsk mass media which is not always well-wishing. It is a favorite rhetoric topic of local politicians who view *Shanghaika* as a symbol of the 'Chinese expansion' and 'yellow threat'.

It is difficult to narrate on *Shanghaika* since Russian business and migrant communities are specifically closed worlds which disclose little information which is often incoherent and discrepant. Assumptions have to be made on many processes and phenomena on the basis of vague data. Anyway, the life of *Shanghaika* was not that smoothly flowing, and its internal contradictions were often manifested by open conflicts which provided for information 'inflows'. The problem is under discussion in the power circles, public organizations, including Chinese ones. The life of *Shanghaika* is closely monitored by the local mass media as, at one and the same time, this is a source of information, a mirror of public attitudes, and an instrument which creates such attitudes.

To begin with, some information on *Shanghaika* market place itself, its history and role in the life of Irkutsk should be given. In early 1990s, the downtown of Irkutsk seemed full of (or according to some journalists, occupied by) Chinese peddlers. Their appearances and manners were striking, they attracted much more attention than numerous competitors from among the citizens of Irkutsk or migrants from Caucasus. Massive private sales attracted crowds of people in streets which were not allocated for any commerce, and such trading places were soon lacking any sanitary order. Issues of licensing or taxation were out of question. Racketeering and fraud were flourishing, conflicts were not rare. Public opinions were strongly against the new phenomenon; comments by the mass media were sarcastic and angry[28].

A period of confusion was soon over, and the city management decided to force the street commerce into a specially allocated zone. In fact, the success of this business was predetermined by the choice of such a zone. The territory of a bankrupt factory was allocated to become the new market place. This place is near the Central Market, in the downtown

which was historically popular as a trade area. Generations of citizens used to come there for shopping, plus most of public transport routes terminated there. Thus, the traders had all chances to attract more clients.

Founded in November 1992, the market place offered permanent employment for 500 to 600 sellers in the summer of 1993. According to the Regional Statistics Bureau database, their monthly revenue amounted to monthly turnover of all officially registered trade companies of the Central District of Irkutsk known for its largest trading area[29]. At the very beginning, the market place was primitive; it was just a fenced, gravel padded area for display of simple stuff for sale. Its infrastructure developed; soon rows of tables, shelters, wooden toilets, and a small storage facility were constructed. In 2000, the market territory occupied 0.92 hectare which hosted 2,500 trade posts. In 2002, fire control authorities urged that the market should be reconstructed; the number of trade posts was reduced to 1,300; tables in the open air were replaced by 982 metal containers, officially classified as 'metal roofed pavilions'. The reconstruction was slow since the containers had to be procured (20,000 Russian rubles each) and installed at the cost of the lessees, many of whom could not afford such a purchase or were reluctant to spend such big money[30]. The reduction of job places infringed interests of many people involved in the business and therefore was associated with many conflicts.

The market place operated for retail and small wholesale. On Fridays and Saturdays entrepreneurs came in buses from all over the region to buy goods. Sale rates were indirectly evidenced by criminal statistics of tens of thousands of rubles and thousands of dollars stolen by pickpockets[31]. *Shanghaika* was able to host 20,000 persons at one time. The number of its daily visitors varied depending on season and day of the week from 10, 000 to 30,000 persons[32]. None of any other market places in Irkutsk has similar visit rates.

Being the city's property, the 'Shanghai' market had the status of a municipal enterprise. Its trade posts can be leased on a daily, monthly or yearly basis. Since February 2002, a daily charge for one trade post in the open air was raised from 60 to 80 rubles, payments to be executed for one month in advance. A single day trade charge was 100 rubles. A place in the containers was rented for 240 rubles. By 2004, the city budget received 80 million rubles from the market lease contracts, and 40 million rubles were budgeted from an imputed income tax[33].

The infrastructure of services offered at the 'Shanghai' market and its neighboring zone developed over the years. A police station post and a

private agency were in charge of security. The storage facility and several public paid toilets were operational. A lot of nearby houses offered premises for illegal, privately owned catering facilities, cafes and public toilets. They were regularly closed down by the municipal authorities of sanitary supervision, yet their operations were regularly re-commenced. Facilities for hair-dressing, photography, telephone communication, dental services, billiards and arcades were available. Dog fights took place regularly. The police and taxation authorities undertook action against the illegal casino, but all in vain. According to newspapers published in Irkutsk, the casino was very well equipped, and its income could amount to hundreds of thousands of rubles per day[34]. In March 2004, the police discovered illegal businesses involved in production of fake documents and sawn goods. However, the market never had any medical station and, which was even more essential, there was no sewage and water supply system[35].

In addition to its own personnel which was not numerous, many people in Irkutsk were employed to provide services for the 'Shanghai' market, such as local sellers, personnel of canteens and cafes, owners of houses and rooms leased for storage and accommodation, owners and drivers of motor vehicles, loading workers, security personnel and others. Typically, the so-called 'grey' (semi-legal) employment was not recorded by relevant authorities and was thus not taxable. The 'black' employment was also present with numerous pickpockets, racketeers, corrupt state officials and others. Income rates in the 'grey' and 'black' sectors can be only guessed. It should also be noted that a number of small-scale retailers in Irkutsk and its vicinities were regular whole-sale buyers at the 'Shanghai' market.

Thus, the 'Shanghai' market was a large, profitable, flourishing enterprise among the leaders of market economy of the city. It steadily contributed to the municipal budget, established new job places, and operated as a place of employment and income for many citizens of Irkutsk. However, its value was not limited only by the above. It should be taken into account that nine smaller markets are located around it. In total, Irkutsk has 40 markets and over 2,000 department stores, shops, and kiosks[36].

The 'Shanghai' market was not simply a trading area or one of many small-scale wholesale markets. It was a critical, vitally important centre of the overall system of supplies for the region. This was determined by the following factors: inexpensive China made goods, inexpensive and effective labor of Chinese sellers, diverse and strong 'mycelium' of relations

and business contacts, strategically favorable location, and stable attitude of consumers accustomed to this market.

The role of *Shanghaika* stood out sharply in the crisis after default in 1998 when economic activities declined abruptly, and the 'Shanghai' market became considerably deserted after many vendors got bankrupted and goods were supplied irregularly, prices grew and demands shrunk. It was a real shock, and the economic activity of the Chinese traders was suspended. However, this shock did not lead to a collapse. Already in two or three weeks, trading revived, though it took much time for the market to reach its pre-August rates, assortment of goods, number of sellers and buyers[37].

Attitude of the local business community to low prices for goods and the effective operations of the traders at the 'Shanghai' market was diverse. Some of the local businessmen realized and enjoyed its advantages. However, many others were competing with the 'Shanghai' market and its inhabitants, and the competition was tough and perilous. Mass media campaigns and attempts to close down the market were not incidental. The medal of the highly advantageous location of the market had its reverse side of transport jams and traffic safety in the nearby streets. In the downtown, each square meter of premises is in demand and costs much, thus the dynamically growing market had no resources for expansion, so every lot of land was excessively used, gangways between the trade rows were narrow. In case of fire or terror attack or just panic, losses could be high. The territory of the 'Shanghai' market was poorly maintained, there was no storm water and sewage system, no water supply. The pad was not asphalted. Conditions were not sanitary – the place was muddy after rains, the paid toilets were very miserable. Many times the sanitation supervision authorities issued orders to close down the market, but then annulled such orders upon the promises of the market's administration[38].

Canteens, kitchens, cafes, snack-bars were found right within the market itself, in trailers, in nearby houses. Nobody ever knew their number; they never fell short of clients as their meals were cheap and served all tastes in Chinese, Uzbek, Korean, Vietnamese and other cuisines. Most of such messing facilities operated illegally and escaped from taxation. Sanitary doctors told horrible stories of anti-hygienic conditions of cooking. All efforts to stop such services and attempts to make the owners legalize their business were in vain[39].

The 'Shanghai' market engaged the nearby houses into its activities by converting them into warehouses, dens and doss-houses, and making

dumps of their backyards. Businesslike owners of some houses constructed primitive toilets and made money by offering such a service for the market's visitors. This area had already been ghetto-like before the market was founded; and its inhabitants lived in unbearable environment. Fires were frequent in the houses around the market. The residents of such houses and the local mass media believed that this was how the city land lots were distributed (or re-distributed) since upon minimal investments this land can easily become a 'golden vein'.

The 'Shanghai' market became a source of high criminal danger for the city. This is just natural and inevitable for the place where vast financial and commodity flows were concentrated and wherein thousands of people made deals every day. *Shanghaika* was a favorite field of pickpockets. Fraud flourished there in a variety of forms. Racket was a special topic. The formation of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia can not be pictured without this factor[40], though actual information about the racket is scarce. According to available data and expert evaluations, the racket developed from simple blackmail to a structured system. M. Lee, Chairman of the Irkutsk Association for Protection of Chinese Citizens says: *"…in the past, my compatriots were 'roofed'. However, it looked like typical blackmail. When an entrepreneur arrived from China with his goods, he was charged 50 dollars for each bag. Now this keeps working, though not so actively as before"*[41].

According to experts from the concerned authorities, the first 'shuttle traders' were followed by criminal elements. With time, their activities became organized, and from simple robbery of the compatriots the criminals came to controlling and regulating actions. In 1995, the law-enforcement authorities stated that the 'Shanghai' market was controlled by three gangs consisting of Mongolians and Chinamen. Gradually, these gangs merged with the local criminal organization. The process was latent, yet interrupted by few incidents similar to the one in February 2003 when a Chinese businessman was shot. Since 1998, he had developed several businesses in Irkutsk, including timber and metal trade, and owned pavilions in the market. Officials from the law-enforcement authorities informed that he had several previous convictions in China and classified him as a gang's leader. They reported that he imposed levies on Chinese traders in the city, and his assassination might have been ordered by criminals involved in redistribution of spheres of influence in the 'Shanghai' market[42].

Considerable, and probably, the largest financial flows of the market were out of control of the authorities. Fiscal agencies permanently

complained of bid losses owing to mass non-payment of taxes by the traders. According to data from the taxation police, over 70 per cent of the traders paid taxes in reduced amounts or did not pay at all. The results were evident – the state incurred financial losses, Chinese businessmen enjoyed unfairly obtained benefits in competition, taxation and law-enforcement bodies were discredited.

Thus, extortion practices were provoked. It is a sensitive and challenging issue for discussion and research as little information can be obtained on this subject which becomes widely debated only after acute and openly manifested conflicts. In 1999, the reduction of many trading places provoked a meeting. The building of the market's administration was picketed by remonstrant traders who claimed that they were deprived of job places which cost them from 1,500 to 5,000 US dollars each, and then were charged again from 5,000 to 15,000 US dollars to have the lease renewed. Representatives of the market's administration rejected such an accusation in a categorical way by stating that it might be possible that the Chinese traders themselves resell the right to lease the trade posts to their compatriots and do so under the control of the 'Chinese mafia'[43].

In November 2001, a strike of the traders lasted for one week and ended in a non-sanctioned meeting at the building of the regional administration. According to a municipal official, the meeting's participants were outraged by high charges. *"Actually, how much they pay, whom they pay and what exactly disturbed them remained unclear. My task was to advise them on the meeting procedure, i.e. to get all the actions in the legal framework"*. The strikers told the journalists that in addition to the officially fixed lease charge they were demanded to pay 800 US dollars per year for every job place in the market. The market administration categorically repudiated such a possibility and claimed that the disorder was caused by the traders' nervousness as some of them were in "precarious visa position"[44] in view of regular renewal of the lease contracts.

Shadow rates in Irkutsk are most fantastically rumored. One of the newspapers reported: *"Incredibly high profits gained by the traders are evidenced by the following: you have to pay 18,000 US dollars to get a post to trade in the 'Shanghai' market"*. The amount sounds incredible, yet the fact was admitted by the authorities. The journalist comments: *"As far as other markets are concerned, the representatives of the municipality state that it is a common knowledge that an unauthorized lease charge exists along with the officially fixed one. This means that the entrepreneurs pay additional fees in 'black cash money"* [45].

A problem of arbitrary acts and racketeering committed by police is pressing. Most of the Chinese respondents believe that the policemen in Irkutsk consider them as second-rate people and 'milk cows', i.e. a stable profit source. It has been until recently that any uniformed officer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs could visit the market to check documents of the Chinese traders and collect fines. Typically, such charges were collected without issuing any receipt documents. There were cases when GIBDD officers, without traffic police identification badges, visited the market 'to make a pretty penny out'. It was a unique case that the Irkutsk Regional Court sentenced a captain from the taxation police department who was nicknamed 'Dog Edik' for his habits. Being accused as a plunderer, bribe-taker and abuser of the 'Shanghai' traders, he was sentenced to 8 years in jail, and his property to be confiscated.[46]

Another problem is illegal migration. It spreads much farther than the market's framework, and its actual scale can only be roughly assessed. Theoretically, there can be no illegal traders at all since a trade post can be leased only, pending that a set of properly issued documents is available (with temporary registration record, visa, and entrepreneurship certificates). Actual practices are different. The administrators of the market themselves admitted that some of the lessees had quite a doubtful legal status. This was evidenced by results of regular checks executed by the authorities dealing with passport and visa issues and migration supervision.

For any observant visitor, it was evident that a huge mass of people in the market was structured. According to its director, *"there is a strict segmentation of the market as per goods… And we, the administration of the market, have nothing to do with it. Traders in the market are placed by forces which are unknown to us. This is a certain pattern of how goods to sell are distributed as per nations"*[47]. This raises a question – to which extent was this market 'Chinese'? According to the journalist, already in 1994 *"it was like the Arc of Noah 'with every creature in pairs'… Traders of various nationalities have deals here, such as Koreans, Chinamen, Vietnamese, Laotians, Mongolians, Africans, Arabs, Afghanis, Caucasians, and Russians"*[48]. On the eve of the default in 1998, three quarters of the trade posts were leased by the Chinese. By 2002, proportions changed as follows: over 1,000 Chinamen and Koreans, around 300 Vietnamese, 150 Caucasians, 600 plus Russians, 200 persons of other nationalities. After the restructuring in 2002, the number of trade posts was reduced from 2,500 to 1,300; thus, only 495 Chinese and 485 Russian traders remained in the market. The above statistics was obtained from the administration of the market in different

time periods[49]. It can be assumed that the actual market ratio of the Chinese traders was higher since they employed local sellers who were officially recorded as independent lessees.

Thus, the Chinese were dominant in quantity. It is far more essential that the 'Shanghai' market was a key distribution point specializing in Chinese goods. The goods imported from China, the labour of the Chinese traders, and 'Chinese' prices – these phenomena governed the overall environment of the market and predetermined its image as a Chinese one, as viewed by the citizens in Irkutsk. The reputation of the 'Shanghai' market was a prerequisite of its high competing ability. In this respect, its director noted: *"An indicative aspect of 'who is who in the market': during the recent strike, the Chinese did not work, and the market was empty. Its buyers do not accept the 'Shanghai' without Chinese"* [50].

Structuring of the market that was evident from its pattern - rows of grouped goods and national blocks - had not been initiated by the administration, at least as they asserted. Anyway, the administration was not capable of maintaining the monopoly for distributing such places. It can be logically assumed that there were other powerful and influential forces. A mass media source mentioned a council of entrepreneurs of this market[51]; however, it is unlikely that this body was capable of making any real impact.

Most probably, actual power is with non-formal leaders or 'captains' as per a widely used definition introduced by mass media in Irkutsk. As a rule, they have a good command of the Russian language and considerable experience of liaison with the official circles. Along with other responsibilities, they are in charge of collecting money from the traders in the rows to pay taxes and submitting reports to the state taxation authorities. Thus the 'captains' accumulate funds raised from the Chinese traders' turn-over, represent interests of their compatriots in commerce and undertake the function of protecting their interests. By offering a variety of services to newcomers, they help the new traders to adjust to the new environment and the local society.

It is characteristic that, when commenting on conflicting situations related to the distribution and re-distribution of the trade posts, the representatives of the official administration of the market emphasized quite often that they made decisions together with the representatives of the Chinese associations and societies, and in the same comment they used a word 'mafia' in reference to such associations or societies. From their interviews, it is clear that these are real players in the market who

should be taken into account. They are capable of making proposals which are difficult to refuse[52].

It is not a simple task to describe types of the 'captains'. Openly manifested are activities of three Chinese national and cultural societies which are officially registered in Irkutsk. Their histories and experiences in the city are subjects of special analyses. Here we will only note that all of them are proactive in the market. When defending the interests of their clans, they are ready to come into tough conflicts with each other. They are targeted at different groups of their compatriots and supported by different resources (for instance, from the authorities in China).

The Chinese Society leader says: *"We want to promote civilized commercial habits among the Chinese entrepreneurs and to make them aware of the Russian legislation. Our major task is to tutor our compatriots how to live and develop commerce in compliance with the Russian laws"*[53]. The Chinese Society offers consultancy and middleman services, assists in addressing various issues which permanently arise while contacting the authorities, especially those in taxation, and serve as a non-official representative office of the Consulate of the People's Republic of China.

A similar scope of goals is declared in membership documents of 'Association-Asia' (2006): *"All the issues related to claims to produce documents (Article 93. RF Internal Revenue Code) and extraction of documents or items (Article 92. RF Internal Revenue Code) as well as prevention of any unlawful harm/injury/mischief during tax control (Article 103. RF Internal Revenue Code) are addressed by the organization, among which members is the citizen of the People's Republic of China who is the bearer of the given document"*[54].

Whenever required, these societies employ such a powerful resource as the official status and a possibility to directly appeal to the authorities. The Mayor of Irkutsk was addressed by the following 'Collective Complaint' which is characteristic in terms of style: *"We, members of the Irkutsk public non-commercial organization "Chinese Society", on behalf of the Chinese traders from the 'Shanghai market' and on behalf of the whole numerous Chinese Diaspora in Russia, appeal for bringing lawful order at the 'Shanghai market' which if officially named as 'Trade area"*. In fact, they complained about unlawful charges demanded by the administration of the market in regular redistributions of the trade posts. The Chinese Society demanded that every restructuring action should be agreed to, the unlawful charges should be eliminated, the Chinese traders should be provided the posts which they would distribute by themselves[55].

The societies are the real power, yet not the only one and probably

not a dominant one. Large businessmen and actual owners of the job places, goods and financial resources seem far more influential, as small tradesmen work for them and are dependent on them. They ensure actual protection, establish and develop 'patron-client' networks. Their economic power may be supported by criminal tamper, as in the case of the assassinated 'person of authority'.

The influence of such persons is enormous on the mass of traders. Simple traders are people of another rank, from the lower social layers, with little education, without capital and relations. They are ready to survive a rough time, work much and hard, and be satisfied with low wages. Of course, there is some progress in their community in comparison to the status of early 1990s. A predominant personality type from the past, i.e. a poorly dressed rural chap who is lacking confidence in himself, is disappearing. These are already cases of the past when sellers and buyers would write down and cross out negotiated prices on a piece on paper while making a bargain at the 'Shanghai' market. Most of the sellers can communicate with the buyers in Russian; some of them have learnt the Russian language quite well.

How the 'patron-client' pattern of relations works can be illustrated by testimonies from the court hearing of the case against a taxation officer. When 'Dog Edik' took sale proceeds from a trader, the trader appealed to his group leader. Then ten more traders came to the group leader with complaints that the policeman took their documents and goods. The group leader tried to negotiate and sort out the cases, but was beaten. As recorded in the court file, *"then he transferred his authorities to his more experienced companion"*.[56] It sounds like this level turned out adequate for resolving the issue, and the documents and the goods were given back to their owners in exchange of 5,000 roubles and a fur jacket. In his testimony to the court, the '*more experienced companion'* said that he was regularly involved as a middleman in issues related to tax payments. This suggests a well developed scheme and a strict hierarchy of relationships.

Efficient and effective impact of such a mechanism can be evaluated only from indirect indications. This is why it is important to describe and analyze the already existing practices of collective actions. It has been noted above that the most conflicting situation at the 'Shanghai' market and around it developed into strikes and/or pickets of the traders near the market's administration building and in the neighbouring street which is one of the major transport arteries of the city. There was mass picketing near the buildings of the regional and city administrations. For Chinese

and other foreign citizens involved in business on vague legal grounds and especially for those who reside in the city without any rights, any participation in strikes or pickets is associated with high risk. The risk is even higher in relation to unauthorized demonstrations and picketing of the authorities. In fact, these are actions of political nature, regardless of whether its participants are conscious or not conscious about this aspect. Against this background, even huge financial losses incurred owing to the market being closed for one day seem little. Therefore, in addition to strong motivation, mass participation presupposes high commitment and ability of self-organization, strong group discipline, presence of respected leaders, sanctions for failure to obey instructions etc.

From its first days of existence, the 'Shanghai' market was declared as a temporary facility. Its temporary status was confirmed by the municipal and regional authorities, management of fire fighting, law enforcement and sanitary supervision authorities. Any discussion on any problem related to the 'Shanghai' market began and ended with the statement that the market will be shut down, and its location will be converted to a construction site of a multilayered parking facility as per the city development plan. The authorities were asked to shut down 'this sink', and they readily agreed to do so. Nonetheless, the 'Shanghai' market operated for 13 years and even survived in the so-called atypical pneumonia period in 2003, though it was a perfect pretext to attack the market. The City Duma (Parliament) members stated that this issue required a radical decision. Two Vice Governors demanded that the market should be shut down for reasons of epidemics, safety and public security. The Deputy Mayor informed that the strategic decision to relocate the 'Shanghai' market had been approved in 2002 and he advised that it would take much time and efforts to implement the decision. The market provided 1,500 job places and millions of roubles to the city budget. "*Populism is not a method to address the issue of the 'Shanghai'*"[57], stated the official. In fact, this was a clear-cut refusal statement.

Anyway, in September 2006 the Municipal Administration took the decision to liquidate the market. The traders' fight against the decision was severe; they filed claims in the Arbitration Court, arranged public actions (pickets across the streets), collected signatures on public appeal letters, distributed leaflets, established the market's trade union, and its representatives held a meeting with the Mayor of Irkutsk. The case developed to sending a telegram to the President of Russian Federation. The municipal authorities remained adamant. The organized resistance

was met with harsh rhetoric confrontation which was unusual. The only compromise was of issuing a permit to suspend the market closure until the beginning of 2007.

The resoluteness and inexorable attitudes in implementing the action, which was doomed to bring considerable economic and social costs, resulted from the fact that, as wisely noted by the journalist, *"the Shanghai' market became a symbol of an epoch. However, the epoch never elapses without flight"*[58]. The problem of *Shanghaika* acquired a symbolic aspect since none of the city markers has ever been so much discussed and argued about. It symbolized a wide variety of phenomena, including 'Chinese likeness', slums, evident poverty (market for poor), immense financial flows, and suspicions that the municipal officers abuse such funds. For the municipal bodies, the market was not only a source of growing revenues, but also a permanent headache. The most amazing fact is that the 'Shanghai' market was only a part of the trade area which combines 8 more private markets, each creating similar problems to the city. The same slums, anti-sanitary and overcrowded rows, transport concerns, intricate problems in finances and taxation, the same Chinamen (up to 3,000 persons, according to some records)[59]. Nonetheless, their closing down was out of the question.

The 'Shanghai' market has been liquidated as an economic object; it passed into history as a trading area. Does this mean that any *Chinese market* operations will cease in the city? In this respect, indicative is the response of the Chinese traders. These highly active, militant, organized persons were ready to take risk while fighting to redistribute the market's resources, yet they stayed away from the battle to save the market. This was clear in the latent stage of the battle when debates took place in the municipal administration. In November 2004, when the decision to close down the market was approved, a unique event took place in Russia - a newspaper was issued under a distinctive name of *East Siberian 'Shanghai'*. This author talked to its founders and journalists, and they emphasized that the initiative came from the Russian traders, and that the major goal of the newspapers is to influence the public opinion of Irkutsk citizens in order to prevent the market's closing down. Until the summer of 2005, there were about 10 issues of 20,000 circulation each. The newspaper was quite successful and professional in the fight for the market's survival. In autumn 2006, only Russian traders participated in rear-guard struggles.

The dynamics of their rhetoric is indicative. The first issue of the newspaper opened with the appeal of *"the international collective of entrepreneurs of the market"*. It highlighted that this collective is distinguished

by its *"international staff - Russians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Vietnamese, Kyrgyz, Korean, Chinese (in total, 27 nationalities) – choose a seller and you are welcome!"*[60]. In the autumn of 2006, the emphasis was on the prediction that the traders from Irkutsk will suffer from the market's closing down, whereas *"illegal Chinese who do not pay taxes"* have already moved to the neighboring markets wherein nobody disturbs them, and wherein they are patronized by (surely, not disinterested) local officials[61].

This was a clear attempt to employ current politics in the country and, primarily, the federal authorities' decisions in order to supplant foreign citizens from the retail markets. Anyway, the situation in Irkutsk was also pushing to such actions. The Chinese market expanded outside the borders of the official 'Shanghai'; the infrastructure moved to other trade areas in the city, particularly to the neighboring markets. In fact, a 'Large Shanghai' has been formed. As for the decision of the municipal authorities, it demolished only the symbol of the Chinese market. Thus, 'Shanghai' is dead!

In the 13 years of its existence, the 'Shanghai' market evolved from the trading place into a complex, self-developing and self-regulating organism which basically lived as per its own code and rules. At the same time, it became an integral part of the economic and social life of Irkutsk. Its activities were regulated by official standards and instructions as well as (and mainly) by rules, habits and ways, and laws which were never specified in paper, yet were most effective. Along with the official administration, managerial functions were efficiently performed by various unofficial structures, leaders and owners. People operating in the market were not a mere conglomerate or unstructured crowd of traders and servicing personnel, including security guards, janitors, food vendors, taxi drivers etc. They were rigorously organized, hierarchically structured, and interrelated by a complicated system of mutual liabilities and responsibility. Therefore, they were capable of mass collective actions requiring a high level of organization, stringent internal discipline, strong and efficient management.

The 'Shanghai' market was a multi-functional structure since, in addition to commerce itself, it offered a set of services and entertainments, from the illegal casino and dog fights to the illegal workshop which produced fake documents, from a chain of cafes and cheap catering facilities to security, transport and consulting infrastructure.

Not all the Chinese migrants and even not most of them worked at the 'Shanghai' market in Irkutsk. And they did not live there. Nonetheless,

networks of relations and links clustered there to form a neuralgic centre of the emerging Chinese community in the city. And it is unlikely that anything will be fundamentally changed by closing down the original nucleus of the Chinese market.

The example of the 'Shanghai' market as the centre of the Chinese life in the Siberian city provides a possibility to formulate a number of problems and hypotheses. In particular, does obvious insularity of life of the Chinese in *Chinatowns* stem from their 'national character' (one more question comes logically – what is 'national character'?) or results from the overall general migration environment? In other words, do Chinese establish *Chinatowns* because they are Chinese or because they are migrants? Is *Chinatown* a means and a mechanism of migrants' isolation from the receiving society or a specific form and way of their mutual adjustment? Is it a result of the natural tendency to live in the neighborhood of people of the same culture, language and country of origin and/or a specific type of social organization, a specific mechanism of social control and power?

Indications of self-organization in the Chinese market give grounds to suggest that it is not only (and probably, not actually) a centre of ethnic consolidation, it is a social formation incorporating non-Chinese traders, administrators, service personnel, clients and partners. Mechanisms and structures of power and influence are based not only on fiscal and marketing principles and general principles of modern industrial, urban society – a crucial role is played by client relations and clan and community structures.

A hypothesis can be introduced that it is a specific communal formation which is closed up for the receiving society by not only its socio-culturally and ethnically alien pattern, but also owing to its principally different type of social relations, regulation and power. In other words, it is a community nucleus in the atomized, individualized society. Thus, a *Chinatown* may represent not only a compact settlement of representatives of a certain nationality, culture and country of origin. It can be regarded as a special type of social organization which is based on corporate culture and community codes.

An inevitable and long-term consequence is a permanent contact and interaction of two different, possibly incompatible types of social organization, different mechanisms of human behavior regulation, different ways of life, systems of values and visions of the world. In the pre-revolutionary Russia or, say, in modern Indonesia, where the receiving

society was or is consisting of communities, such a community pattern would naturally build into the community society (a ghetto model), whereas in modern Russia, intolerance and conflicts are inescapable.

Being ready to tolerate ethnic and cultural diversity and often capable of providing support and developing such a diversity within the framework of multi-cultural policies and strategies, the modern marketing, industrial, individualistic society is unlikely to be able to accept and integrate a community type of organization, power and human behavior regulation. This raises concerns in relation to possible establishment of *Chinatowns* and their impact on the life of Chinese migrants and their descendants, on the one side, and the receiving society and powers of Russia, on the other side.

References

1. A brilliant analysis of some reasons and mechanism of this phenomenon has been recently published by Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaya. Neighboring China will Assist in Resolving the Problem of Acute Deficit of Manpower, See *Facing Immigration*.Vol. 30, No. 3, November-December 2005, pp. 72-86. (In Russian).
2. As an Illustration see articles in *Izvestia* and *Rossyakaya Gazeta*, such as "Whoever has arrived here; Mosgorduma (City Parliament of Moscow) fights with scoundrels and foreigner". *Izvestia*. 11 April 2000 (In Russian); V. Malakhov, Whoever has arrived. Segregation of citizens by nationality index – a way to principalities, *Rossijskaya Gazeta*. 26 September 2006 (In Russian). A search in Internet has shown that this word combination, which is almost an idiom, is used more than 1,000 times, primarily in titles of articles.
3. V. I. Dyatlov, *Modern Trade Minorities: A Factor of Stability or Conflict? Chinese and Caucasians in Irkutsk.* Moscow, Natalis, 2000, pp. 114-141 (in Russian); V. Dyatlov, and R. Kuznetsov, 'Shanghai' in the centre of Irkutsk: Chinese Market Environment in *Baikalian Siberia: Components of Stability.* Moscow, Irkutsk, Natalis, 2005, pp. 166-187 (in Russian); V.I. Dyatlov, "The Chinese Migration to Siberia and the Beginning of the Formation of a New Diaspora" in Vitaly Naumkin (ed.) *Current Research on Past and Present Asian and African Societies: Russian Oriental Studies*, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004, pp. 123-161.
4. D. Trenin and G. Vitkovskaya, "Introduction", in *Perspectives of the Far East Region: Chinese Factor*. Moscow, Carnegie Centre, 1999. p. 7 (in Russian); V. G. Gelbras, *Chinese Reality in Russia*. Moscow, 2001, p. 51 (in Russian).
5. A few typical titles of newspaper articles: O. Lipchinskaya, "In 10 years

Irkutsk will become a China Town", *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Irkutsk. 18 October 2006 (in Russian); A. Kolganov and S. Solonenko, "China Town in Irkutsk", *Pyatnitsa*, 20 December 2002 (in Russian); S. Kez, "Crawling occupation of Siberia. Chinese migration has brought New Problems to the Russian East", *Novye Izvestia*, 27 March 1998, (in Russian); "The Last Invasion of Non-Marsians, *Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda*, 30 June 1998 (in Russian); N. Orlov, "The Great Chinese Siberia", *Pravda Buryatii*, 27 January 2005 (in Russian).

6. L.L. Rybakovsky, O.D. Zakharova and V.V. Mindogulov, *Illegal Migration in Near-Border Regions of the Far East; History, Nowadays, Consequences.* Moscow, 1994, p. 39 (in Russian).
7. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
8. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
9. Ibid, p. 21.
10. Ibid, p. 37.
11. Ibid, pp. 23-29.
12. This is to illustrate how such a 'method' works. A threatening 'forecast – statement' of 'marital expansion' published by L. L. Rybakovsky, O. D. Zakharova, and V. V. Mindogulov was immediately converted into an anonymous expert conclusion that "in the Irkutsk and Chita regions, nearly every second man who gets married is a Chinaman". For details see, V. Portyakov, "Are Chinamen Coming? Migrational Situation in the Russian Far East, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* 1996, No. 2, p. 82 (in Russian). And now the given assessment is cited with reference to his authority. As a true fact, this is used in politics; during the last State Duma election campaign, O. Rogozin, leader of *Rodina* (Motherland) Party used to tell a story about an old lady from the Far East who happily married Chinamen thirty times and thus became 'an instrument of their demographic expansion'. V. Ishaev, Governor of the Khabarovsky Krai is strongly against mixed marriages, he is "concerned that compact settlements of Chinese are formed in the region, they are trying to become more and more influential in the economic and political situation." "Chinamen in Russia", *Izvestia,* 26 January 2000 (In Russian). However, the number of such marriages in the cities in the Far East and Siberia is negligible and recorded in first dozens. About the situation in Irkutsk, see E. Dyatlova, Marriage Relations of Migrant Minorities in Irkutsk in 1989–1998 (Chinese, migrants from the North Caucasus, Trans Caucasus and Central Asia, *Vestnik Evrazii*, 2001, No. 1, pp. 30-46 (in Russian)
13. "Chinese Pressing on Amur", *Asia and Africa Today,* 1996, No. 3. pp. 2-5 (in Russian).
14. K. E. Sorokin, *Geopolitics of Modern Times and Geostrategies of Russia.* Moscow: Rosspen, 1996, p.107 (In Russian)
15. À. Kharamchikhin, "Yellow Predominance, Takeover of Siberia by China is not a 'thriller': There is no other way out", *Political Magazine,* 2005, Vol. 27, pp. 61-64 (in Russian).

16. For details, see V. I. Dyatlov, 'Yellow Threat': A Xenophobia's Transformation" in S. V. Golunov (ed.) *Russia and East: Problems of liaison: Proceedings of the VI International Conference*, *Volgograd, 28-30 November 2002*, Volgograd: VolGU (State University) Publishing House, 2003, pp.116-123 (in Russian).
17. M. Delyagin, "To Protect Siberian residents", *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, 2 March 2005 (in Russian).
18. V.G. Gelbras, "Chinese Warning", *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 2005, Vol. 42, p. 3 (in Russian); G. Vitkovskaya and S. Panarin, "Migrations and security of Russia", *Interdialekt*, 2000, p. 193 (in Russian); Also see V.G Gelbras, *Chinese Reality of Russia.* Muravei, 2001 (in Russian).
19. S. Kez, "Siberian Chinatown of a new format", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 30 May 2005, (In Russian).
20. V. G. Gelbras, op. cit.
21. 'Chinatown" on the Ob' river bank? Siberia Forum, 27 February-2 March 2006, (http://sibforum.ru/) (In Russian); Novosibirsk 'Chinatown" or Chinese puzzle? *SibirInfo. Informational portal of Siberia,* 27 October 2006, (http://www.sibirinfo.ru/) (in Russian).
22. L. Mijo, Siberia resists 'yellow pressure', *Liberation*, France, 22 December 2005), *InoSMI.Ru,* 22 December 2005 (www.inosmi.ru) (in Russian); Ya. Leder, Can Chita get its Chinatown? *BBC.RUSSIAN.com.* (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5149000/5149518.stm) (in Russian)
23. "Chinatowns: A Challenge to Russia, *Business and Finance,* 20 March 2006. (http://www.advis.ru) (In Russian).
24. D. Steshin, "Lomonosov was mistaken: China will enlarge by Siberia", *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* 11 and 12 April 2006 (in Russian).
25. Olga Vendina, "Migration status in regions of Russia, Migrants in Moscow: is the Russian capital city threatened by ethnic segregation?" Moscow, 2005, p. 56 (in Russian).
26. Ò. Sorokina, Chinese quarters in the Far East cities (late 19th and early 20th centuries), *Diasporas* Vol. 2-3, 2001, pp. 54-74 (in Russian); G.A. Sukacheva, "Residents of 'millionaire' and others. Activities of secret societies in Vladivostok in late 19th and early 20th centuries", *Russia and ATR,* Issue 1, 1993, (in Russian).
27. Olga Vendina, op. cit.
28. See, *Sovetskaya Molodezh,* 6 August 1989 and 27 June 1992 (in Russian).
29. *Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda*, 7 July 1993 (in Russian).
30. *Irkutskaya Torgovaya Gazeta*, 15 April 2003, (in Russian); *Pyatnitsa*, 24 May 2002, (In Russian).
31. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 18 April 2003 (In Russian); *Baikal*, 27 September 2002 (in Russian).
32. *Pyatnitsa*, 1 February 2002 and 24 May 2002 (in Russian).
33. *Pyatnitsa*, 1 February 2002 (in Russian); *Irkutsk*, 22 February 2002 (in Russian); *Izvestia*, Irkutsk, 8 May 2003 (in Russian); *East Siberian Shanghai*,

November 2004, Issue 1 (in Russian); Telegram from M. M. Toropov, Chairman of Primary Trade Union Organization "Trade Unity" to V. V. Putin, RF President (December 2006).

34. *Irkutskaya Torgovaya Gazeta*, 15 April 2003 (In Russian); *Video Channel*, 2001, Vol. 36 (in Russian); *SM-Nomer Odin,* 22 June 2001 (in Russian); *Pyatnitsa*, 11 October 2002 (in Russian); *AS Baikal TV,* 26 February 2003; *Kopeika*, 27 September 2002 (in Russian); *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Baikal, 27 September 2002 (in Russian).
35. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 18 August 2000 (in Russian); *Pyatnitsa*, 10 September 2004 (In Russian).
36. *Kommersant*, East Siberia, 7 March 2003 (in Russian); *Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda*, September 2002 (in Russian); *SM-Nomer Odin,* 12 October 2000 (in Russian).
37. For details see, V. Dyatlov, *Chinese in Irkutsk: Some characteristics of the situation in 1998 – 1999.* Moscow, Carnegie Centre, 1999, pp.86-89 (in Russian).
38. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 22 April 1998 (in Russian); *Irkutsk,* 18 May 1998 (in Russian).
39. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 7 September 2000 (in Russian); *Izvestia*, Irkutsk, 26 September 2003 (in Russian); *Pyatnitsa*, 21 March 2003 (in Russian); *Komsomolskaya Pravda–Priangarie*, 24 April 2003 and 14 May 2003 (in Russian); Informational Agency Baikalinfo, *Irkutsk News,* Issue 86, 19 January 2004 (in Russian).
40. V. Volkov*, Strength Entrepreneurship*, St. Petersburg, Moscow: European University in St. Petersburg: Letny Sad, 2002 (in Russian).
41. *Irkutskaya Torgovaya Gazeta*, 27 May 2003 (in Russian).
42. *Vecherny Irkutsk*, Issue 2, 1995 (in Russian); *Kopeika*, 28 February 2003 (in Russian); *AS Baikal - TV*, 22 February 2003 (in Russian); *Inform Polis*, Ulan Ude, 26 February 2003 (In Russian).
43. *Mosckovsky Komsomolets v Irkutske*, 9 December 1999 (in Russian).
44. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 1, 5, 6, 12 November 2001 (in Russian); *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 2 November 2001 (In Russian); *Kommersant*, East Siberia, 3 November 2001 (in Russian).
45. *Vostochno-Sibirskie Vesti*, 27 May 2003 (in Russian); *Irkutsk*, 18 April 2003 (in Russian).
46. "Chinese 'syndicate'" *Rodnaya Zemlya*, Issue 10, 26 March 2001 (in Russian); L. Bogdanov, "Blackmailer in a police uniform", *Vostochno-Sibirskay Pravda,* 12 March 2001 (in Russian).
47. *Chto Pochem*, 16 December 1999 (In Russian).
48. M. Lykova, "Is time of 'shuttle traders' out?", *Vecherny Irkutsk*, 22 April 1995 (In Russian).
49. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 21 October 1998 and 28 March 2002 28 (In Russian); *Irkutskaya Torgovaya Gazeta*, 15 April 2003 (in Russian).
50. *Pyatnitsa*, 1 February 2002 (in Russian).
51. *AS Baikal – TV*, 6 March 2003 (in Russian).

52. *Chto Pochem*, 16 December 1999 (in Russian).
53. *SM-Nomer Odin*, 22 October 1999 (in Russian).
54. Author's archive.
55. Ibid.
56. L. Bogdanov, op. cit.
57. *Irkutsk*, 18 April 2003 (in Russian); *Pyatnitsa*, 11 April 2003 (in Russian); *SM-Nomer Odin*, 10 April 2003 (In Russian); *Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda*, 13 May 2003 (in Russian).
58. E. Trifonova, "The Shanghai 'recruitment'", *Vostochno-Sibirskay Pravda,* 2 November 2006 (In Russian).
59. *Siberian News*, Irkutsk, 1 November 2006, (in Russian); Telegram from M. M. Toropov, op. cit.
60. *Vostochno-Sibirskiy 'Shanghai* (East Siberian 'Shanghai'), Issue 1, November 2004 (in Russian).
61. E. Trifonova, op. cit; Our business. Informational leaflet of "Social Trade Union of Entrepreneurs and Sellers of the 'Shanghai' Market"; Minutes of the general meeting of lessees of MUP (September 28, 2006). (Author's archive).

Philosophical and Legal Aspects of Confessional Tolerance in the Trans-Asian Context

Igor A. Arzumanov

While writing about problems of tolerance in the religious context, one would inevitably reach the level of understanding of confessional politics as one of the predominant ideological subsystems. Ideology as a system of mental values is immanent to any society. At different times, different elements have been dominant in the ideological system of "certain social values". The loss of the dominant due to transition to another dominant can cause geopolitical transformations. The mental dominant determines the form and the extent of the national interest comprehension. Temporal loss of the dominant causes geopolitical disorientation until a new one appears. Thus, geopolitical transformation of the socio-political field in Russia at the end of the 20th century is also due to the fall of the Communist ideology and inability of the liberal ideology to replace it completely. The common type of geopolitical behavior of a state in all fields, in any transformation, is an expansion, i.e., the dimensional expansion, including in spiritual and cultural fields. Today the most common fields of expansion are those of economics and ideology. Two sub-systematic variants of ideology – religious and nationalistic, stimulate geopolitical expansion especially actively.

The topicality of the reflections connected to the complex range of methodological approaches to the research of the religious issues as a whole and particularly in East Siberia, is determined, at first, by underdeveloped deductive and inductive components, which include:

- solving the issues that concern religious politics in Russian regions from the liberally-democratic position, which is fundamental for the western civilization;

- the lack of precise criteria of traditional values in history and culture, and therefore;
- the absence of logically adjusted positions in the development of state religious policy in the regions;
- realizing the fact that East Siberia is an intercultural borderland, and this is one of the specific features of this dimensional continuum, which is not always considered while analyzing confessional dominants of socio-cultural field;
- the necessity of complex methodological approach to the cultural basis of socio-political phenomena in their comparison within the regions (Mongolia, China, Korea, India, Russia etc). This necessity is based upon the insufficiency of the research methods, which usually do not conceptually coordinate the whole complex of socio-cultural continuum.

The state influences the society, first, with legal regulation of social relations, i.e., the establishment or the sanction of legal norms and provision of their realization. A number of researchers and lawyers note the fundamental character of constitutionally legislative institutes as a regulative base of the framework of society.[1]

But along with objective assessment of the functional role of religion during the processes of "de-westernization" in traditional societies, the general role of confessional institutes is often considered to be "a relationship between people, a person, a society and a state, concerning spiritual and cultural good"[2]. Furthermore, as legal experts note, the majority of constitutional enactments in western countries regulate the interaction of religion and constitutional law by guaranteeing the freedom of conscience constitutionally and legislatively, and the constitutional preference of the most widespread beliefs in a country is considered from the liberal-democratic position to be a socio-cultural deviation[3]. The spectrum of socio-cultural questions, concerning the religious area in its confessional aspect, is considered together with the problem of state security[4].

In the context of methodological stratification of the analysis of relation between the body of laws and axiological block of religiously determined ideological subsystems, which lay in the field of spiritual and cultural relations, this author examines the following approaches:

- deductive integrant block of the religious processes research, consisting of philosophical world view and philosophical-anthropological aspects.

- inductive-structural block of research, including philosophical-cultural approach and analysis of religious determinants of socio-political aspect;
- analysis of the civilizational dominants of geopolitical factor of the religious field research[5].

As noted before, religion was frequently used as an efficient way of geopolitical expansion (mission), and at times geopolitical expansion itself was assuming a religious nature. Today, Russian (and the world's) practice in religious and ideological field is based upon constitutional and legal[6] and religious enactments[7], which are mostly determined by the recommendations of international institutes of law[8].

One of the main criteria of socio-political estimation of the positions is the concept of tolerance, which is an ideological dominant in the field of fundamental human rights. Let us look at this concept from the position of historically logical, philosophically anthropological and theoretically legal approaches.

Historically, the first issue relating to tolerance was philosophical – concerning religious tolerance among Christian confessions in Western Europe, which appeared as a result of religious wars in France in the second half of the 15th century. The works of J. Locke, Earl of Rotterdam, Voltaire and others have become theoretical elaborations of religious and civil tolerance.

The Augsburg religious synod (1555) and the edict of Nantes (1598) have supported confessional pluralism, but this fact did not signify the emergence of the tolerance phenomenon. The concept of tolerance is bound up with emergence and developing of a constitutional state in Western Europe. This period can be characterized as a "cultural disintegration": in contrast with dogmatic thinking and the power of the church, which controlled cognition, experience and behavior of an individual in Middle Ages, the Renaissance put forward a secular, non-catholic culture, independent from the church. The tolerance phenomenon demanded acquiescence – each rival camp had to admit the right of an opponent to exist. It is in the long coexistence of religious and secular cultures that the tolerant phenomenon is born, and this fact explains its late emergence in western countries. By this time, tolerance adjusted to the legal system through the most important philosophical categories: "freedom", "equality" and "justice".

International attention to the issue of tolerance was formed by the

1990s, which was reflected in certain programs and juridical documents, for instance, in "Declaration of principles on tolerance" (1995)[9]. The concept of tolerance is related to international legal aspects of human rights, which support pluralism in different fields of social life. The tendencies connected to this concept determine the character and dynamics of disunity processes in certain type of culture, which is also reflected in national constitutional systems. Therefore, it should be noted, that today the concept of tolerance is not yet well elaborated and does not respond clearly to the body of concepts, which it is often geared to. In general, the usual understanding of the term "tolerance" does not differ so much from its etymological meaning[10], where can be traced the exact socio-cultural aspect of this period – tolerance towards the other's way of life, behavior, feelings, beliefs. In subject-object relationship, this feature is one of the main characteristics of stability and predictability for personal and social relations.

However, in spite of the semantic propinquity between the definitions "tolerance" and "lenience", the latter does not reflect the whole meaning of the term "tolerance". N. V. Krouglova states that these terms differ in the following: lenience includes the recognition of the other people and rejection of domination and violence, and tolerance is an acquired or cultivated idea[11]. In addition, there is another definition for tolerance. In biology and medicine, it is associated with a negative fact – an absence or weakening of immune response, inability of an organism to form antibodies. This fact frequently leads to death of a biological organism.

The common social content of the concept of tolerance supposes a tolerant attitude of society towards the variety of contemporary and contradictory aims and ideologies. Legal pluralism supposes coexistence of different legal systems including those conditioned by religion. According to social psychology observations, the secular law can regulate not more than 50 percent of all public relations. The other half depends on traditions, beliefs and customs, i.e. on the field of certain religions, ideologies or superstitions, frequently primitive ones. Thus, legal conscience and culture highly depend on beliefs that really influence the society, its institutes and individuals. And, thereby, emerge philosophical-cultural and philosophical-legal questions, concerning reflections of the concept of tolerance.

The variety formed by pluralism is not merely a reason to think about the disunity processes in socio-cultural field. Furthermore, the variety is the coexistence of religious cultures. And this correlation is completely

different from the "religious" - "secular" dualism, established by the historical and logical approach. The opposition of ideological dominants, which underlay different religious systems[12], objectively lowers the level of tolerance within doctrinal and common fields of religious consciousness. In spite of the declarations of international legal citations and their statements in national legal systems, the aporia of religious cultural areas will objectively cause latent conflicts. The contradiction of "the limit of tolerance" foregrounds the necessity of 1) comprehensive analysis of doctrinal thesis of religious innovations; 2) the state control reinforcement over religious institutes by reason of unsolvable contradiction of their socio-cultural display's axiological determinants and motivations of adherents; 3) legislative prevention of the transition of "the limit of tolerance" into intolerance.

On the globalization dimension's macro level, the direction of tolerance researches changes radically. On the one hand, globalization supports international and personal contacts, and, as a result, establishes tight interaction of subjects in spite of the differences between them. Therefore, the issue concerns creation of a legislative mechanism for social peacekeeping. On the other hand, breaching the limit of tolerance – the rise of intolerance not only locally, but also globally follows globalization processes.

In society, this position is supported by a number of legislative acts, which guarantee the interference of the state in case of threat towards the tolerance in ethnic and confessional relations. Thus, federal normative enactments, normative enactments of Russian Federation subjects and normative enactments of autonomous authorities regulate the aspects of relations between state and religious associations[13]. Herewith, Russian and international legislative acts note common religious aspect of the problem, concerning violation of tolerance consensus in socio-cultural continuum[14]. The definition of threats towards religious tolerance does not usually go beyond such terms as "a sect"[15], "a destructive cult", "a totalitarian religious sect", which are also connected with the problem of religious extremism[16].

Complex analysis of anthropological doctrinal statements, which lay in the confessional field, elicits the transforming nature of religious processes in regional and All-Russian level as well. In case of world religions – a traditional confessional base for a number of countries – this fact concerns the cultural base of society and is one of the general geopolitical factors in the modern world. These circumstances make relevant the

research of confessional specialties in missionary (All-Russian and regional) field and discovering the nature of confessional innovations. The necessity of the researches is due not only to neo-religious movements, but also to analogical processes in some traditional confessions. Let us contemplate these statements, using the example of East Siberian and Mongolian missionary dominants in religious field during the 20th and 21st centuries in the context of theoretical and legal innovations.

In Mongolia and East Siberian region of Russia continues the further structuring of religious innovations, the activity which has trans-Asian orientation (the main object being China and the countries of South-East Asia). In these processes, Russia and Mongolia de facto are springboards, prepared in the period of "the great break up" of socialistic heritage by the "opening" of socio-cultural field of the region. In methodological projection, missionary activity of confessional innovations will determine the main directions of further philosophical, religious, cultural and political studies, connected with socio-political aspect of the study of religious sphere in Central Asia. At first, it concerns the characteristics of "domestic" mission (Russia and Central Asia) and "foreign" (Mongolia, China, South-East Asian countries). Thereby, the issues of the day are forms and methods of realization of the legislative policy concerning conservation of state and confessional liberty and rights of an individual. This course is due to several factors – a tendency to "anthropologization of law", an active position of an individual, determined not only by present legislation but also by historical and cultural basis of the natural right principles, the legislative culture and the sense of justice. Mongolian constitution of 12 February 1992, establishes "the creation of humane, civil and democratic society"[17], the state priority principles of which are "providing for democracy, justice, freedom, equality, national unity and respect of law."[18] By the mid-1990s, after the relative restoration of traditional confessional structures, the Mongolian law of state-church relations of 1995 had been adopted, and within the framework of this law, continue the innovative processes in socio-cultural field of the country.

Main de-unification factors are religious innovations. They mostly include post-protestant and neo-orientalistic trends. For the post-protestant denominations, the Baikal Siberia today is just a springboard for the expansion to Mongolia[19]. Though, in recent years, another tendency has been noticed, which is connected with inverse diffusion of the denominations, which were set in Mongolian socio-cultural field towards Russia and China. Moreover, the factor of Chinese migration policy

towards Russia and Mongolia plays a special role. Along with native population, the migrants become an object of the mission for religious innovations. As this author believes, market relations have determined not only the functioning of the autochthon fields of religious consciousness in Mongolia, but they also underlay the transformation dynamics of religious legislation of the country. "Total liberalization" of Mongolian law, the dynamics of the transformation of Mongolian religious legislation during the 1990s was due to the policies of the USA and West European countries in the North-East Asia.

There are 36 Christian religious associations registered with the Mongolian Department of Justice. The dynamics of structuring of the mission develops dramatically: in 1992 there were 12 Christian missions in Mongolia, during the period 1995-2000 and by the year of 2006 there had been about 50 missions from different countries (from the end of 1990s also from Russia). One of the most rapidly developing missions is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons). In the center of Ulan-Baatar city there is a modern building, which belongs to Mongolian Mormons' administrative center. The total number of people in the regional organization is 5,000. The Mormons have a developed system of parishes, which include the communities in all the main industrial centers of the country. There are parishes in such cities as Kobdo, Ulasutai, Darkhan (85,700 citizens), Erdenet (56,100 citizens). The main direction of the parishes is the mission. Ways and methods are social and charity work, education and translation service. The strategic "target" is Central Asia, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In China, as the Mormons themselves admit, the mission is challenged by the regulations of Chinese legislation, which restricts foreigners from religious organizations to attract the citizens of China to their associations. According to remedial organizations, China continues to restrain the freedom of the rituals, granting only those religious organizations, which have passed state registration. As a result, at this time the sphere of the mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints doesn't go beyond the circle of the followers from the number of foreign workers and employees from foreign companies located in China. Therefore, one can assume that in contrast to the dynamics of the 1990s, Mongolia today is becoming a regional "donor" for innovative religious subdivisions.

One can conclude with the following:

1. The analysis of civilizational context of tolerance shows us the

fact that the contradiction of religious cultures in their anthropo-doctrinal context is geopolitical. The contradiction of ideological dominants, which underlay religious confessional systems is latently minimizing the extent of anthropo-doctrinal tolerance in the projection of the trivial level of religious consciousness.

2. In the light of contradiction noted in definition of "religious tolerance", is arising an issue about the role of the state in the processes of legal prevention of the transition of "tolerance" to "intolerance". As for confessional institutes, there can be considered the development of tolerance in religious confessional establishment. The complex of ideological values (including civil behavior norms) is related to the trivial level of religious consciousness, where the values of civil unity are combined with national forms of the world's religions.

REFERENCES

1. See V. E. Chirkin, *Constitutional Law of Foreign Countries.* Moscow, 2001 (Chapter 4. Constitutional Principles of Economic, Social, Political and Spiritual Life of Society); K.V. Aranovsky, *Constitutional Law of Foreign Countries*, Moscow, 1998 (chapter 2. Social and Economic Relations and Constitutional Law Regulation).
2. S. Y. Kashkin, "Constitutional Law Basis of the Framework of Society", in B. A. Strashun (ed.) *Constitutional Law of Foreign Countries.* Moscow, Norma, 2005, pp.263-270.
3. Though, as S. Holmes notes, in USA parents who choose religious schools for their children, receive taxing exemptions. See S. Holmes, "Church and State in Eastern Europe". *KPVO*, Vol.25, No. 4, 1998 and Vol.26, No.1, 1999, p.49.
4. Generally from the position of civilization approach, including its regional projections. See A. I. Bobkov and D. V. Shelepin, *Religious Security of East Siberian Region in Context of State Security* (The materials from Russian Science Conference 28-29 November 2004), pp.3-8.
5. See I. A. Arzumanov, *Transformation of Confessional Field of Baikal Siberia (20th-21st centuries): Complex Methodological Aspects of the Research*. Irkutsk, ChitSU, ISU, 2006, pp.13-95.
6. The 13th article of the constitution of Russian Federation says the following: "1. Ideological plurality shall be recognized in the Russian Federation. 2. No ideology may be instituted as a state-sponsored or mandatory ideology". Article 14 of Russian constitution says: "The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. Religious associations shall

be separated from the state, and shall be equal before the law".

7. Legislative acts of Russian Federation "On confessional freedom" 1990 and the law "On freedom of conscience and on Religious Associations" 1997 have established in the legislative field the level of comprehension of problems in society and culture, including the expansion of new religious trends.
8. *Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Forty-Fourth Ordinary Session*, 23rd Sitting, Strasburg, 1993. (15th paragraph).
9. "Declaration of principles on tolerance", signed in 1995 in Paris by 185 members of UNESCO, says: "Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace".
10. In Latin, the word "tolerantia" means "lenience".
11. N. V. Krouglova, *Tolerance: Genesis and Typology* (Dissertation) St Petersburg, 1998, p.5.
12. First of all, confessional differences, which include the differences not only in ceremonial practice, but also the contradictory positions of anthropo-doctrinal nature.
13. For example, in Russian Constitution (from 12-12-1993) the following statements are established: "The establishment and the activities of public associations, whose aims and actions are directed at forcible alteration of the fundamentals of constitutional governance and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation and undermining of the security of the state, the forming of armed units, the incitement of social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited"; See *The Constitution of Russian Federation*, Article 13, Paragraph 5.
14. See, Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General Assembly on November 25, 1981. Article 1, paragraph 3; Article 5, paragraph 5; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols, adopted in Rome on November 4, 1950. Article 9, paragraph 2; Convention of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Minsk on May 26, 1995. Article 10, paragraph 2 etc.
15. As I. V. Ponkin notes, the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation has put an end to a dispute about juridical or non-juridical nature of the term "a sect" by proving the use of it in the enactment on the case of the constitutional check of indents 3 and 4 of section 3 article 27 of the federal law "On the freedom of consciousness and religious associations" from

September 26, 1997, No. 125 FL. The reason for it was the complaints of Jehovah's Witnesses religious association in Jaroslav city and Church of praise religious association. See The Conclusion of I.V. Ponkin from 22. 03. 2004 on A. E. Sebentsov's suggestion to move an amendment in the federal law "On the freedom of consciousness and religious associations" (the variant from March 1, 2004) *http://state-religion.ru.*

16. See Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation, established by decree of the president of Russian Federation from September 9, 2000. Article 2, paragraph 6, "In the spiritual sphere" section; federal law "On counteraction of Extremist activities" Article 1. It should be noted, that this conceptual terminology spectrum still needs a normative legal elaboration.
17. *Vestnik gosudarstva* (In Mongolian) (Mongolian constitution), January 1992.
18. *Ibid*, ch.1, 1.
19. I. A. Arzumanov, *op.cit,* pp.105-126.

Soviet Policy towards the Buddhist Faith

Victor M. Mitypov

As regards the state-church relations in Russia, it is well known that in 1741 AD Buddhism was officially recognized as the state religion in Buryatia by a decree of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. Since for a long time there was no document regulating the legal status of Buddhist church, it was considered as a part of state machinery. However, in 1853 "Regulations" were made which formed the basic act to regulate mutual relations of church and the state and relations within the Buddhist church. This led to the centralization of church administration and management was formally concentrated in the hands of the head of Buddhist church - Bandido Khamba Lama. Yet, Buddhism as also other religions, particularly, Christian Orthodoxy remained legally deprived of civil rights and was firmly subordinated to the state.

At the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century, there existed a formal system of the church-state relations based on the laws of Russian empire. Under the influence of the first Russian revolution, the authorities attempted to change the church-state relations. On 17 April 1905, the decree of Emperor Nikolay II "Strengthening of Religious Tolerance" which expanded limits of religious freedom, was published, but it did not specify the legal basis of relations of the state and religions. In 1906, the Stolypin government introduced several religious laws in the Duma. These included laws about heterodox societies, and also about the state attitude to different confessions. However, no draft laws could become law as these were blocked by the State Duma and the State Council.

After the October Revolution in 1917, Russia followed the path of secularization which at the initial stage was focused on overcoming religion. Civil war sharply changed the political and legal status of the country. Though several projects for the reorganization of Buddhist church developed in 1917-1919, these did not find validity of the law. Ever since

1918, the original model of the government-religious sphere began to develop. Bolsheviks believed that in the system of government it was necessary to have the central establishment to fulfill the functions of the state supervision, regulations of religious questions, whose competence would include the sanction of disputes between religious societies as private persons and state and local authorities. For accomplishing these tasks of VIII (later on V) department was formed at Narkomyust under the guidance of L.A.Krasikov by decree of ÑPÊ issued on 8 May 1918. On 20 January 1918 the Decree on separating church from the state and schools from church formulated the essence and the contents of the separation of church and the state in the former USSR. It envisaged the lack of state legal control or compulsion defining citizen's attitude to religion and declared the right of each citizen to profess any religion, or not to profess any religion. It proclaimed the guarantee of full equality of citizens in their rights and duties, in spite of their attitude to religion. V. I. Lenin categorically objected to any registration of citizens along the principle of religious belonging. He decreed that "from all official acts any indication of a religious belonging of citizens is removed". This position of Lenin corresponded to the norms of democracy.

According to article 10 of this Decree, all church and religious societies submitted to general provisions on private societies and the unions and did not take any advantages or grants from the state, local autonomous and self-managing establishments. Another substantive provision of the Decree was the declaration of separation of school from church. According to Bolsheviks, religious associations in practice were the unique legal organizations which absorbed hostile elements in them. In 1922 in acts of the Soviet authority appeared the term "registration of a religious society" (Decree VTSIK dated 12 June 1922). According to VTSIK decision, from 3 August 1922, any religious society could not begin its activity without its registration in a department of management - provincial or *oblispolcom*. In 1924, after the Constitution of RSFSR adopted the circular of Narkomyust validating the circular [1] 254 (4 October 1924) in which it was especially emphasized, that the religious societies which had not registered within three months from the date of publication of the text of the Constitution, stood closed. The principle of registration of clerics was also kept though in point 54 of the decision "About religious associations", from 8 April 1929 it was unambiguously forbidden. The principle of "registration" implied direct interference of the state in church affairs.

Registration of religious societies in Buryatia started since 1923 as

per decisions adopted in 1922 by VTSIK and CPK BMSSR. In 1923-1924, during the first attempts to implement the Decree about separation of church from the state, agricultural lama's communes began to be formed within the Buddhist clergy in Aginsky, Kizhinginsky, Koimorsky and some other *datsans*. It was necessary to register such communes and to approve "Regulations of a labour community of Buddhist monks." Establishment and registration of religious societies caused inflow of the population to these societies and these societies existed for very short term.

The politics of local authorities concerning the Buddhist faith was determined by the general directions of the center on anti-religious struggle. In Buryatia republic, children below 18 years were forbidden to enter the *khuvaraks* and medical practice in *datsans* was also banned. On the basis of decrees and acts of ÑPK and decisions of local authorities the cattle, real estate and *datsans*' lands were turned over to the peasants. Such an attitude of the state to religion and church set in a process of repressive measures against the church. Various bodies of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs implemented party's directions "we fight with religion and fight really" through various punitive measures. The special role in struggle against "church counter-revolution" was carried out by VI Department of OGPU. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had various duties concerning religion: general supervision of their activity, registration (including regulations) and stock-taking; execution of the Decree "About separation of church from the state"; giving permissions to carry out the congresses, curbing any violations of the legislation. ÎGPU also supervised the political activities of clergy and bodies of church management.

Interference of temporal power into the church life started from the very existence of the Soviet authority. National Commissariat of Justice (V department) looked after legal matters of mutual relations of church and the state. All questions connected with the implementation of Decree and all other issues were resolved, according to the existing legislation. Later it was decided to create the separate state organization responsible for the church affairs, headed by a government official. Permanent Central Commission at Presidium VTSIK concerning cults which was headed by P.G.Smidovich, was founded on 8 April 1929. Simultaneously, corresponding commissions were created in Republics and Autonomous Regions, including in BMASSR. In their activities they were guided by VTSIK and ÑPÊ of RSFSR Decision of 8 April 1929 regarding religious associations. The state legislative body was directed towards undermining

and, finally, to liquidate the Buddhist faith. on 12-13 August 1929, bureau of the Buryat-Mongolian VKP (b) adopted the resolution "about anti-religious work", which determined the duties of state, party, Komsomol and other organizations in this direction. Even earlier in 1922, first religious Congress of Buddhists from two Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Regions DVR and RSFSR discussed "Regulations about management of spiritual affairs of Buddhists of Siberia" and "Regulations of an internal life of monks in Buddhist monasteries of Siberia" so that old imperial "Regulation of 1853" was replaced. The first document was for establishing the system of administrative control over lamaist church of Buryatia, the second was regarding regulations of Buddhist monasteries and rules of monastic community's life.

Actually, the activity of Buddhist clergy was regulated not by monastic canons, but by the decisions of "active workers" from laymen who under the offered project could easily have a majority in parish councils. In this manner, the problem of the control over clergy was solved, but it also limited the influence of lamas on laymen. In 1924, the Commission concerning religious cults was created at VTSYK RSFSR. Simultaneously, the Commissions concerning religious cults were organized at the Buryat-Mongolian regional and Verkhneudinsk city Councils. Their functions included distribution and an explanation of the normative acts, concerning religious sphere, consultations with regional and local Councils concerning stock-taking, registration and taxation of religious societies and priests, and also preliminary examination of construction, opening or closing of prayer houses - *datsans*, *dugans*.

The Decree "About separation of church from the state and school from church" was adopted in Buryat Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR) on 17 December 1925. The delay was due to need for using the special forms of the Soviet legislation of RSFSR on religion under the specific conditions of Buryatia. In 1925, the Commission on religious questions was created in BMASSR to control and determine policy concerning all religious associations of the Buryatia republic, and also to conduct anti-religious propagation at Burobkom RKP(b). The primary goals of the commission were study, management and control over all actions for the implementation of the Decree about separation of church from the state. On 25 December 1925, the decision of a bureau OBKOM RKP(b) established similar commissions on religious questions at *aymak* committees having the structure of Secretary *aykom* RKP(b), Chairman of *aymakispolkom* and authorized regional department ÎGPU.

There ensued a struggle between the followers of renovation and the conservatives within the Buddhist faith on the issue of accepting the decrees of 1925-27. The struggle concluded with the victory of the followers of renovation at the All-Union spiritual cathedral of Buddhists in June 1927. On the opening day of second All-Buryat Congress of Buddhists, the decision of the Central Electoral Committee and CPK BMASSR which deleted the words "Regulation" and "Charter" from registration, as being inappropriate to the Soviet legislation was published in the *Buryat-Mongolian Pravda* on 20 December 1925,. This decision determined the legal status of Buddhist church: it forbade dedication to spiritual status, training of a religious cult, acceptance to lama's community the persons who had not reached 18 years age. The minors had the right of return to secular life. The Congress approved the new edition of "Regulations".

In 1925-1927, BMASSR resolved questions of suffrages, calling of lamas to military service and about the rights of lamas to land tenure. The next step in the struggle against lamas was the instruction of Central Electoral Committee BMASSR issued on 10 August 1928 on carrying out "the combined system of measures on places." It provided for economic restrictions for lamas in the form of income, military and agricultural taxes, self-taxation, wood gathering, rent for *datsans* lands. By adopting such a complex set of measures, the state tried to undermine the economic vitality of Buddhist church.

The Soviet authorities created the mechanism of suppression and state control of religious organizations, and the state interfered in internal affairs and internal functions of the church. The Soviet legislation had fixed positions sharply narrowing the right of liberty of conscience and religion in the international-legal aspect. However, those legal positions did not work in practice, because the majority of them were not the norms of direct action.

Intercultural Relations in the Baikal

Olga V. Buraeva

Migration of people to the south of Eastern Siberia started during the period of 1620s to 1670s. The process of incorporation of this area was not short-term and easy, as a tax (*yasak*) was imposed. Evenks and Buryats struggled against it. However, strengthening of the Manchu-Chinese expansion influenced these people in joining Russia. By the end of 1650s and the beginning of 1660s, these people aspired for consolidation as a part of Russia. And soon after the joining of these territories with Russia, the settlement process had begun.

Firstly the population concentrated around the founded stockaded towns which were the centers of the tax (*yasak*) collection, border guarding and transport ways. The villages, small settlements (*zaimka*), large villages (*sloboda*) were growing around the banks of rivers in accordance with the advancement of Russians to the south and the east from Baikal. As a result, in the 17th century the ethnographic map of the territory was essentially changed. Russian villages alternated with Buryat villages (*ulus*) and Evenks settlements, which in turn led to the interaction of these ethnic groups.

Let us first look at the relations of representatives of different ethnocultural traditions in business and industrial spheres. During the period of 17th till the beginning of 18th century, the population mostly *sluzhilye*, was involved in the military - administrative measures, economic relations, primarily trade and organization of commercial production in its early stages. One can see the contact of two different-stages societies when the exogenous factor was found to have favorable effect on the course of ethnic and cultural processes thanks to concurrence of several circumstances.

First of all, the culture of a cattle-breeding society is characterized by the large-scale mobility both in direct and figurative sense. A dynamic way of house keeping: stationary migrates, developing new lands, high

degree of its technology and openness to the innovations, psychological adaptability and at the same time ability to save cultural tradition - all this promoted the natural and fast entry of the breeders into various kinds of ethnocultural contacts and establishment of strong symbiotic connections with societies of other economic - cultural types. The important point is that Buryats occupied the lands which were the bridge between two centers of the Western and Eastern civilizations, and thus played a historical role of the major contact zone.

The Baikal region had been involved in the process of cultural interaction of western and eastern centers of civilization from an antiquity that also determined the psychological readiness of the Buryats to closer interaction with the Russian culture, which established itself in the 17th and first half of the 18th century. To no small degree this was promoted also by ancient historical experience of Slavonic agricultural culture of Russians which from the early stages of their existence always actively interacted with nomadic cattle-breeding cultures of the Eurasian steppes. Cultural-genetic memory of Russian ethnos also had worked in this case.

Trade was and remains one of the forms of an inter-ethnic dialogue since ancient times. With the coming of Russians to Siberia, the trade relations of the Buryats had extended and modified. The natural character of an economy stipulated weak development of domestic trade. The trade had a travelling character. At the end of 1760s fixed trade outlet was opened in the border with Mongolia. Kyahhtinskaya trade had appreciable influence on the economic development of the region. The development of this trade became a stimulus for general development of the ethnic cultures, opening new ways for penetration of different innovations into it.

Geographical location of the region had made it an important point on the movement of goods from the East to the West and from Europe to Asia, which in turn had a stimulating influence on the local economy. The export trade demanded a service: processing, packing of goods, and their transportation on the carts to the west. Many inhabitants living along the roads were engaged in it. Carrier's trade developed to a large area and caretaking, blacksmith's work, cart's work, tanning manufacture developed along the roads. Kyakhta needed the goods made by Buryats and Evenks: furs, leather, lambskin, etc. Thus the export trade promoted not only the development of domestic trade, but also domestic economy as a whole.

At the end of the 17th century there were found deposits of lead,

copper and silver in Eastern Transbaikalia. From this moment, the industrial development of the mineral resources of Southeastern Siberia started. Both Buryats and Russians participated in the development and searches of mineral resources. As a result of the joint mining, and enterprises there was an exchange not only of certain professional skills and techniques, but also of behavioral directions. Information exchange among the participants of these searches, sometimes belonging to absolutely dissimilar ethno-cultural traditions, led to closer interaction.

Mines and factories laid down a heavy "yoke" on the population. The connection of Buryats with the industrial enterprises was manifested in delivery of raw materials, building materials and foodstuffs for the factory. Eastern-Siberian administration asked the Buryats to expand sheep-breeding for supplying the factories with wool, promising them with the awards *taisha.*

The urban population and the urban way of life played an important role in the development of ethnic contacts. Townspeople had usually more complicated ethnic and social structure than the neighboring population. Poly-ethnicity left its traces on the culture and way of life of the cities which boosted the process of intensive interaction.

The growth of colonization, development of external and domestic trade, origin of industrial enterprises, increase of the population in cities and at the factories, need for the foodstuffs for convicts and military units - all this increased the demand for agricultural products. Initial existence of two economic-cultural types during the second half of the 18th century was replaced by an active involvement of the Buryat population in the agricultural economy. This was also promoted by the series of the state decrees ensuring for the Buryats engaged in this activity, a most favored treatment. An agricultural occupation demanded from the Buryats mastery of new technologies, which in a historical perspective meant for the Buryat culture fast overcoming of phased development distance. Thus cattle-breeding remained for the Buryats a principal kind of management.

According to archival data, the pioneers of agriculture were tribal chiefs induced in every possible way by authorities. The population owning lands had more possibilities to purchase the agricultural implements, seeds etc. But the ploughing increased in the poor economies which were already under strain for living at the expense of only cattle-breeding. The requirement for money, which all social groups of the society had, promoted the development of a new branch of economy. Undoubtedly, the top of the Buryat society were the champions of Russian culture. Tribal chiefs

built Russian houses, acquired Russian furniture and utensils, clothes, food, and through them came the Russian culture to the Buryat society.

As a whole, by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, there were considerable innovations in the field of material culture of the native people of the region. The degree of this influence was determined by two circumstances: duration of the neighbourhood with Russian village and agricultural development, which strengthened the contacts and entailed transition to the settled way of life stimulating changes in many fields of material culture such as food, clothes etc.

The language communication, since the 17th century, was maintained thanks to the bilingualism of considerable proportion of the population. In the 17th-18th centuries, the population of Southeast Siberia (excepting special institute of interpreters), knew two or more languages and functionally applied them. And thus originated the elements of new relations. As integrated and differential features represent dialectic unity, with the starting of bilingualism in 17th century in poly-ethnic Siberian environment appeared, the means of ethnocultural approach, and also the consolidation processes of nationalities of Siberia.

Christianity also promoted the transition of the Buryats to the settled way of life, changed their mode of life and brought them into more close contacts with Russians in household activities and family connections. However, Christianity did not destroy the religious outlook of the Buryats. Alongside with Christian gods there were huts, spirits and *tengrii* in the world outlook of the local population. In the 18th century, the first teachers from the Buryats appeared who would become transmitters of secular enlightenment among the fellow-countrymen. For the first time in the beginning of the 18th century, smallpox vaccination was conducted among the Buryat children, which was a major event in the life of all population, because smallpox, plague and other diseases were social disaster for peoples of Pribaikalye.

Inter-ethnic contacts between Russians and Buryats were also cemented by mixed marriages. The whole settlements with mixed population were thus formed. Mixed marriages changed the external appearance of Russians and Buryats. In the 17th-18th centuries, Russians owing to their small number, remained under the greater influence of the Buryats. The mixed population equally knew Russian and also Buryat languages though Buryat was prevalent. They appreciated and followed economic, social features, traditions and customs of both the ethnic groups.

This inter-ethnic engagement played an important role in the

neighbourhood in a broad sense (being zones of inter-ethnic contacts), and in more limited manner (for example, the neighbourhood along the street, or on agricultural lands, etc.). There were a number of everyday situations which led the population into closer inter-ethnic contacts.

Every decade, Buryat village (*ulus*) and Russian village were merging in the general economic life of Eastern Siberia more and more. The need for money induced the people to develop those branches of economy which would enable them receive commodity production easily and which could be sold in a local market. Such branch was, first of all, agriculture. For further development, haying was done by the Buryats. For more haymaking Buryats created *Utugi* - well fertilized and irrigated meadows. *Utugi* gave hay two times more than unfertilized mowings. Russian peasants adopted this practice from the Buryats.

Inter-ethnic contacts and interaction of ethnic groups found an expression in their way of life and were its integral parts. It was and is a natural historical process of an exchange by activity and its outcomes. Being realized in the formal and personal behavior, inter-ethnic contacts embraced practically all forms of culture and household activities. Essentially the change of ethnic properties occurred at a personal level.

The Role of Old Believers in the Baikal Region

Svetlana V. Vasiljeava

Russia has always been and still stays multiconfessional country. Its people have belonged and still belong to different religions and faiths – Christianity (in the form of old Orthodoxy – Old Believers, Orthodoxy and Catholicism), Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and many others. Religious life of the country has never been easy and monosemantic.

During the last few years some historic events have occurred in the culture of Baikal region, alongwith some changes in the values of different cultures and religions, which vary according to the ethnic divisions. Whereas Cossacks are oriented towards the cathedral Orthodoxy and towards the cultural historic achievements of their social class, Buryats are oriented towards cultural values of the Orient, Mongolian speaking world and Buddhism; and Old Believers of Baikal region look towards the cultural achievements of Russia. Such a situation has existed for centuries, mainly seeped in national spirituality and also due to the pressure of large scale experiment of creating a new social culture.

The attitude of Russian groups which came to the Baikal region and became the most numerous population, towards cultural and historic confessions is very important. The history of their formation in the Baikal region is quite complicated and has a lot of peculiarities. Old Believers of the Baikal are considered to be a specific branch of the Russian people. Due to their refusal to accept new rules and different innovations in Russian Orthodox Church during the 18th century, the ancestors of Old Believers were forced to flee to the remote parts of the country and abroad in order to escape from pursuit.

While living in Zabaikalye, Old Believers got the name *Semeyskie*. This specific ethnonym (ethnic term) is connected with the fact that Old

Believers settled in big families. For Old Believers of Gorny Altai the ethnonym was *kamenshiki*, *polyaki*, *kerzhaki*. For Old Believers of Romania and Moldavia it was *lipovane*; for Old Believers of South Ural *kulguri*; for the Old Believers of USA *harbinci*; and for Old Believers of Turkey *nekrasovci* and so on. In the official documents of Russian empire, Old Believers were given the name *raskolniki*[1] (splitters), and it was considered as an offensive term.

The Culture of Old Believers (*Semeyskie*) during the period of adaptation had mostly traditional character, and its development had two trends: the essence of the first one was the self-preservation of conservative traditions of Russia during the 13th-17th centuries, that corresponded with safeguarding the cultural tradition. The essence of the second trend – interdependence and influences of different social environments, various ethnic groups, which resulted in the innovations and changes in their culture. The process of the formation of Old Believers in Zabaikalye was gradual. The researchers point to some stages[2] in the development of this formation, which are characterized by meaningful changes that happened in the life of Old Believers in different periods of time.

1. The first period started from the beginning of schism in Russia in the 17th century till the formation of spiritual centers in Vetka (from where Old Believers of Zabaikalye were evicted).
2. The second period is associated with the foundation of cultural and religious centers of Old Believers in Vetka (today it is Gomelskaya Oblast in Byelorussia). The culture of Old Believers had mostly been traditional, but in spite of quite a high degree of traditionalism, it could not fail to have some innovations.
3. The third period of the formation of Old Believers' culture existed in the Zabaikalye area, that is, since their removal to this area till the second half of the 18th century. This period had a range of peculiarities: remoteness from the maternal ethnic group, uneven density of population, local migration process.
4. The fourth period is considered to be the blossoming of the culture of Old Believers. The second half of the 19th century was marked by the increase in the number of cultural buildings; by the growth of Old Believers' population; by their economic welfare, which was accompanied not only by the delivery of goods to the market of Zabaikalye, but also to its borders; the development of folk

creative work which was characterized by the presence of various styles in the technique of wood engraving, house painting, jeweller's art of Old Believers, resulting in blossoming and enrichment of folk tradition.

5. New period in the history of Old Believers began after the Great October Revolution, when the life of Old Believers changed a lot, because the Government began to influence all the confessions and ethnic groups in Russia. The main peculiarities of that period were: the disintegration of religious unions, abandoning the Churches and temples for simple peasant's houses, "secret" Old Believers Unity, disassociation of the population from religion.
6. The next period starts towards the end of the 20th century with the beginning of the renaissance of Old Believers culture. It has been characterized by the process of the formation of the religious Old Believers unions. In Buryatia there are about 18 Old Believers Unions such as The Tarbagataiskiy Center of Family Culture, the Republican Center of Old Believers Culture Studies, the Union of Old Believers; religious communities (in the villages Hasutra, Bichura, Kuytun, in Ulan-Ude – Verchneudinskaya community, Old Believers Center). The first arrival of Old Believers of Zabaikalye in 1993 is considered to be the most important event in the first grade of the organized Old Believers movement, a specific moment in the confessional history in contemporary times, which is the result of changes in the ideological worldview of Old Believers. At the first Meeting of Old Believers, the official documents like the Charter of Old Believers Community of Zabaikalye and the program of culture – developing activities during 1993-1996 were adopted.

The beginning of the 21st century witnessed several important events in the studies of history, culture and language of Old Believers of Zabaikalye. In October 2000, a Scientific Conference devoted to the problems of history, culture and language of Old Believers of Zabaikalye was held in Ulan-Ude. In June 2001 the Russian Scientific Conference concerning the problems of Old Believers of Siberia and Far East was organised in Ulan Ude, the capital of Buryatia. In May 2007 an International forum *Avvakum's Way*, where not only the scientists, but also the representatives of Old Believers from all over the world met – from Canada, Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, China, Japan and Latvia, was held in Ulan-Ude.

In contrast to the voluntary settlement process of Old Believers in Russia, Western Siberia and Far East, they entered Zabaikalye either as exiles or as colonists and settled there. Essentially there were the exiles. This fact led the government conduct very cautious policies towards the native population of the area, including religious affairs.

From Verchoturye a lot of horse-drawn vehicles, carts and sledges, transporting the necessary house-hold implements, ran to unknown Siberia through the old Moscow highway. It was the way to Zabaikalye, where the runaway Old Believers from central Russia were sent. The first period of the exile of Old Believers begins in 1735 AD, though more numerous settlements in the territory of Zabaikalye had not been observed during that period. The most numerous exodus was in 1746, when 14 parties out of 23 groups of Old Believers settled in Zabaikalye.

According to Bolonev's research, one may define the number of the settlers, which was determined by the quantity of the food-stuff given to Old Believers and their convoy, and also the route of Old Believers (Bug, Vinnica, Gorohov, Boh, Berdyaev, Starodubi, Vetka, Kaluga, Kazan, Tobolsk, Baraba, Altai, Zabaikalye). Old Believers from Poland were sent to Kaluga, through waterways by the Oka and the Volga to Kazan. There the parties of Old Believers were divided. One group comprising 8 parties was sent to Ekaterinburg, the other one of 14 parties was sent to Tobolsk, Verchorutye, after which Old Believers were sent to Altai and Zabaikalye.

During 60s and 70s of the 18th century a number of big peasants villages appeared in Zabaikalye, situated in the drainage-basin of the river Selenga. Mostly Old Believers were settled near native old residences. So, by the end of the 18th century the process of sanctioned removal had assumed systematic and mass character. Being unevenly distributed on the territory of the area, the member of settlers was increasing constantly due to the migration processes and also due to the natural growth of the population. As a result of the shifting of Old Believers in the 18th century to Zabaikalye, the territorial center of Old Believers was thus founded. So, about 5000 settlers of Old Believers found place to live there, and in the 18th-19th centuries, due to the overpopulation of villages along the rivers, local migration process began taking into account various factors such as the religious ideology of different followers, lack of land and also the growth of Old Believers family clans.

Since the middle of the 19th century, "distant" migrations had begun, when the Old Believers of Zabaikalye moved to North Siberia and Far East. Due to their shifting to Ayanski Highway, which was not properly

organized by the Government and severe climate conditions, the plans to settle in Yakutia could not be materialised. So, some of them returned back to Zabaikalye, and some went to Far East. And it helped in integrating Zabaikalye with the political, economic and cultural sphere of the Far East of Russia.

The absence of the united religious center, united spiritual power among the defenders of Old Believers led to their splitting into different trends and directions. The general scientific classification distinguishes two main branches: those, who stress the necessity of clergy (*Popovshina*) and those, who discount its necessity (*Bespopovshina*). Also, both of these branches, especially Bespopovshina, are divided into small groups and unions.

The specific character of the religious life of Old Believers in Zabaikalye consisted of the diversity of different laws and agreements inside the main branches, which reflected the organized search for truth in the philosophical, religious understanding, change in ideological orientations, the main point of the confessional group, which is far from spiritual religious centers. It is necessary to stress that the ideology of Old Believers and their world outlook was formed deliberately. The only spiritual mentors of Old Believers in Zabaikalye were the priests, far removed from the official Orthodoxy, runaway priests and regulators. In the period of living in Zabaikalye the mass event for Old Believers was the denial of confession and communion in Orthodox churches because of their religious beliefs. They did not cross their children in Orthodox temples, but brought them up in the way of their old beliefs, for what they had been warned by the official church and the regime.

The main peculiarities of the formation and the development of Old Believers in Zabaikalye consisted in the fact that the basis of their ideology was religious ethics, which determined their attitude to the household activity, the surrounding population, and also to the state institutions. Till the 20th century, the Ministry of Internal Affairs worked out the main principles of influencing Old Believers and the control over the region was carried out by the Secret Committee of Split[3]. The missionary activity of the Orthodox Church among the Old Believers of Zabaikalye[4] did not have any results, as for a long time the official church considered Old Believers to be heretics, deserving only punishment. Old Believers, in their turn, resisted proclaiming the united belief, displayed their protest against oppression, arrests of the priests and sealing of chapels. They adhered, illegally, to the rules of their old beliefs.

Russian laws were in force in Zabaikalye as well as they were common for the whole country. But the number of secret resolutions shows that the Government took into consideration some activities of Old Believers. It was connected with the fact, that Zabaikalye, being the most important region with regard to the communication of Russian State with the Far East, Mongolia and China, played a great role in the firm establishment of Russia in the East, concerning the foreign policies and domestic politics of the Empire. The importance of the foundation of the new constant Russian population in the area and the importance of economic mastery over Zabaikalye by this Russian population were taken into consideration. Old Believers were admitted as the most necessary branch of the settlers. While they got used to any conditions and developed all the spheres of economies quite fast, they almost did not assimilate. That is why in the region of Zabaikalye the laws, limiting the position of Old Believers, were not always put into practice, or one may say were not very strict. The Government was more concerned about the spread of Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodox Church relied on the help of the Soviet power. As a rule, the government policy in the sphere of religion was conducted according to the practical need of the region.

Considering Old Believers of Zabaikalye as local settlers[5], one can agree with the fact "…that for them such processes, as consolidation, inter-ethnic integration, and then assimilation were natural. But the degree of their manifestation differed from time to time. During the first period of their removal and settlement consolidation had a great dominance, later on inter-ethnic integration was observed. The process of assimilation was not spread much among Old Believers of the region of Zabaikalye. The degree of traditionalism and conservatism was too high in its culture, and also there were some elements of resistance to the influence of other cultures[6]."

Thus, the formation and the development of Old Believers in the region of Zabaikalye as a social phenomenon was determined not only by its inner reserves, inner processes of consolidation and unity, but it also depended on policies of local administration, position of the Church, and on the support of local population, whose world outlook was based on the Oriental mentality, traditions of shamanism and Buddhism.

References

1. S. V. Vasilyeva, *Regime and Old Believers of Zabaikalye* (from the end of the 17th century- the beginning of the 20th century). Ulan-Ude, Buryat State University Press, 2007. p. 5.
2. E. V. Petrova, Social and Cultural Adaptation of Old Believers in Zabaikalye. *Ethnosociological Analysis*. Ulan-Ude, 1995. pp. 123-126.
3. GAIO.F.50. Op.8.D.556.L.67.
4. NARB. F.478. Op.2. D5a.L.89.
5. E. V. Petrova, *op.cit.,* pp.21-22.
6. F.F. Bolonev and S. V. Vasilyeva, "Traditional Culture of Old Believers of Zabaikalye", *The World of Old Believers*, Issue 4, 1998, p. 400.

Administrative-Territorial Division of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1937

E. Palkhaeva

The year 1937 was crucial in the history of the state development and the national policy of Buryatia because the administrative-territorial division of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was undertaken in that year.

Izvestia TsIK SSSR i VTsIK dated 27 September 1937, the Republican newspaper *Buryat-Mongolskaya Pravda* (Ulan-Ude) and *Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda* (Irkutsk) dated 28 September 1937 published the news about the division of East-Siberian province into Irkutsk and Chita provinces. The resolution of the Central Executive Committee dated 26 September 1937 read: "…5. Alarsky, Bokhansky, Ekhirit-Bulagatsky and Olkhonsky districts (*aimak*) of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to join the Irkutsk region.6. To form the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat-Mongolian national district (*okrug*) in the structure of the Irkutsk region with the administrative center in the settlement Ust-Orda."[1] At the same time the Olkhonsky district (*aimak*) was not included in the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat-Mongolian national district (*okrug*). It was placed under the direct subjection of the Irkutsk region.

Until September 1937 the whole autonomy process of the Buryat people can be clearly explained from the historical perspective. All the actions and decisions concerning the formation of the Buryat-Mongolian autonomous districts of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Far East Republic (FER) as well as the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR) were taken as a result of the continued public work of the local authority and authorized organs of the central government (the Peoples' Land Committee, the Central

Executive Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks). So this resolution came as a surprise for the Republic as it had been made without the participation of the local organs of the republican government. The misunderstanding got further deepened due to the absence of the republican leaders, who had by that time been subjected to repression. Besides, the Buryat Central Executive Committee and the Buryat regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party did not agree to this change.[2] This resolution also contradicted Article 15 of the Constitution of the Buryat –Mongolian ASSR which stated: "the territory of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR cannot be changed without the agreement of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR."[3]

In the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR dated 26 September 1937 the division of the Republic into three administrative units was declared and the reasons for this action of the central government were not explained. The scientists could "afford" to analyze the events and debate their reasons only with the beginning of the democratization in our society. The scientific viewpoints on this issue can be conventionally subdivided into two groups:

1. The division of the Republic had a positive impact on further development.
2. The division of the Republic had a negative impact on further development.

The representatives of the first group (the researchers from Novosibirsk such as V. A. Demidov, V. V. Demidov and V. S. Poznansky) positively evaluate the resolution of the central government and say that it corresponded with the specific historical conditions and took into account the economic, geographical and national factors.[4] This opinion is based upon the thesis of the geographical remoteness of the Buryat districts (*okrug*) from the central Buryat-Mongolia. In the condition of the underdeveloped regional infrastructure (the absence of operational communications, good roads, means of transport and so on) there were serious problems concerning the supply to these territories and their administration. Besides the accession of the Buryat districts (*aimaks*) with their potential agricultural area (corn farming, dairy and cattle breeding) was extremely important for the economy of the Irkutsk region.

The resolution of the Center on the division and accession of the part of the territory of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR to newly formed regions was promoted by the previous territorial disputes of the Republic with

the neighboring regions (*guberniya*). It is known, that the Irkutsk regional executive committee was against the formation of the Republic in 1923. That the Irkutsk regional authorities had initiated the project on the formation of the Lensko-Baikalsky region (it was supposed that the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR were to merge the new region as a district (*okrug*), testifies to the existence of the territorial claims of the Irkutsk *guberniya* to the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. According to V.A.Demidov, V.V.Demidov and V.S.Poznansky, the above cited resolution of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the USSR was meant to solve this problem. Until the 1990s, this viewpoint was prevalent and common in historical literature and it was dictated by the political requirements of that time. The resolution of the CEC of the USSR and the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks couldn't be described as "wrong."

With the beginning of the democratization of the Soviet society, a different viewpoint on this problem was introduced. For example, in the book *The History of the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat Autonomous Okrug* edited by L.M.Damesheka it is stated, that the formation of *okrugs* from the *aimaks* of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR and other territories was aimed at not only the division, but also at the peculiar territorial isolation of the Republic, which had been "infected by pan-Mongolism" and other "typical diseases" of that time. The Irkutsk region appeared to be a much more reliable district, because a faithful Stalin's team-mate, A.S.Shcherbakov had been working there in 1936-1937. He was an "outstanding" public figure of the Communist Party of the Soviet state, the First Secretary of the regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.[5]

Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiyev states definitely that the division of the Republic, the transfer of the six *aimaks* to the neighboring regions had a rather negative impact. The Republic was weakened politically and economically as its territory was reduced and the unity of the national economy of the Buryat people was destroyed. The relations between different groups of Buryats were weakened and the national consolidation of Buryats was terminated. Since that time the deformation of our national language, our national traditions and customs began. In conclusion it is said that in 1937 an anti-constitutional action was undertaken and this action was discriminatory in regard to the Buryat-Mongolian people as their sovereign right to self-determination was violated. As a consequence of the territorial changes in 1937, cultural and ethnic ties were weakened, and the process of the formation of unified culture, unified written and

standard languages was slowed down. Buryats, living outside the Republic, turned out to be in a position of inequality to those living on the territory of the Republic in cultural, language and national life. With the result, there have been whole generations of Buryats who are unable to speak their mother tongue. The division of the Buryat people had a negative impact on the demographic process and on the growth of Buryat population. In general, the ethnic territory of Buryats was reduced considerably.

Many other modern scientists share the same opinion. For example, I.S.Urbanayeva, T.M.Mikhailov, Y. B.Randalov and I.D.Burayev take up the position that "in the Irkutsk region of Olkhonsky, Verkholensky (Kachuksky), Kitoisky, Molkinsky (Balagansky), Saitutsky and Nizheudinsky, Buryats turned out to be outside the national government structures. Moreover, if the total territory of Alarsky, Bokhansky and Ekhirit-Bulagatsky districts comprised 240,000 square kilometers, now it is just 129,000 square kilometers".[6]

The main reasons of the division of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR are rooted in the general policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet state with regard to the nationalities question. Class approach towards the nationalities problem determined the change in the policy of the party which depended upon the specific historical situation. While the threat of war from the militaristic Japan was increasing, the process of the national formation in the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR (the largest autonomous district on the territory of East Siberia) did not suit the Soviet state at that time. During the period 1930-1937, the military alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan - the so called "anti-Comintern pact" was formed. The Soviet government realized that the formation of the Berlin-Tokyo- Rome axis was the first step towards the unleashing of a new world war, into which the USSR would be inevitably sucked in. While making defence preparations, the Soviet military authorities divided the territory of the USSR conventionally into two theatres of military operations, the western and the eastern ones. The Soviet military doctrine at the end of the 1930s was based upon an offensive strategy in the western theatre of military operations and upon a defensive one in the eastern part. Taking into account this strategy, the Soviet government began in 1930-1937, the formation and the fortification of the military defense of East Siberia and the Far East at an accelerated pace. The haste, with which the Soviet government had begun to carry out the assigned objectives, could be explained by the increasing tension

on the far-eastern border. At the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, Japan organized a number of famous provocations against the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. In 1937 the Japanese troops intruded into northern China, took Peking, Tianjin, Shanghai and other big cities. In summer of 1938 there was a military conflict on the territory of the USSR near Khasan lake. In May 1939 the Japanese troops intruded into Mongolia.

In our opinion, in these circumstances of increasing political and military tension on the far-eastern frontiers of the USSR, the geopolitical position of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR was one of the decisive factors in the strategic planning of the Soviet government particularly in matters concerning the fortification of the military defence of East Siberia and the Far East. The territory of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, namely the part of the Trans-Siberian railway which passed through it, was the only link between the central part of Russia and the Far East (from the southern border on Mongolia and from the north- lake Baikal). In case of losing control over this territory, the former Soviet Union would have been literally "cut" into two parts. The importance of this question was evident for the government, because it was during that period that it was resolved to build the Baikal-Amur Railway as an alternative to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

While preparing for the war, the Soviet government used all possible means and methods, even illegal, trying to bring political stability and control in the frontier districts. For example since August till December 1937, NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs) by the direct order of I.V.Stalin "mopped up" "politically unreliable elements" in the frontier territory. Consequently, 120,000 Koreans and 8,000 Chinese were forcibly displaced from the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, the Chita region, Khabarovsky territory and Primorsky Krai to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics. According to a researcher of the Buryat history, A.A.Yelayev, "the Center didn't dare to deport Buryats from those *aimaks* (districts) which were outside the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, because Buryats unlike Koreans and Chinese had their own national state sub-division. That's why they didn't belong according to the accepted classification to the so called "moving ethnic groups", that didn't have class structure and so called historical territory, the latter being an excuse for their deportation.[7]

However the problem of "the link – the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR" had to be solved by all means, since the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party couldn't afford to have even a thought about

the possibility of the nationalistic separatism (in the form of " pan-Mongolism") in the Republic, which was the largest and the only national (ethnic) entity in the region. That's why the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee decided to weaken the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR as a national (ethnic) entity by dividing its territory into three parts.

The reasons for the division of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR lie in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy of the former USSR which was implemented by the Soviet party leadership in the second half of the 1930s. But the main reason was the functioning of a totalitarian system existent at that time. Totalitarian system doesn't recognize the supremacy of law, but follows the guidelines of subjective expediency. A vivid example of such practice is the division of the territory of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, when the territorial integrity of the region was sacrificed to the subjective idea of "the frontier autonomy without pan-Mongolism and secure defense of the eastern borders."

The division of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, undertaken in September 1937 according to the Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Political Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party resulted in the isolation of 6 *aimaks* (districts) from the Autonomous Republic, which were joined to the Irkutsk and the Chita regions as national districts (*okrug*)- the Aginsky Buryat-Mongolian Okrug and the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat-Mongolian Okrug. The official premise of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR division is the geographical factor, economic expediency, previous territorial disputes between the Autonomous Republic and the neighboring regions and the domestic policy of Stalin's totalitarian regime. True reasons for the division of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR lie in the so called struggle against "pan-Mongolism", which allegedly "infected" the Autonomous Republic and served the interests of militaristic Japan, whose aggressive actions represented a direct war threat to the USSR. Evaluating the consequences of the division of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, it should be pointed out that it had a rather negative impact on the development of Buryat-Mongols that resulted in reducing their ethnic population and their territory of residence, besides the rupture of the ethnic-cultural and economic relations of the people.

Notes

1. G.L. Sanzhiyev and N.A. Khuduguyev, *Buryat regional organization of the Communist Party of the USSR. Chronicle. 1895-1987*. Book one, Ulan-Ude, 1987, pp.208-209.
2. A.A. Yelayev, *The Way Towards the Autonomy and the State System.* Moscow, 1994, pp.124-125.
3. *Constitution of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.* Ulan-Ude, 1938, Art.15.
4. V.A. Demidov, V.V. Demidov and V.S. Poznansky, *The Peoples of Siberia on the way of Internationalism.* Novosibirsk, 1990. p.80.
5. L.M.Damesheka (ed.), *The History of the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat Autonomous Okrug.* Moscow, 1995, p.436
6. I.S. Urbanayeva, T.M. Mikhailov, Y.B. Randalov and I.D. Burayev, *Nationalities Question in Buryatia.* Ulan-Ude, 1989, p.5
7. "How Unified Buryat-Mongolia Disappeared, 1937-1958", *The Congress of the Buryat People*. Ulan-Ude, 1997, pp. 41-43

Peculiarities of Socialist Industrialization in Buryatia

Marina N. Baldano

Industrialization is an objective natural phenomenon of historical development with its peculiarities and specific features in different countries. Here it is important not so much to understand the global parameters of industrialization, it is as to look at the dynamics of the process of its realization in Buryatia. This region is peculiar for its unique experience of accelerated industrial development that was realized in the framework of several types of social, political and economic systems. The process of creation and development of industry and other brunches of national economy as well as formation of the working class had its peculiar features in Buryatia due to historical, geographical, economic and national reasons.

It is difficult to disagree with A.G. Vishnevsky's point of view on the modernization process in Russia. In his opinion, on the one hand, Russia did not "drop out of history" in the 20th century, and "the thirty years were the years of industrial jerk which cannot be denied and which created the basis for transformation of the USSR into powerful industrial state," and on the other hand, the Soviet modernization was conservative and not complete.[1] To create more or less perfect material and technical machinery of modern industrial economy is really half-business whereas the second half (to inhale life in it), is "to build in" mechanisms of self-development. Such mechanisms developed gradually in the West, together with the industry itself, whereas in the former Soviet Union industrialization was artificial in many respects, based on borrowing of ready technologies and some organizational forms. The mobilization model of early Soviet economy made such borrowing possible in very short term, but it led to suppression of the market mechanisms generating stimulus to

development. Its functioning in logic was reproduced, certainly, in the medieval principles of vertical hierarchy, natural economy, personal dependence, etc. That is why it quickly exhausted its possibilities.[2]

The basic features of socialist industrialization are as follows: a) in terms of purpose - achieving economic independence, transformation of the USSR from the country importing machinery to the country making the machinery; b) in terms of methods - an emphasis on development of the branches of heavy industry, development of the industry on the basis of five year plans; c) in terms of time and rates of realization - prompt industrial growth, the highest rates of pre-war five-year periods; d) in terms of price - high rates were provided due to swapping means from agrarian to industrial sector, and also due to means of the population – this was characteristic both for the country as a whole, and for its regions.

The economic base of the country was built within the years of forced industrialization. Industrial development was carried out on the basis of state sector with planned and centralized mechanisms of economy, public property, and by means of non-economic (including ideological) methods such as by stimulating mass enthusiasm of workers. There is no doubt that in such a short period from 1929 to 1941, essential break in economic development and creation of enormous military-industrial, intellectual, scientific, technical and technological structure was developed in the former USSR.

At the same time there existed rather low standard of living and rather low demands of mass groups of the population during the Soviet period. They were mostly formed because of closeness of the country, which was due to the Soviet ideology and unfavorable social experience: war, post-war mobilization, a low claims.

The policy of leveling of levels of economic development of national outlying districts and regions that began in the end of 1920s, has been closely connected with the carrying out of forced industrialization. But within the framework of existing system proper economic questions, such as mutual settlement between territories and branches of economy, had no special importance. All calculations and parameters were defined and formed on the basis of all-Union planned targets. From this point of view, both the country as a whole, and its individual territories were only objects for realization of decisions of higher level bodies of hierarchy of the government.

Industrialization of Buryatia began on the basis of already created large-scale industry in the central areas. Rates of growth of capital

investment in the industry of Republic in the first five-year period were much higher than in the country as a whole. This meant, on the one hand, forced development of the industry of Buryatia, and on the other hand, of low starting level of the Republic.

Peculiar feature of industrialization of Buryatia was creation of industry almost from zero point. Working class of the Republic and local engineering and technical intelligentsia were formed in this process. Working collectives were recruited from former peasants. This along with irregularity in supply and absence of normal life conditions, aggravated difficulties in construction and operation of industrial enterprises. At the same time workers, engineers and technicians from the central regions of the country arrived in the Republic which, in turn, was an important factor contributing to the preparation of qualified workers from the local population including the Buryats. The working class of the Republic was formed not as national, but as multinational with rather small share of Buryats in its structure.

Working class of Buryatia during the reconstruction period was formed from individual peasants, farm laborers, jobless people; during industrialization years and the following period it was formed from collective-farm peasantry of the Republic, qualified workers from the central regions of the country, youth and the population not employed in the national economy. Ways of formation were the organized recruitment under contracts, planned movement of labor from other regions of the country, free employment, or self- recruitment of labor in the enterprises.

In the first five-year period according to the plan of industrialization the 118 enterprises including several large enterprises were constructed - mechanized glass factory, Verkhneudinsk power station, locomotive repair factory, meat factory, Dzida volphrame and molybdenum combine. Metal working, machine building, mining, coal, building materials industry, wood and other branches of industry were created. Capital construction of Buryatia passed the way from Verkhneudinsk building office and departments of capital construction to single whole territorial building organizations with well developed internal specialization.

The largest allocations were directed to the industry, first of all, in branches of all-Union specialization. Capital construction in Buryatia demanded increased expenses in connection with the creation of common conditions of development of industry, transport, electricity supply, auxiliary and maintenance branches, housing and community services, delivery of materials and equipment for long distances.

Industrialization of the Soviet Union was done at high cost. It could not be different, considering, that the choice was made in favor of prompt achievement of economic independence, creation of a complex of branches of heavy and defense industry, with emphasis on own material and manpower resources and forced refusal of help from outside.

Any variant of transition to industrial economy in each country is carried out sensitively as it is accompanied by significant redistribution of national income in the accumulation fund. In the former USSR, in conditions of industrialization the share of accumulation fund was very high. The share of gross capital investments in the national income in Buryatia in the first five-year period rose up to 38 % while in other countries it equalled 5-10 %, and remained 30-35 % up to the beginning of the Second World War.

Looking back in the past, it is necessary to recognize that the variant of development chosen at the end of 1920s by the leadership of the former USSR, was not radically incorrect. But certainly, serious tactical mistakes took place. The most important of them was underestimation of material stimulus not only at the level of an individual worker, but for the whole economy, all its subjects. Another mistake was the faulty development of planning. The increase of nomenclature of produced goods and quantity of enterprises demanded transition from planning of concrete products for concrete enterprises to planning of branch and regional proportions, search for optimum ratio of expenses and incomes. But the Soviet planning was not ready for this.

However, in any case it is possible to ascertain that the growth of production, both in the country and in Buryatia, was rather significant. Industrialization was carried out by extensive methods, with huge costs, being accompanied by high inflation. The growth of industrial production was achieved mostly due to putting into operation of new objects.

The centralized, command, administrative and directive model formed during accelerated industrialization, allowed the country to overcome the phase of backlog from the states of Western Europe in the development of productive forces and passing to the main stages of industrialization. However, the former Soviet Union always was a catching up country in technical and economic development which was connected with modernization. But despite all efforts, it did not manage to achieve the strategy of outstrip development.

Industrialization of the economy of the Republic was completed in the late 1950s on the whole. Natural resources and historically developed

economic base determined the specialization of Buryatia in the single economic complex of the USSR and Russia. During the period 1960-1980s, big changes took place in economic and social development of Buryatia. Significant changes in the industrial transformation which embraced all spheres of economy - industry, construction, transport, communication and other branches, were carried out. Further industrialization for them meant essentially new stage of growth. In each branch it had its own specific features determined, first of all, by peculiarity of production. At the same time common trends that influenced the economic situation in general, were revealed.

Industrial development took place on the basis of centralized plan and directive, limit and distributive mechanism, directive pricing; the economic mechanism causing extensive growth; weak economic stimulus; prevailing technocratism in thinking of heads of various ranks.

Dynamics of social structure of the population of Buryatia during the period 1960-1980s testified to significant industrial development of the society. It resulted in the growth of number and proportion of office employees, first of all, engineering and technical intelligentsia, specialists of various branches of economy. Noted changes in the social and class structure in many respects were the result of strong-willed regulation from administrative and command system.

The working class began to prevail in the social structure of the population of the Republic and a national working class was thus formed. Their general educational and qualifying level was raised. However, the system of preparation of qualified personnel for the industry had a number of essential drawbacks. For instance the qualification of workers was lower. The listed processes were inconsistent: big economic, social and psychological problems of work (difficulties in involving and securing youth and women at production, dissatisfaction with work, fluctuation of manpower, etc.) continued to remain.

The growth of number of industrial enterprises led to intensification of anthropogenic load on natural ecological system. In spite of the fact that some measures for improvement of natural utilization system were undertaken (stopping of unsystematic wood felling, prohibition on wood floating on the Baikal and all rivers, creation of natural reserves, construction of sewage disposal facilities, etc.), development of production forces continued at the cost of steadfast destruction of natural potential.

Refusal to solve structural problems in industry led to the crisis in the Soviet industry which began in the mid-1970s in the system where, one

would think, all features of industrially developed economy were present. A number of indicators testified to the crisis: falling of industrial growth rate, labor productivity (while demographic situation was worsening), reduction of capital investments return, investment boom and growth of incomplete construction, reduction of consumption. The situation was the result of various long-term tendencies and specific economic policy.

Perestroika, determined as "reconstruction" of the building of the Soviet society as a whole, in practice led to destruction and disintegration of the system. Parameters of industrial production increase did not cease to decrease, having achieved a zero level in 1989 and having noted 10 percent reduction in the first half of the year 1991. None of the reforms carried out in the economy led to any positive results. The socialist system of economic management made more and more mistakes in its basic part - planning. Frequent plan updating, discrepancy of annual plans to five years' tasks were only a part of the crisis in the economy. The reasons of the crisis in the planning system lay in the fact that in the new conditions budgetary distribution (up to 75 % of the national income), an attempt was made to embrace up to 80-90 % of all production by material balances. There was delay in structural reorganization and economic reform.

Reforms did not touch the essence of economic mechanism. Country's leadership could not take notice due to ideological and political reasons, though scientists had warned of its latent dangers in 1920s. The bureaucratic economic management system tried to solve the problems by administrative measures: enlarging economic structures, including branches in larger complexes, creation of new committees and the ministries, toughening of control and measures of punishment, etc. The system that showed high dynamism at early stages, later displayed tendencies of self-destruction. Efficiency level of management fell and effective management did not materialize in structure and direction of huge resources.

Various steps to increase independence of enterprises and broader use of material stimulus were taken. But economic tendencies in conditions of scientific and technological revolution and need for integration processes became more and more urgent: technical and technological level, competitiveness of production, dynamism of industrial system, a place in the global division of labor. The economic policy could not provide positive results of reforming the national economy. The trends of the first post-war decades, became more apparent in 1980s in the economy of Buryatia Republic. Many processes entered into the finishing phase of development.

The existent stage of industrialization aggravated the contradictions in the economic and political system.

References

1. A.G. Vishnevsky, *Sickle and Rouble: Conservative Modernization in the USSR*. Moscow, 1998. p.56.
2. *Ibid*, p. 57.

Social Changes in Buryatia in the post-Soviet Period

Konstantin.B. Mitupov

The existence of different status, role, attitudes, norms and values, institutions, groups, organizations, and interests that are spread around multiple layers in the society calls for clarification and revision of the social structure concepts. A society being complex and multi-dimensional, that includes multiplicity of components and elements needs to be analysed as such. Besides, the modern social structure being prone to social conflicts determined by varying interests and values needs a thorough analysis of conflicts, contradictions and ambivalences.

Republic of Buryatia provides a successful case of polygon for the study of changes in social structures, main trends and patterns of social development applicable to other national regions in the Russian Federation, where the traditional and non-traditional are interwoven. During the transition period, in the Buryatia republic, the de-structurization of its social sphere was characteristic, as both the elements of old and new systems, the socialist, capitalist or post-socialist exerted mutual influences and mutual pressures. Social sphere cannot be equated with the economic, political and other spheres. It simply specifies the general directions of development. The peculiar is reflected in the form of social character, socio-economic relationships in the economy of the republic. The changes occurring in the social organization of a society are inevitable consequences of transformation of its economic structure.

Social structure today is characterized by extreme instability within social groups, among them and also at the level of the personal comprehension of his/her place within the social hierarchy. On the one hand, there is a process of "washing out" of traditional groups of population - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, civil servants and on the

other hand, new types of groups emerge according to their property holdings, level of autonomy and work of staff involved, their income, social prestige, inclusion into power structure, social and national self-identification.

Main trends that have surfaced during the development of social structure can be described as follows:

Working class in Buryatia has disintegrated into separate groups of people working on the state, joint-stock, private and other enterprises. A significant part of the working class turned into the marginal groups of permanent or temporarily unemployed, which in turn form the reserves of the criminal gangs. Ethnic composition of the unemployed people in general corresponds to the ethnic composition of the Republic: 70.3% are Russians, 26.9% Buryats, and rest being the representatives of other nationalities.

The *kolkhoz* peasantry has disintegrated, part of whom remained in the collective farms, which have changed in forms, while retaining their essence; some part went to the farming, some to the groups of small traders, the rest have joined the groups of lumpenised elements. Significant differentiation also took place among the republican intelligentsia, part of which layer moved to a new group and entrepreneurial structures.

Social structure reflects in full degree involvement of the "national" into general processes of interactions of tradition with modernisation, which in turn, is reflected in the social-professional structure of the population of Buryatia Republic. For an analysis of the social structure of Buryatia and finding her new components under the conditions of transitions the criteria of income, character of activities and educational level, are applied.

The main but also the most painful element of the social differentiation is the growing inequality in the property of groups and layers, which reflects the impact of the broad spectrum of economic, social and demographic factors. Due to these factors, inequality in property holdings also reflects upon many other social aspects, such as age, profession and field of activity. During the past few years, the sharp polarization between the poor and rich has taken place. Development of market relations destroyed the fragile balance that existed during the Soviet period.

The average monthly salary in 1998 was 980 Rubles, which was 2.4 times more than official minimum living costs (403 rubles), and was sufficient for survival in the conditions of economic crisis. In essence, the minimum living costs defined the level above poverty, comprising of

483,000 people or 46 per cent of the total population of the Republic. Paradoxically, education and professional qualifications didn't improve the remuneration of labor, but on the contrary only reduced the same.

Modern stage of the development of a society is characterized by the existence of various technological modes of production. The requirements for the general education of their workers are different: the number of operations that do not require high school or professional education is still high. The all-Russian industry that sees Buryatia as a raw material appendage was totally interested in the sole aspect of timely supply of raw materials into the central regions of the country. Insufficient funding for modernization of industrial sphere during the Soviet period and specific peculiarities of scientific progress under conditions of the state property resulted in the significant number of workers getting involved in unskilled labor. In the Buryatia Republic, unqualified labor employed 4.2 per cent of all people working in the industrial sector in 1991. By 1997, this indicator increased to 5.8 per cent.

Increase in the number of people aged under 19, who have only elementary level of education, only helped to maintain this tendency. Currently 24 per cent of youth of similar age do not study anywhere. One can observe the decline of 18.7 per cent in the secondary level education in the age group 16-29 years, that do not study either. By 1 January 1997, it became 7.1 per cent of this age group. In the beginning of the 1990s, the major part of the workforce of the Republic, including the unemployed, started getting involved in various production activities: agricultural production and processing, retail sale and *chelnochestvo*, production of consumer goods, transportation and other services. By the end of 1990s, the number of people involved in private business increased by 3.7 times as compared to the beginning of this decade. However, imperfections of market, legislation and taxation system, tough and semi-criminal relations in entrepreneurial sphere, enormous interest rates on banking credits, corruption on the part of high profile bureaucrats have forced many entrepreneurs to wind up their activities having lost everything and to seek new spheres to match their skills or step into the shadow business. In 1999, in the Buryatia Republic there were more than 12,000 production, trade, financial and commercial private and joint companies, including 2,648 farms. All large and medium urban stock companies had multi-ethnic composition among their employees, mainly Russians and Buryats. In rural areas small private farms and enterprises differed in their ethnic composition.

Today the growing differentiation and complexity of social structure has increased social mobility leading to replacement of traditional symbols of prestige. At the same time, more and more importance is attached to even the minimum differences in rank or status within each social stratum. All this promotes social mimicry – acquisition of the image that is the most desirable and effective in each particular situation. The youth have greater opportunities in these terms, which in contrast to the adult section of population, is not burdened by the "load of the past." The youth are possibly hoping to change the existing social structure and mode of life of the society in next ten years. Age balance acts mainly to support sustainability and equilibrium of the social relations, and to enable the social system as a whole or in parts to resist destructive factors, and for self-preservation in the face of internal and external factors of political, economic, cultural, psychological character.

Sectoral employment, in essence, is the mould of how educational change through the choice of professional activities, and application of own current or future labor, has reflected in the social-economic image of Buryatia. Agricultural specialization has come out among other things also as a means of retaining the Buryat people in their own territory.

The main characteristic feature of the modern social structure of the Buryatia Republic, as well as other national entities of Siberia, is the absence of the large middle class population that could guarantee stability and equilibrium in the society. Complex social systems go through self-reproduction and self-improvement. The last decade in Buryatia witnessed various social metamorphoses that were the result of post-*Perestroika* processes, economic and political reforms. Consequently, the main tendencies of the social dynamics in the Buryatia Republic are:

1. De-structurization of economy and serious changes in socio-professional structure (popularity of one type of occupation has fallen to the zero point, while others have acquired high demand).
2. Differentiation of population according to the income level, emergence of property polarization and impoverishment of general population.
3. The absence of a large middle class to guarantee stability. Increase of the influence in both economic and political spheres by the "middle" middle class, pioneers among which were traders-*chelnochniks*, businessmen. Strengthening of private construction companies, private transportation firms and services in the

economic arena.

4. The processes of further marginalization (large number of unemployed, people in search of employment, self-employed, poor) and Criminalization of population.
5. Five classes are functioning in the class structure of the Republic. While some of them are the legacy of the Soviet system, some are principally new: working class, peasantry, clerks, middle class, social marginals. The essence and characteristics of the "old" classes in the new circumstances have changed dramatically.

As one can see, the multidimensionality of the problem provides a broad research field for representatives of various social sciences—historians, sociologists, philosophers, specialists in cultural studies, ethnologists etc.

Relationship between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia in the era of Globalization

B. V. Bazarov

The bipolar world has ultimately disintegrated but a new multipolar world is still in the making. Its further development may, in principle, defy preservation or emergence of any particular state as a superpower. Quite the contrary, it presupposes the nation-state, racial-ethnic, socio-economic, socio-cultural, religious, political, and other forms of pluralism.

Processes of economic growth in East Asia and normalization of the Sino-Russian relations provide a brand new scheme of transformation processes and ways of further development for the Mongolian peoples. In Inner Mongolia the socio-economic processes have significantly intensified. With its large, strategically important auto border crossings, Inner Mongolia has gained its "second breath".

Volumes of economic aid from China in the recent years have surpassed the total investments of the socialist period by several times. The departure points of this economic growth were laid, first and foremost, in the development concept of China, which demanded leveling the development of the center and regions. Second, they lay in the open society policy, and third – in a new approach to the national question. This entire group of questions is united by the inner, utterly pragmatic integrity.

Having proclaimed the principle of "open policy" the leaders put a stake on the principles of the nation's vital interests, especially in the field of wealth accumulation and investment policy. However, the promotion of this policy has confronted a difficult obstacle. The problem is that out of 180 main export items 120 must pass through the territories of national minorities. Without entering a precarious dialogue with the national minorities having a colossal numerical advantage, China turned to a brand new scheme of national policy. With its large, strategically important auto

border crossings, Inner Mongolia has gained its "second breath".

As a result of modernization programs, the GDP of Inner Mongolia in 2004 reached 271 billion Yuan. Compared with the previous year the surplus was 20 per cent. Growth rates surpassed the all-China indicator, which was equal to 9.9 per cent, i.e., in the two recent years the autonomous region occupied the leading position in China. The indicators of 1947, when the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia had been created, were surpassed by 130 times, and in comparison with the pre-reform 1978 the indicators grew by 13 times.

Agriculture developed at a quick pace. The production of added value reached 51 billion Yuan, i.e., it grew by 14 per cent. The crops harvest reached 15 billion tons, i.e., it grew by 10.6 per cent. The cattle-breeding structure was rationally transformed and the ratio of cattle breeding in agriculture was 43 per cent. According to the cattle herd census data the total herd was 92.74 million heads, which constituted a 16.1 per cent surplus to the level of the previous year. Agriculture is the leading branch of economy of Inner Mongolia.

Industrial production is also dynamically developing. Besides a visible increase in the efficiency of production, the surplus of which reached 29 per cent, the industrial parks also developed rapidly. For example, complex works to process coal, mined by the Shenghua mining corporation were initiated and as a result the largest complex was launched. Such branches as road construction, transport, trade, food production, tourism have been developing at exceptionally rapid pace. Information services, furniture manufacturing, as well as dairy services are developing fast.

In accordance with the principle of decrease of the state share, ten most important enterprises were reorganized. Among them are the Energy Corporation of Inner Mongolia and coal-mining corporation "Huulin Gol". Works to discover the northern direction" are of utmost importance too. Direct foreign investments into the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia amounted to 600 million US$ and the surplus reached 60 per cent. In 2004 the gross foreign trade turnover of Inner Mongolia amounted to 4 billion 50 million US$. Export volume reached 1.68 billion US$. Border and port structures are being improved and in 2004 the transit capacity of goods reached 10 million tons, 6.5 million tons of goods passed through in 2004. About three million tourists passed through the borders of Inner Mongolia and in comparison with 2003 the surplus was 27 per cent.

Private sector acquired a considerable space for development. More then 25 per cent of the GDP of the Autonomous Region is produced in the

private sector. Taxes from private ventures in 40 of 101 administrative units of Inner Mongolia make up from 30 to 50 per cent of local taxes. Improvement of the production structure follows the rapid development of the private sector of economy. If in the near past the production units of the private sector engaged primarily in trading, foodstuff and services now they have expanded their activities, especially in the fields of agricultural products processing, communications, transport, ecological activity, energy, construction, and trade.

We witnessed a very interesting and exemplary process of emergence and instant growth of enterprises in Inner Mongolia. In 2000, following the expeditionary itinerary developed by our local hosts we visited a recently opened private diner "Fat lamb" in the town of Baotao. The most memorable thing was not the unusual name of the diner, quite unusual for the mentality of Mongols, but young and aspiring proprietors. We were back on our schedule by several hours, and when they understood that the food would lose its quality they did not hesitate to go out in the street and trade it to the first passer-by. Their activity matched the changing market conjuncture and their entrepreneurial talent gave a stunning result. Today the proprietors of that small diner opened a large chain of small private diners, spread all over China. Annual profits reach more than 2.5 billion Yuan and the taxes paid to the state are more than 80 million Yuan. Annually they process more than 30 thousand tons of mutton, which has an effect on the development of cattle-breeding, agriculture, processing branches and transport. It is a classical example of how the Chinese economy is developing today.

The "Mennu" dairy corporation developed approximately along the same lines. Its profits doubled from 5 billion Yuan in 2003 to 10 billion Yuan in 2004. Among that branch of industry the corporation occupied the second place in all of China. Unlike "Fat lamb" we were not at all sure about the prospects of success of this venture because we were not precisely informed about the place of dairy products in a Chinese ration. There was a misconception that dairy products are not well liked by the bulk of Chinese. There was even an opinion that the Chinese lacked necessary ferments to normally digest dairy products.

Among 60 most important economic units of the Autonomous Region, one may mention such private companies as "Dunda", specializing in Cashmere wool, "Chiangkung" specializing in manufacturing of gold and silver goods, scientific-technical company specializing in rare non-ferrous metals, which make up the spearhead of the private economy and are

becoming an important growth factor in the economy of Inner Mongolia.

The dynamic development of Inner Mongolia and its certain "overhanging" on Outer Mongolia could seemingly bring the latter into economic dependence from its great southern neighbor. However, this process has not yet acquired dynamic characteristics. Contrastingly, a certain degree of reciprocity emerged in the interaction of these two subjects. It is premature now to judge how quickly the rapprochement tendencies will progress, but there is an obvious geopolitical homogeneity, determined by common geomorphological and climatic features, economic management, ethnic and racial identity. Obviously, the rapprochement tendency is inevitable, if any additional political motives of disintegration do not emerge.

On its way to reforms, Mongolia demonstrated a surprising ability to maneuver in its foreign multi-vectored orientation. Its departure from the Soviet political model, followed by democratization process collisions did not lead to the emergence of a more stable and consistent model of development. But processes of sovereignty acquisition, rise of nationalism in the people's mentality as well as determination of national priorities were, undoubtedly, an achievement of the national-democratic idea. The country, which for decades had been a satellite of the former USSR, sandwiched between the two great neighbors – the USSR and China – and having no sources of self-sustained development managed to gain equal partnership in the international community. In addition, over the recent years Mongolia managed to restore the friendship and good neighborliness formula, albeit on a different political platform. Further trajectory of Mongolia's development will depend on the interaction between Russia and China.

As an "active subject of international relations" Mongolia continued to develop the multi-vectored policy built upon the principle of primacy of national interests. For the national policy doctrine such formula looked obscure and ponderous from the standpoint of its actual implementation. An idea that any direction of foreign policy has to have a foundation or an objective criterion and national interests of Mongolia should lie at their crossing point was meant under the notion "basis". Besides Russia and China, traditionally central to its foreign policy, all highly developed countries of the West and East were designated as the "bases". But the complexity lay in a fact that if the "bases" were political constants from the outside, their priority was always used as a variable. The presence of the developed countries' interests in Mongolia deformed the geopolitical

constant in Inner Asia, which has a peculiar crisscrossing of geographical, geomorphological, political, ethnic, cultural and historical characteristics.

First of all, attention is attracted to the growth of influence of the Western and Pacific "bases", which is referred to as "the third neighbor" in Mongolia. Mongolia intensified its interaction with the USA, Japan, Germany, France, and Turkey. It acquired membership of the World Bank and a variety of international foundations and unions. Already in 1990, being in a deep internal crisis, Mongolia agreed to the wish of the USA to become "the third neighbor" during the official visit of the US Secretary of State Joe Baker. This intention caused interest because it concerned political and economic dimensions and was targeted at leveling of the Mongolian-Russian and Sino-Mongolian relations with the help of a "third player". It should be remembered that for the first time since 1928 these countries got a chance to be present and to exert influence in the very heart of Eurasia, the strategic point of the largest continent on Earth. Inner Asia is presented by mainly territories, little attractive for life. It is a space of more than 4 million sq km including access to Tibet and Sinkiang. Yet this territory is a real divide of the world between East and Central Asia. It embraces East Asia with the Gobi desert and semi-arid Mongolian steppes, with a sharp turn into hard-to-inhabit mountain regions of Tian Shan and the Himalayas.

The new Constitution of Mongolia declared that, "…the country will have a diversified economy in accordance with the global tendency of the world economic development as well as specific peculiarities of our country." The essence of market reforms was in carrying out wide-scale measures to liberalize prices, privatize state property, and develop a private sector, as well as create new financial institutions, including a two-facet bank system, change the budget, tax, financial and credit policies and liberalize foreign trade. During the market reforms a new, more open economy was created. The significance of foreign economic ties was increased in the economic development of the country. The geography of foreign trade changed significantly. It became a more important factor in the process of structural changes in the country's economy. In 1991-1996 the legislative foundations of liberalization of foreign economic activity were created. In 1996 Mongolia became a member of the World Trade Organization. A further liberalization of the foreign economic activity of Mongolia continues in accordance with the norms of this organization.

Prior to 1990 the Mongolian economy was deeply integrated into the economy of the USSR. By the time of its collapse, the USSR's share in the

foreign trade of Mongolia constituted almost 80 per cent. In the course of transition to market economy a sharp re-orientation of the economic ties took place. From the markets of Russia and the former Socialist states the focus shifted to Western markets. Such a change in priorities seems quite natural because since the economic liberalization the foreign economic ties of Mongolia started to be determined by the geopolitical position of the country, its comparative advantages and emerging demand. At present, Mongolia maintains trade relations with 71 countries of the world. Its foreign trade turnover amounted to more than a billion US$ in 2006 including export. China leads in Mongolian export with 30 per cent, while Switzerland occupies the second position with 21 per cent, followed by Russia with 12 per cent, South Korea, Japan, etc. In the gross import volume Russia occupies the first place with 30 per cent, China – second place with 13 per cent, Japan follows with 12 per cent, South Korea (7.5), and Germany (5). As is seen from this data, China is one of the principal partners of Mongolia.

Mutual visits and meetings at different levels boosted further development of trade and economic relations between China and Mongolia. After 1990 more than 25,000 ventures and organizations with foreign capital were registered in Mongolia. One third of them are ventures with Chinese investments. Nowadays, China occupies one of the prime positions in Mongolia in direct investments. Chinese investments into Mongolian economy have significantly increased. Besides, the volumes of humanitarian aid and interest-free credits from China also increased. In 2006 for the first time since1990 China pushed out Japan, Mongolia's traditional economic partner, from the leading position in humanitarian aid and interest-free credits.

Border trade plays a special role in the economic relations between China and Mongolia. The total length of the Mongolian-Chinese border equals 4,676.8 km. Eight Mongolian *aimaks* are situated along the borderline with China. Border trade goes through 10 border crossing points. From the Chinese side the leading role in border trade belongs to the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. The volume of foreign trade between Mongolia and Inner Mongolia in the recent years increased from 50-80 million US$ in 1999 to almost 400 million US dollars in 2006. There is a tendency towards a significant increase of these volumes in the near future. These numbers are slightly smaller than the gross trade volume with Russia and the CIS. Both sides acknowledge the fact that there are many unsolved problems in the foreign trade issue. In particular, this concerns the

improvement of border trade posts, increase of their capacity, intensification of control over quality of goods and foodstuffs, improvement of financial transactions system, etc.

Interactions in the transport sector also contribute to the development of trade and economic partnership. Passenger and cargo transit regulations, cooperation between border stations of Mongolia and China is regulated by a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Among them are: the bilateral agreement on cooperation between trans-border railroad organizations of Mongolia and China (1956); Agreement on international passenger transportation; Agreement on the cargo railroad carriages for international cargo transportation. In 1991 a special Sino-Mongolian agreement was concluded, according to which Mongolia uses a cargo terminal in Tianzin seaport for cargo operations.

In the middle of 1999 the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin visited Mongolia on invitation from President of Mongolia N. Bagabandi. At the end of the same year Mongolian Prime Minister R. Amarjargala was in China on a business trip. These visits were an important step in the process of broadening all-round cooperation. Agreements on the expansion of trade and economic partnership, e.g. an agreement on the Chinese gratuitous aid of 30 million Yuan, an agreement on intensive use of the Beijing-Ulanbaatar-Moscow railroad, on an increase in the number of Mongolian students at Chinese universities, on Chinese tariffs on medical assistance to Mongolian citizens in China, as well as on shipments of petrochemicals from China to Mongolia. It should be mentioned that for more than 70 years Mongolia purchased petrochemicals exclusively from Russia. Since 1999 Mongolia actively imports gasoline and fuel from China.

Thus, Russia, Mongolia and China are intensifying their economic and political interaction. The trans-border area between Russia's Siberia and the Far East, Mongolia, and border provinces of China is turning into a prospective zone of world economy. The growing activity in these relatively quiet regions distant from the world economic centers gives a chance to found new powerful economic hubs, situated along the almost 10,000 km long Sino-Russo-Mongolian border. The process of relieving tensions between China and Mongolia through objectively developing economic process in Inner Mongolia becomes a peculiar prologue in the new type of relationships between the countries, the union of which may provide new determinants in Eurasian geopolitics.

Favorable development of these centers is able to actively transform

zones of Russian Far East and Inner Asia, which remain in the condition of post-socialist stagnation. Therefore, it is important to have forecast scenarios of socio-economic and political interaction in this space taking into account vital interests of the state, geopolitical divisions of influence zones and national security in all its structural components. The objective course of historical development will bring Russia and China to the necessity to establish a more sustainable economic interaction and a deeper harmony of relations. It is necessary to notice that this process is not going to be fast, but its objective inevitability is clear. A retrospective look at the international interaction in East and Central Asia in the conditions of a frontier zone shows that there are no obstacles to strengthening of further dialogue other than the sheer unpreparedness of Russia for the rapid development of events in this direction. The scientist's task is to provide more precise forecasts of this interaction and calculate not only possible ways, but also stages of the move. This is essential for the right calculation of harmonious development in the period of transformation of the world community.

HRCF File

Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India Report of Exhibition and Seminar (3-4 October 2007)

The Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation organised an Exhibition and Seminar on ***Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India*** at the Hungarian Information and Culture Centre, New Delhi on 3-4 October 2007. This event was organised in collaboration with the Hungarian Culture Centre, New Delhi and Hungarian Geographical Museum, Erd, Hungary. This function was organised to recall and record the rich and varied contribution of Hungarian scholars, academics, explorers and artists in the field of Indology and Oriental Studies.

Among the notable participants were Dr. Istvan Huller, Minister of Education and Culture, Hungary; Dr. Geza Palmai, Ambassador of Hungary in India; Dr. Janos Kubassek, Director, Hungarian Geographical Museum; Dr. Imre Lazar, Director, Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, New Delhi; Prof. Lokesh Chandra, Prof. K. Warikoo, Prof. Ashok Mathur, Dr. Margit Koves, Dr. Binay Sahay, Mr. Vivan Sundaram, and a galaxy of diplomats, literary and art critics and cultural personalities.

In his welcome remarks, Dr. Imre Lazar dwelt upon the contribution of Hungarian scholars like Alexander Csoma de Koros, Ervin Baktay, Prof. G. Germenus, Dr. J.M. Honigberger, Odon Jakabos, G.V. Leitner, Prof. L. Loczy, Aurel Stein, K. Ujfalvy and others in the field of Himalayan Studies and Indology. The works and contribution of these Hungarian scholars, travellers and artists not only represent an important bridge between Hungary, Europe and India but also help in enhancing the understanding of India and its people in Europe. Dr. Lazar thanked the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation and its Secretary General, Prof. K. Warikoo, for his tireless efforts in developing Himalayan and Central Asian Studies in India and for its publication of Berczenczey's book on ***Adventures in Central Asia***.

Prof. Warikoo in his remarks introduced the work of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation and its journal *Himalayan and Central*

Asian Studies, before the distinguished gathering. He thanked the Hungarian Geographical Museum and Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, New Delhi for their collaboration with the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation in organising this elaborate cultural exhibition and seminar.

Dr. Istvan Hiller, Minister of Education and Culture in his inaugural address highlighted the strong and deep interest in Hungary about India, its people and culture, which is evinced by the numerous Hungarian scholars and explorers who spent their lifetime travelling in India and writing about Indian people and culture. He stated that this exhibition not only brings to light their contribution at one place but also immortalises the same. Dr. Hiller released the two publications L. Berzenczey's ***Adventures in Central Asia*** (edited by P.J. Marczell and published by Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation) and ***Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India*** (edited by Dr. Imre Lazar) and jointly brought out by Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, Hungarian Geographical Museum and Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation.



Seated on the left are Dr. Janos Kubassek, Director, Hungarian Geographical Museum; Dr. Imre Lazar, Director, Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, New Delhi; Dr. Istvan Hiller, Minister of Education and Culture, Hungary; Dr. Geza Palmai, Ambassador of Hungary in India; and Prof. K. Warikoo

Prof. K. Warikoo presented a paper titled ***Great Game in Central Asia:***

Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India

The Exhibition was prepared and arranged by

Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre,
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary, New Delhi

Hungarian Geographical Museum, Érd

Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation,
New Delhi

Curated by
Dr. Imre Lázár, Director, HICC
Dr. János Kubassek, Director, HGM

Text by
Dr. János Kubassek, Dr. Imre Lázár, Edit Lendvainé Tímár

Photographs of the Exhibition and
of the Catalogue are from the
Archives of the Hungarian Geographical Museum, Érd,
Documentation Department,
Ferenc Hopp Museum of Eastern Asiatic Arts, Budapest,
Library of the Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, New Delhi

Selected by
Edit Lendvainé Tímár, Katalin Puskás, Dr. Imre Lázár

Supported by
Ministry of Education and Culture, Republic of Hungary
Balassi Institute, Budapest

View of the Audience

A Section of the Audience

Dr. Istvan Hiller, Minister of Education and Culture, Hungary delivering his Inaugural Address



Prof. K. Warikoo making his speech



Dr. Lokesh Chandra speaking



Prof. K. Warikoo presiding at the Seminar

Berzenczey's Experiences *at the Seminar on* ***Hungarian Explorers and Travellers in India*** *organised by Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre, New Delhi on 4th October 2007. The text of his speech is reproduced below:*

"By early nineteenth century both Britain and Russia had emerged as the most powerful States in Asia. Exercising control over vast territorial empires in Asia, both these powers were separated from each other by weak and unstable Khanates of Central Asia. The 'Great Game' was a result of the convergence of the Anglo-Russian imperialist interests persued by both the powers in Central Asia, from two opposite directions. Whereas Britain was scared of the unchecked growth of Russian power in Asia which would undermine the British power and prestige in India, Russia felt tempted to restrain the hostile British moves in Europe by playing up the Russian threat to India. So during the first half of the nineteenth century Britain was busy exploring the means to prevent the absorption of the intervening Central Asian Khanates into Russia. It also sought to extend commercial activities in the area with the hope of supplanting Russian infuence there and creating a friendly buffer between the two empires. Both these powers viewed Central Asia as a land of promise which could assimilate their manufactured goods and supply in return raw materials like cotton, silk and wool. The activities of British officers like Moorcroft, Burnes, Connolly, Abbott and Shakespeare in Central Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century only helped in activising the Russian forward policy towards Central Asia.

Even after the incorporation of the Central Asian Khanates in the Russian empire, the British continued to send experienced officers on reconnaissance and diplomatic missions to this area. In doing so their modus operandi was not dissimilar to that adopted by Tsarist Russia. Thus Valiknanov and Robert Shaw went as traders to Eastern Turkestan to test its commercial and political climate. Ignatyev, Kuropatkin, Forsyth and Younghusband went on official diplomatic missions. Similarly Grombchevsky of Russia met his British counterpart in the person of Younghusband in Hunza. Once Russia had gained total control over Western Turkestan, Britain geared up its machinery to carve out a friendly buffer in Eastern Turkestan. Britain's fear of a possible Russian expansion towards Kashgaria led it to follow a policy of appeasement towards both Yakoob Beg in 1870s and subsequently the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang.

The travelogues of Russian and British explorers, political agents and missionaries have been quite helpful in understanding the contemporaneous situation in Central Asia and also the dynamics of 'Great

Game'. It is in this context that the relatively unknown travelogue by the Hungarian traveller L. Berzenczey is an important addition to the accounts already available. Berzenczey holds the distinction of being the only European of his time for having travelled in 1873-74 all the way from Europe through Russia, Siberia to Central Asia, Kashgaria and over the Karakoram into Ladakh, Himalayas and onwards upto Bombay.

His visit to Kashgar coincided with that of the British mission led by Thomas Douglas Forsyth, who did not like Berzenczey's presence in Central Asia. Berzenczey, who was 54 years old at the time, wrote his travelogue which was published in *The Times of India*, Bombay in ten instalments. He had a perceptive eye and wrote about his experiences in a lively and readable style. Born in the year 1820 in Transylvania, Berzenczey joined the Transylvanian liberal movement in 1842. And he was elected to represent the country of Morozszek in the Parliament (*dieta*) of Kolozsvar, where he became known for his speeches. He advocated the abolition of serfdom and unification of Tasnsylvania and Hungary under one government.

Berzenczey decided to travel to Asia in search of the Hungarian's ancestral homeland. He had some notions about the Hungarians originating from Dzungaria. Influenced and inspired by Csoma de Koros, Berzenczey persued his idea of locating the homeland of Hungarians. His thought of travelling to Dzungaria took further shape, when he heard about a book written by a French Catholic missionary E.R. Huc in 1850 about the *Recollections of a Journey though Tactory Thibet and China during 1844-46*. In 1873, he started his journey to Kashgar to meet the local Amir, Yakub Beg, to secure the chief's assent to travel in Urumchi and beyond towards lake Kuku Nor (now Xining, Qinghai Province of China). In May 1873, he secured the letter of recommendation from St. Petersburg and reached Nijni Novgorod and then spent some time in Siberia. The Governor General of Turkestan, Kuropatkin allowed him to continue his journey to Kashgar, Naryn and onwards. When he reached Kashgar in March 1874, he encountered numerous problems in Kashgar, where he was first suspected as a Russian spy. Berzenczey sought to offset these problems by contacting T.D. Forsyth, head of the British delegation which was exploring the possibility of extending British commerce in Kashgaria. On account of the European solidarity, Forsyth did intercede with Yakub Beg stating that Berzenczey was not a Russian spy, which enabled him to leave Kashgaria for India through Karakoram and Ladakh.

That Berzenczey was travelling in Kashgaria on his own accord,

unlike his British contemporary T.D. Forsyth who was on an official mission, makes this Hungarian travel account an important input to understand the dynamics of the political situation in Central Asia at the height of 'Great Game'. He had no official colonial interests or ambition and he was outspoken in writing about what he saw and experienced. Berzenczey earned the distinction of having travelled not only from St. Petersburg to Kashgar but also from Kashgar through Ladakh to Bombay. As such, he had become familiar with the Russian, Central Asian and British way of dealings in the heart of Asia".

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES is a quarterly Journal published by the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, which is a non-governmental, non-profit research, cultural and development facilitative organisation. The Journal is devoted to the study of various issues pertaining to the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture, language and literature, demography, social structures, communication, tourism, regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc.

While the principal concern of the Journal will be on its focal area, i.e., from Afghanistan to Mayanmar including the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, China, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan and the Indian Himalayan States of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttaranchal and North East states; papers with a broad sweep addressing environmental, social, cultural, economic, geopolitical and human rights issues are also welcomed.

The objective is to make a scientific appraisal of the issues confronting the Himalayan and adjoining region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, and to make specific policy oriented studies and need based recommendations as the means to promote the human, educational and economic advancement of the peoples of the region besides preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage. Promotion of human rights, social justice, peace, harmony and national integration are the other key areas in which the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has been active.

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PUBLICATION AND ANY ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO :

Prof. K. WARIKOO
Editor and Secretary General
Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation
B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave
New Delhi - 110029 (India)
Tel. : 0091-11-26742763, 0091-11-41651969
Fax : 0091-11-26742843
E-mail: **kwarikoo@gmail.com**
Books for review should be sent to the same address.

Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers R.No. 67256/97

HRCF PUBLICATIONS

Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1994. 73pp.)

Society and Culture in the Himalayas
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 316pp.)

Central Asia : Emerging New Order
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 352pp.)

Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh : Linguistic Predicament
Edited by P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1996. 224pp.)

Artisan of the Paradise : A Study of Art and Artisans of Kashmir
By D.N. Dhar (New Delhi, 1999. 230pp.)

Gujjars of Jammu and Kashmir
Edited by K. Warikoo (Bhopal, 2001. 317pp.)

Bamiyan: Challenge to World Heritage
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xviii, 313pp. 61plates)

The Afghanistan Crisis : Issues and Perspectives
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xxvi, 523pp.)

Mongolia-India Relations
By O. Nyamdavaa (New Delhi, 2003. 228pp.)

Child Labour Rehabilitation in India
Edited by B. Zutshi and M. Dutta (New Delhi, 2003. 257pp.)

Mongolia-China Relations
By Sharad K. Soni (New Delhi, 2006. xix, 328pp.)

Afghanistan: The Challenge
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2007, 377pp.)

Drugs Production and Trafficking in Afghanistan
By Deepali Gaur Singh (New Delhi, 2007, 380pp.)

Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities (Set of 3 vols.)
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2007)

L. Berzenczey, Adventures in Central Asia: A Hungarian in the Great Game
Edited by P.J. Marczell (New Delhi, 2007)

HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION
Central Office : B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029 (India)
Tele : 0091-11-26742763, 0091-11-41651969, Fax : 0091-11-26742843
E-mail: **kwarikoo@gmail.com** Website: **www.himalayanresearch.org**